The Trump Transition Could Give Us Clues on His Plans for Ukraine and the Middle East

By electing Donald Trump president for the second time and handing his Republican Party a majority in the Senate, US voters have given a ringing endorsement to his vision to “Make America Great Again”. This is a movement that, among other things, combines transactionalism with a continued commitment to project Washington’s primacy on the global stage.

With the incoming administration not due to take over from the current administration of President Joe Biden until January 20, the Trump team will use the intervening period to pick a cabinet and fill key positions inside the White House.

Cabinet appointments, including those who will lead the State, Defence and Justice departments as well as the National Security Council, are likely to be people Mr Trump views to be loyal not just to himself but to his “Maga” vision. It is notable, therefore, that the president-elect on Saturday announced that neither Mike Pompeo nor Nikki Haley, who served as secretary of state and US ambassador to the UN during his first term and are known to be more traditional conservatives when it comes to foreign policy, will not be picked this time.

It will be just as interesting to see how much involvement Elon Musk will have in the new administration. Some US media outlets have speculated that the tech billionaire could become an unofficial partner to his friend, vice president-elect JD Vance, by taking on new roles related to government efficiency and artificial intelligence.

Prospective candidates for the various positions will have the opportunity, albeit unofficially, to showcase their capabilities by presenting ideas, positions and policy roadmaps.

Over the next two months, the transition team will determine the incoming administration’s approach to key focus areas, such as economic policy and foreign affairs. It will also be tasked with preparing a menu of options for the president-elect and his team to consider once in power. Discussions on various issues and policy positions with conservative think tanks may already be under way.

This period could test Mr Trump’s patience. Will he begin articulating his strategies in public on, say, possible tariffs against China or the EU, while the Biden team is still in office? It will be prudent for him not to do so.

When the president-elect eventually moves into the White House, his two big foreign policy agendas are likely to pertain to Russia’s war in Ukraine and Israel’s wars in Gaza and Lebanon.

Mr Trump has hinted at the possibility of talking to Russian President Vladimir Putin sooner rather than later. The American leader’s approach to ending the war in Ukraine is likely to be to call for a cessation of hostilities, with a potential deal to follow that might outline the resolution of the conflict and a path to mending relations between Washington and Moscow.

The logic here is that if Mr Putin rejects Mr Trump’s insistence on freezing the war, the latter can present himself as having genuinely tried to broker peace while the former may end up looking like the obstructionist.

The idea of securing an armistice without discussing borders or who controls specific territories, and without conditions for negotiations, are unlikely to be welcomed by either the Russian or the Ukrainian leaderships. It’s an unfavourable option for both countries. But it is important to note that a former adviser to Mr Trump, Bryan Lanza, has said that the incoming administration might focus on achieving peace rather than supporting Kyiv’s aim to recover territory occupied by Moscow.

If a deal does emerge, the next steps after freezing the war would involve creating demilitarised zones, sending multinational troops into the corridor between the two sides, and indefinitely postponing Ukraine’s Nato membership.

Mr Trump might take a less proactive approach to try to restore peace in the Middle East. For starters, he is likely to not focus on the issue until after his inauguration in January. In other words, he will probably leave it in Mr Biden’s hands without weighing in.

Another policy direction concerns Iran. Mr Trump’s message to Tehran will be clear: either co-operate on its nuclear weapons programme and halt its proxy wars in the region or face even more tightening economic sanctions and international isolation.

The transition team will also be aware that relations with the Gulf countries must be a priority for several reasons: security, economic interests and fulfilling Mr Trump’s ambition to secure the “deal of the century” between the Arab world and Israel. Such an agreement will, however, require Israel agreeing to the establishment of a Palestinian state.

In any case, Israel will continue to receive full support from the current and incoming administrations in its efforts to achieve its stated “objectives”, including the destruction of the military infrastructure of both Hamas and Hezbollah. After all, America’s strategic alliance with Israel remains a constant, regardless of which party is in power.

While that much is clear, there is much else that isn’t. And so, even as Americans heave a collective sigh of relief that the outcome of the election was decisive, the rest of the world holds its breath to see what is to follow in its wake.