On October 8, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu urged the Lebanese people to rise up against Hezbollah, giving them a stark choice: “Stand up and take your country,” he said, “before it falls into the abyss of a long war that will lead to destruction and suffering like we see in Gaza.”

Shortly before Netanyahu spoke, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had visited Lebanon in an effort to shore up Hezbollah’s morale. In the week since Israel began its full assault in late September, the group’s leadership and rank and file had been decimated by successive military operations. Thousands of Lebanese had been killed or injured and more than a million had been displaced by Israel’s heavy bombardment, including in Beirut itself, and the country’s politicians were pushing for a cease-fire. But Araghchi’s visit seemed to have scuttled those efforts. A few weeks later, Iran’s speaker of Parliament, Mohammad Galibaf, declared in an interview with the French press that Iran would negotiate with France on behalf of Lebanon for a cease-fire. Hezbollah is Iran’s protégé, and it is the most powerful actor within Lebanon—more powerful than Lebanon’s own armed forces. Both Araghchi and Galibaf made clear that the fighting would not end until Iran said so.

Netanyahu’s speech and Araghchi’s visit highlighted just how much Lebanon had become the center of the proxy war between Iran and Israel. It is the place where the two countries are most outwardly tussling over the Middle East’s regional order. Lebanon’s role in their fight has, accordingly, received substantial international attention.

But overlooked is the effect that this conflict will have on the future of Lebanon itself. The war has come to the country at perhaps the worst possible moment. Lebanon is experiencing a political deadlock that has prevented the election of a new president. Its internal security forces are now so weak that communities and people have turned to private self-protection services, often affiliated with key political parties. The state is still dealing with the aftermath of the 2020 Beirut port explosion, considered by international organizations—including Human Rights Watch—to be one of the most powerful non-nuclear explosions of all time. The country is in the midst of a five-year economic and financial crisis that has wiped out its middle class and sent poverty rates skyrocketing, from 12 percent in 2012 to 44 percent in 2022 (the most recent year for which there is data).

Critically, the power-sharing system through which Lebanon is governed means that the state is also highly fractured along sectarian lines, with political parties representing different communities. The fighting with Israelis worsened these divisions. The massive destruction and suffering could, in time, turn the country’s Sunni and Christian populations against its Shiite Muslims, who make up about a third of the population and are Hezbollah’s base of support. It is also unsettling Lebanon’s domestic political balance. Lebanese people and parties that have long resented Hezbollah’s hegemony are sensing a unique opportunity to reshape Lebanon’s political dynamics more in their favor.

For Lebanon, this makes for a dangerous moment. The country’s factions have a history of settling their differences through violence, as the terrible 15-year Lebanese civil war attests. But the country can avoid a new outburst of civil unrest if its factions, Hezbollah included, initiate a national dialogue that advances a path forward and an inclusive vision for the country. If nothing else, these groups should all share an interest in stabilizing their country’s institutions. And they need support from the international community—in part to stop Israel’s brutal attacks.

PERFECT STORM

Israel and Hezbollah have been fighting since October 2023, when Hezbollah attacked the country in support of Gaza (as did other groups aligned with Hamas). But for most of the last year, these skirmishes were limited, consisting mostly of targeted assassinations by Israel of Hezbollah members and aerial bombardments of the group’s weapons depots and other Hezbollah-affiliated positions. Hezbollah, in turn, lobbed missiles across Israel’s border with Lebanon. Around 430 members of Hezbollah were killed during this period along with scores of ordinary Lebanese civilians, including three journalists. Some 60,000 residents of northern Israel were forced to flee the area. In Lebanon, around 90,000 residents fled Israeli bombardments of towns and villages.

But after 11 months, the fighting transformed into an all-out war, as Hezbollah’s bet on maintaining a limited conflict failed. The switch happened quickly, with a shocking series of operations on September 17 that culminated in the assassination of Hezbollah’s senior military leadership, followed by the September 27 killing of the group’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah. (Days later, Israel also killed his presumed successor, Hashem Safieddine.) Israel launched a mass campaign of countrywide aerial bombardments. It moved soldiers to its north. And on October 1, it initiated a ground invasion into Lebanese territory.

