Lebanon has been drawn deeper into a widening regional crisis, with critics accusing the Iran-backed Hezbollah of engaging in what they describe as reckless support operations that have exposed the country—particularly its southern regions—to severe consequences, including large-scale destruction and the growing prospect of a buffer zone along the border with Israel.

For years, Hezbollah has portrayed itself as a force guided by strategic calculation and political acumen. However, opponents now argue that the group has effectively operated as an extension of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, driven more by ideological imperatives and directives from Tehran than by Lebanon’s national interest. They contend that this dynamic has come at a high cost, with entire southern villages devastated and Israel potentially gaining what some describe as a strategic opening to impose a buffer zone extending between 7 and 10 kilometers inside Lebanese territory.

Against this backdrop, analysts say southern Lebanon faces an uncertain future shaped by overlapping and complex scenarios. At the heart of the debate lies a fundamental question: how can the Lebanese state and the international community repair the damage while also compelling Israel to withdraw fully from occupied areas under credible and lasting security guarantees? And can external solutions realistically be enforced on the ground?

A “third path” gains traction

In an opinion article published in The New York Times last week, prominent columnist Thomas Friedman laid out a proposal that has gained attention in Western policy circles. Known for his influence on political discourse in Washington, Friedman described what he called a potential “third path” aimed at stabilizing southern Lebanon while addressing Israel’s security concerns.

His proposal envisions the deployment of heavily armed NATO forces to take control of the contested southern zone—whether occupied or designated as a buffer—in coordination with the Lebanese Army.

Friedman argues that such a force could offer assurances to both sides. Israel, he suggests, would be more inclined to trust NATO’s presence, while Hezbollah and Iran would be unlikely to confront the alliance directly given the overwhelming military consequences. In this scenario, Israel would withdraw fully from Lebanese territory, while Hezbollah’s role could be further exposed, potentially weakening its domestic standing, even among segments of Lebanon’s Shiite community.

“It is time for a third way. I am happy to call it the Trump Plan to Save Lebanon. Push Israel to pull entirely out of south Lebanon and have heavily armed NATO troops help take over the area in partnership with, and under the symbolic authority of, the Lebanese Army,” Friedman wrote.

“Israel can trust NATO. Hezbollah and Iran will not dare take them on — or if they do, they will be smashed, and a vast majority of Lebanese, including Shiites, will applaud, because Israel will be entirely out of Lebanon and Hezbollah will lose its justification for attacking Israel."

“Sure, it may not be a perfect solution, but it is better than Israel invading Lebanon over and over, let alone a Lebanese civil war. It’s worth a try.”

Legal and political pathways

Retired Brigadier General Tony Abi Samra, a former head of U.N. security operations in Asia-Pacific, told Nidaa Al-Watan newspaper that the proposal reflects a broader shift in international thinking on Lebanon. He noted that it resembles, in practice, an intervention under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, but without relying on traditional Security Council mechanisms.

Any binding resolution at the Security Council requires approval from at least nine members and no veto from the five permanent members; a condition that has often blocked decisive action. As a result, alternative pathways are being explored, relying more on political legitimacy than strict legal authority.

One option involves referring the issue to the U.N. General Assembly under the “Uniting for Peace” framework, which allows for collective recommendations when the Security Council is deadlocked. This mechanism has been used in major crises such as the Korean War and the Suez Crisis to enable international intervention despite institutional paralysis.

Other approaches include pre-negotiated compromises to avoid vetoes or the formation of coalitions operating outside the U.N. framework, as seen in NATO’s intervention in Kosovo.

Lessons from past interventions

Historical precedents illustrate both the potential and the risks of such strategies. In the Bosnian war, NATO intervention helped enforce the Dayton Agreement, bringing an end to years of conflict.

But other cases highlight the dangers. The 2003 Iraq war led to the collapse of the regime but triggered prolonged instability, while Libya’s conflict saw rapid military success followed by state collapse.

Analysts caution that Lebanon presents an even more complex environment, given its entanglement in regional power struggles involving Iran and Israel. Any externally imposed solution could risk triggering a broader confrontation, with the challenge extending beyond intervention to managing its aftermath and ensuring long-term stability.

The cost of intervention

A key obstacle remains political will. Deploying an international force would require not only high-level decisions but also troop commitments, sustained funding, and readiness to absorb casualties.

“States are far more cautious when it comes to sending soldiers into environments as complex as Lebanon,” Abi Samra said, noting that even large coalitions often struggle to secure meaningful participation without clear prospects of success.

Retired Brigadier General Khalil Helou described the NATO option as theoretically sound but practically difficult, particularly in light of Western hesitation and competing global priorities. He told Nidaa Al-Watan that Lebanon itself appears to have few alternatives after Hezbollah’s actions, which he said have undermined efforts to restore full state sovereignty without external support.

U.N. missions at a crossroads

The debate comes as existing U.N. mechanisms face growing scrutiny. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), established in 1978 and expanded after the 2006 war, has been tasked with monitoring hostilities and supporting the Lebanese Army in securing the south.

Alongside it operates the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), active since 1948, whose unarmed observers assist in monitoring the Blue Line.

Despite these efforts, both missions have struggled to contain escalating tensions, raising questions about their future effectiveness. Political opposition to renewing UNIFIL’s mandate has reportedly grown, with the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump and Israel opposing its extension on the grounds of inefficiency.

France, under President Emmanuel Macron, has sought to secure continued support or alternative funding, but broader European engagement has been constrained by competing priorities, including the war in Ukraine.