An estimated 307 villages make up southern Lebanon, stretching across the South and Nabatiyeh governorates and spread over the districts of Sidon, Tyre, Jezzine, Nabatiyeh, Bint Jbeil, Marjeyoun and Hasbaya, according to a report by the Al-Modon news portal.

Among them, 55 villages are under direct military occupation, while Israel says it controls 68 villages. A further 58 villages have been largely emptied following Israeli threats and evacuation warnings, forming what the Israeli military refers to as the “yellow line.”

Border strip villages under occupation

Villages along the border strip and second line currently under direct military control include Naqoura, Alma al-Shaab, Dhayra, Tayr Harfa, Jibbayn, Bustan, Marwahin, Shihin, Umm al-Tout, Yarine, Zalloutiyeh, Batishiyeh, Aita al-Shaab, Ramiyeh, Qawzah, Debel, Beit Lif, Bint Jbeil, Maroun al-Ras, Yaroun, Blida, Rab Thalathine, Adaisseh, Kfar Kila, Houla, Mays al-Jabal, and Markaba.

Villages under evacuation warnings

Following the ceasefire, dozens of villages have been placed under evacuation warnings:

Nabatiyeh district (25 villages north of the Litani River)

Kfar Tebnit, Zawtar al-Sharqiyeh, Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh, Arnoun, Yohmor, Choukine, Mifdoun, Nabatiyeh al-Fawqa, Habboush, Deir al-Zahrani, Houmine al-Fawqa, Arabsalim, Harouf, Aba, Jibchit, Adshit, Qaquaiyat al-Jisr, Breqaa, Kfar Sir, Toul, Kfar Jouz, Qsaibeh, Doueir, and Sharqiyah.

Bint Jbeil district (16 villages)

Ghandouriyeh, Burj Qallawiyah, Jmaijmeh, Safad al-Battikh, Qallawiyah, Braachit, Shaqra, Ayta al-Jabal, Tebnine, Sultaniyeh, Bir al-Salasil, Deir Kifa, Kherbet Selm, Kfar Dounin, Selaa, and Srifa.

Marjeyoun district (2 villages)

Sawaneh and Ain Arab.

Tyre district (15 villages)

Samaiyeh, Hanniyeh, Qlaileh, Wadi Jilo, al-Kneisseh, Kafra, Majdal Zoun, Siddiqine, Majadel, Arzoun, Hmiri, Maaroub, Qana, Shehour, and Srifa.

The pattern means that roughly one-third of southern Lebanon’s villages are now either occupied, threatened, or evacuated, underscoring a shift that goes beyond immediate military developments and points to longer-term strategic positioning.

A widening battlefield pattern

What is unfolding across these 58 evacuated or threatened villages—north and south of the Litani River—appears less like a series of isolated operations and more like a structured campaign to “empty the land” ahead of sustained control on the ground.

The geography involved spans three main districts—Nabatiyeh, Bint Jbeil, and Tyre—with a smaller extension into Marjeyoun. Analysts describe this configuration as a “pressure belt” running parallel to the border and gradually extending inward.

Strategic layering of terrain

The targeted villages are distributed across distinct but interconnected terrain:

North of the Litani in Nabatiyeh, villages such as Kfar Tebnit, Habboush, and Nabatiyeh al-Fawqa sit on internal road networks linking the south with the Bekaa Valley and deeper inland routes.

In Bint Jbeil, elevated towns including Tebnine, Shaqra, and Braachit overlook wide valleys and historically serve as key movement corridors.

In Tyre, Qlayleh, Hanniyeh, and Wadi Jilo lie along open coastal approaches that allow movement toward the interior.

Marjeyoun forms an eastern extension linking these sectors together.

Taken together, the layout suggests a focus not only on border villages but on successive geographic layers, from frontline areas to hills and then deeper inland positions.

Depopulation as a tactical tool

Evacuation warnings have resulted in widespread civilian displacement. On the ground, this serves multiple operational purposes.

First, it removes the civilian presence, allowing for heavier use of force with fewer constraints. Second, it eliminates concealment in populated areas, which otherwise complicates targeting and movement. Third, it transforms villages into open operational zones that can be monitored and controlled more easily.

In this context, depopulation is not a consequence of military activity but a prerequisite for it.

Controlling movement corridors

A closer examination of the villages shows they are not random residential clusters but key geographic nodes.

In Nabatiyeh, towns such as Kfar Tebnit, Habboush, and Nabatiyeh al-Fawqa sit on road networks linking the southern border region with inland Lebanon.

In Bint Jbeil, Tebnine, Shaqra, and surrounding highlands dominate surrounding valleys and control historic inland routes.

In Tyre, coastal villages such as Qlaileh and Hanniyeh sit along accessible corridors that can serve as routes toward deeper territory.

The underlying objective, analysts say, is not simply territorial control of villages but command over mobility networks—roads, hills, and natural corridors.

An emerging undeclared buffer zone

Despite the formal existence of a ceasefire, developments on the ground suggest the gradual formation of an undeclared buffer zone that may extend beyond the internationally recognized border.

The evacuation of more than 50 villages has effectively created a depopulated belt, even if it has not been formally designated as such.

This zone offers several advantages: limiting proximity to the border, improving surveillance and targeting capabilities, and establishing facts on the ground that may be difficult to reverse in future negotiations.

Maneuver-based advances

Field reporting suggests that recent operations rely less on direct frontal assaults and more on layered maneuvering.

The pattern includes flanking movements through interior routes, securing elevated positions first, and then advancing downward into villages. This approach reduces exposure and allows forces to operate from dominant high ground.

Notably, many of the targeted villages lie north of the Litani River, outside what was traditionally considered the immediate combat zone. This indicates both an expansion of operational depth and a shift of pressure further inland.

Long-term implications

Taken together, the developments point to several possible strategic outcomes: the establishment of a deeper security belt, the systematic removal of infrastructure that could support military use, the creation of a new geographic reality ahead of any future negotiations, and the transformation of populated villages into controlled or monitored zones.

The scale and pattern of displacement and control have raised concerns about long-term consequences for southern Lebanon. Reconstruction, if and when it begins, is expected to take years, and many villages may not return to their previous form.

What is unfolding, observers say, appears to go beyond a temporary military phase. Instead, it reflects a broader reshaping of the region’s geography and security landscape under complex regional and international conditions.

The 58 villages are not isolated cases but part of a connected system. Once emptied and controlled, they form a continuous belt of surveillance and separation.

For many in southern Lebanon, this raises the prospect of a profound and lasting rupture; one that could redefine the region for years to come, even if active hostilities eventually subside.