Israel’s attacks have had devastating consequences. Over the past month, densely populated and predominantly Shiite residential neighborhoods in Beirut’s southern suburbs have been repeatedly bombed. Roughly 100,000 housing units have been partially or fully destroyed, and an estimated 37 towns and villages in South Lebanon have been reduced to rubble through constant bombings. Israel has used white phosphorus, a highly flammable chemical that ignites upon contact with oxygen, in violation of international law, devastating the area’s environment and agricultural land. Beirut’s Chamber of commerce estimates that Lebanon’s GDP will contract by around nine percent this year, and the World Bank estimates that the country’s direct economic losses (including the cost of physical damage) amount to $8.5 billion. Around 166,000 individuals have lost their jobs. As of November 18, close to 3,481 people have been killed and 14,786 have been injured. Around 1.2 million people, or 20 percent of Lebanon’s population, were displaced in the space of four days, triggering an overwhelming humanitarian crisis. Only 19 percent of these displaced people are living in government-funded shelters. Everyone else is renting, staying with family or friends, supported by nongovernmental organizations, or sleeping on the streets. Given the scale of the destruction, most of these people will not be able to go home at the end of the conflict and will likely remain in limbo for years, creating additional pressure on Lebanon’s infrastructure, host communities, and overall resources.

On October 29, the Israeli army announced that it had achieved its military goals in Lebanon. And yet it has not withdrawn, because Israel’s war objectives seem to have changed. Israel’s original reason for invading Lebanon was to allow displaced Israeli citizens to go home. And now, instead of simply wanting its residents to return, Netanyahu is promising a new regional order: to change “the strategic reality in the Middle East,” as he put it at the end of October. To do so, Israel wants to break the Iranian regime’s network of allies and proxies—the so-called axis of resistance—of which Hezbollah is a central component. That means that in the absence of outside pressure and a cease-fire deal, Israel may continue fighting in Lebanon for at least the near future.

Israel’s attacks are doing more than causing humanitarian and economic damage. They are also heightening sectarian divides. Although there have been overt shows of solidarity among the country’s religious communities, including a collective prayer by all of Lebanon’s religious leaders for the victims of a ghastly attack on the northern town of Aito, tensions between displaced populations and host communities are rising. Most Lebanese are unhappy to have been dragged into a conflict that they had no say in and wanted no part of. Fueling such tensions are Israel’s attacks on areas that most Lebanese deemed relatively safe because of their mixed sectarian composition and lack of affiliation with Hezbollah. In these places, Israeli missiles have brought down entire residential buildings with the stated claim of killing a specific individual. Aito, for example, is a predominantly Christian area where Israel bombed a building that was housing two displaced families. It did so, ostensibly, to kill a Hezbollah official tasked with distributing financial aid to displaced persons. The attack ended up killing 24 people, including 14 women and children. Such indiscriminate strikes are completely unnecessary: as the targeted assassinations of the past year have shown, Israel has been able to kill particular people with relatively minimal collateral damage. But that has not stopped the Israel Defense Forces. The threat of more such strikes has made many Lebanese fearful of hosting displaced Shiites.

MOMENT OF OPPORTUNITY

Israel is not the only force driving up tensions between Lebanon’s religious groups. Hezbollah also bears responsibility. The organization has wielded outsize influence in Lebanon, and it has engendered resentment for its expanding role in regional conflicts, especially in Syria. It has also earned widespread ire for its willingness to deploy military force and political capital within the country to protect its interests and preserve the status quo.

