Kataeb Lawmaker Selim Sayegh emphasized that Hezbollah must reclaim its Lebanese decision-making authority and recognize that it is no longer an armed party.

He warned against repeating past behavior, such as circumventing and hollowing out the essence of UNSC Resolution 1701, issued in 2006.

"This resolution, which is effectively no longer operational, was reduced to a mere cover for Hezbollah’s armed agenda," Sayegh said in an interview with Lebanon24.

Before rushing into promised reforms or reconsidering ineffective aspects of the political system, Sayegh stressed the need to assess Hezbollah’s seriousness about transforming into a political party akin to others.

He noted that Hezbollah harbors concerns that, as experience has shown, it cannot resolve on its own.

"Addressing these concerns, along with those of other components of the Lebanese fabric, requires a return to a state of citizenship—the only genuine guarantor of individual and collective rights as enshrined in the Taif Agreement and the Constitution. This includes the implementation of administrative decentralization, as outlined in the Taif Agreement, through parliamentary action, with adjustments made as needed based on experience" Sayegh explained.

The Kataeb Lawmaker expressed concern that Hezbollah's rigidity might escalate extremism in Lebanon, especially as regional shifts have upended past checks and balances, potentially leading to uncontrollable chaos.

With the announcement of a ceasefire in Lebanon, many of Hezbollah’s opponents concluded that the era of electing a president whose primary role was to safeguard the resistance is over.

Likewise, the practice of forming governments paralyzed by the party and its allies through a blocking third (or veto power) has come to an end. This is particularly significant as the Doha Accord had granted Hezbollah political leverage, allowing it to obstruct decisions it opposed.

In this regard, Sayegh clarified: “The Doha Accord never explicitly endorsed a blocking third. Instead, it affirmed the principle of consensual governance, rooted in constitutional legitimacy and the spirit of inclusivity in decision-making. The agreement did not establish a majority-minority dynamic; otherwise, the formation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri's government would not have been delayed by six months.”

He added, “Even if we hypothetically accept that the agreement implied otherwise, the profound changes in Lebanon today necessitate salvation through a strict return to the Constitution without introducing new interpretations.”

He also pointed to the need for a comprehensive defense strategy—one that protects Lebanon holistically.

Such a strategy, he explained, extends beyond military and security measures to include economic stability, social safety nets, a robust business environment, the establishment of independent judiciary systems, and a foreign policy that shields Lebanon rather than exposes it.

Sayegh argued that Lebanon’s neutrality provides reassurance for all, ensuring that no group can dominate others by leveraging shifts in regional or international power dynamics.

“We aspire for every citizen to feel that no one can rely on external support to impose their influence domestically,” he stated.

Sayegh underscored that Lebanon's neutral stance has remained consistent, whether during the peak of the resistance axis’s strength or its current decline.

“Isn’t neutrality,” he concluded, “better than all forms of tutelage, offering Lebanon an unparalleled immunity and invincibility?”