The group’s power has been a long-standing issue. After Israel withdrew from the southern part of Lebanon in 2000, leaving places it had occupied for 22 years, many Lebanese hoped that Hezbollah would disarm. But it refused, insisting that it needed its weapons to resist Israel. (Critically, both Iran and Syria did not want the group to disarm, either.) Hezbollah has since used this arsenal to fight against Israel, including in a bloody 2006 war. Yet it also used its military strength to intimidate other groups in Lebanon, and indeed the Lebanese state. According to the findings of an international tribunal at The Hague, the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, in 2005, was perpetrated by Hezbollah members. The organization was believed to have been responsible for a string of other political assassinations of prominent politicians and intellectuals. Since 2019, Hezbollah has played an active role in obstructing reform and protecting the status quo. And although all of Lebanon’s political parties benefited from the port of Beirut’s poor governance and accountability structures, which allowed corruption to flourish, some suspected that Hezbollah was involved in storing over 2,000 tons of ammonium nitrate there, which led to the 2021 explosion. It subsequently blocked an investigation into the incident, intensifying anger against the party and further deepening sectarian tensions. These tensions materialized in localized shootouts with Sunnis, Druze, and Christian communities.

Throughout all this turmoil, Hezbollah has retained its power. But the group’s fight with Israel has weakened it. Although the organization and its patron, Iran, are still looking to improve their future positions on the battlefield in South Lebanon, Hezbollah has lost its command-and-control structure, including all senior commanders, thousands of fighters, and according to the Israel Defense Forces, around 80 percent of the military arsenal it stored within 40 kilometers of Lebanon’s border with Israel. The killing of Nasrallah was a particularly significant blow: he was not just Hezbollah’s secretary-general but also a regional player influencing developments across Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, as well as a trusted insider in Iran. With his death, Iran has become more directly involved in running Hezbollah’s military activities and managing its political position. It will be very difficult for Hezbollah to rebuild militarily in the coming years, particularly as Israel continues to attack its supply lines in Syria.

Today, various Lebanese political parties, most noticeably predominantly Christian parties, are seeking to capitalize on Hezbollah’s apparent weakening in order to redraw the political map of Lebanon. Samir Geagea, the leader of the Lebanese Forces—a predominantly Christian Maronite party—and a presidential hopeful, announced on November 6 that his group was ready to elect a president without the participation of the Shiite community. He, along with other parliamentarians, has reiterated a long-standing Lebanese demand for the disarmament of Hezbollah.

Hezbollah is well aware that the longer its war with Israel continues, the more pressure it will face from the Lebanese—including thousands of its own constituents, who have lost everything. The group agreed to a cease-fire with Israel even before its secretary-general was assassinated. It did so even though there was no cease-fire in Gaza, which the group had previously considered a prerequisite. Allies of Hezbollah, specifically the speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri, have said the party would also accept the implementation of UN resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 conflict between Lebanon and Israel. That resolution calls for both parties to respect the Israeli-Lebanese border, for Israel to halt its military flights over Lebanon (something it has steadfastly refused to do), and for Hezbollah to withdraw from the border and beyond the Litani River in South Lebanon. It further calls on the Lebanese state itself to implement the Taif accord—the 1990 agreement that ended Lebanon’s civil war—and two earlier UN resolutions, 1559 and 1608, which demand the disarmament of Hezbollah.

But that hardly means that Hezbollah will fold. It may have lost large numbers of military personnel and weapons supplies, as well as some financial infrastructure. But it was starting from a strong position. As Brett Holmgren, acting Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, put it, Hezbollah “remains down but is far from out.” In fact, it has managed to stabilize its position. On the military front, Israel’s ground invasion has even allowed Hezbollah to reconsolidate a narrative of resistance. It still has a significant political presence, including 13 members of Lebanon’s parliament and a network of nongovernmental organizations that provide a broad array of social services to their constituents.

It also has a new, younger generation of leaders who are battle-hardened by their experiences in Syria. To some extent, this generation is more ideological than the preceding one. Its formative experiences are fully rooted in the concept of forming a “resistance society,” promulgated by Hezbollah. Its members have studied in the organization’s schools, joined its scouts, and listened to its news. Hezbollah-affiliated media are, for their part, already at work trying to protect the group’s position. These outlets are labeling all who criticize the organization’s role in Israel’s conflict as treasonous, and they are working to reaffirm Hezbollah’s identity as the Lebanese Shiites’ principal representative. Israel’s brutality and campaigns of mass destruction work to their advantage. There is growing anger at Israel’s behavior across different Lebanese communities, including among Hezbollah’s ardent domestic enemies.

COME TOGETHER

Creating a better future for Lebanon will not be easy. Most of the country’s current leadership, scarred by Lebanon’s 1975–90 civil war, is being more careful about accentuating communal polarization with the goal of avoiding the mistakes of the past. But some of these leaders do clearly see this moment as an opportunity to reshape the country’s political balance and perhaps redress the political disadvantages between the country’s communities. Electing a president without Hezbollah’s consent will effectively make an embattled Shiite community feel that it is being further ostracized and marginalized in Lebanon’s new political system. The result could be all kinds of conflict and unrest. The country might return to an era of political assassinations—or even to the chaos and kidnappings of the 1980s.

To prevent the violence on the Israeli-Lebanese battlefield from ricocheting internally, Lebanon’s parties will need to cooperate and come to some kind of road map for putting the country back on track. They need to immediately elect a president, appoint a new prime minister, and set up an emergency government—one designed to initiate an inclusive and broad-based political dialogue on Lebanon’s trajectory and on rebuilding state institutions, as well as areas devastated by the conflict.

This dialogue must also feature key members of Lebanon’s politicized civil networks, as well as the country’s main activists, who represent important currents within Lebanese society.

Such a national dialogue would have several items on its agenda. The first would be to offer the Lebanese the promise of a better future by crafting a vision for Lebanon that includes a state-building plan to address the challenges facing Lebanon’s political economy. The government would also implement a plan for managing population displacement, given that tens of thousands of people will not be able to return home for at least a few years because of the scale of the destruction. Such a plan should give Lebanese citizens access to their desperately needed bank accounts, most of which have been frozen since the onset of the 2019 financial crisis. This plan must help, in particular, the roughly 70 percent of depositors who have less than $100,000 in their accounts.

The dialogue must also pave the way for Lebanon to finally implement the Taif agreement. The deal created an intricate set of power-sharing mechanisms. It also called for the state’s militias to dissolve. But with the approval of the president of Lebanon, Hezbollah retained its arms. Today, in the aftermath of the current war, Hezbollah’s arsenal is a topic of even greater contention within the country. To get Hezbollah to disarm, however, Lebanon needs a national defense strategy that integrates the group’s forces into the state’s army. Such a dialogue would build on the 2012 Baabda Declaration, agreed to by Hezbollah and all of Lebanon’s other key political parties, which calls on the Lebanese to “eschew local block politics and regional and international conflicts” as well as “to avoid the negative repercussions of regional tensions and crises” and to respect resolution 1701. An inclusive dialogue about these issues would assure Hezbollah and, with them, the broader Shiite community. It could mitigate Hezbollah’s worst impulses as the group adjusts to new realities.

The outside world will have to be involved in fostering such conversations, given that an end to the conflict in Lebanon will likely come as part of a broader regional settlement involving France, Iran, Israel, the United States, and key Arab countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and possibly the United Arab Emirates. Right now, cease-fire negotiations still have significant points of contention related to upholding Lebanese sovereignty while ensuring that Hezbollah does not rearm. A U.S.-drafted Israeli-Lebanese agreement, leaked to the Financial Times, reads more like a diktat of complete surrender from a Lebanese perspective. According to its terms, Lebanon would implement UN resolution 1701 alone, leaving Israel free to continue conducting flyovers and bombings and to enter the country at will. An annex associated with the document would provide U.S. guarantees to Israel that it could continue bombing Lebanon whenever it felt that resolution 1701 was being violated.

Such a deal should be rejected by everyone, given its violation of Lebanese sovereignty. It would have the main effect of allowing Hezbollah to reconfirm its narrative and identity as a resistance party. Instead, Washington must work with Doha, Paris, Riyadh, and other partners to scale up financial, military, and institutional support to the Lebanese army to allow it to move to the south and take control of Lebanon’s borders. These states should also support reconstruction initiatives as part of their package deal with Lebanon, ensuring that their support is channeled through Lebanese state institutions.

But most urgently, the world should apply pressure on Israel to end the conflict in Lebanon. Otherwise, this war may lead to the undoing of Lebanon and its increasingly rare, if flawed model of societal diversity—with even greater regional aftershocks.