Nearly a year after the end of Syria’s civil war and the fall of the Assad dictatorship, the country has embarked on a long and complex reconstruction process. The destruction is staggering: entire neighborhoods lie in rubble and basic infrastructure (roads, power grids, and water systems) has collapsed, and public institutions are dysfunctional. Millions of Syrians remain displaced inside and outside the country, schools and hospitals are incapacitated, and what remains of the economy is crippled by unemployment, inflation, and the lingering impact of sanctions (even as many have lately been eased). Ongoing sectarian violence and a deepening humanitarian disaster, with more than 14.5 million Syrians facing food insecurity, compound the crisis. As the international community re-engages in Syria, reconstruction will require many hundreds of billions of dollars in aid and investment as well as assistance to restore governance, security, and stability.

Lebanon is uniquely positioned to play a role in Syria’s recovery. At first glance, this statement may sound surprising, as Lebanon itself is still suffering from its own severe economic crisis and from the damage of repeated Israeli military attacks. Yet Lebanon, with its geographic proximity and close ties to Syria, as well as its competitive advantages in finance and other services, offers a natural platform for Syria’s reconstruction. Playing this role would help not only Syria but also Lebanon’s own economic revival.

To seize this opportunity, however, Lebanon needs to rebuild trust with the international community. Despite the government’s repeated pledges, crucial reforms including banking sector restructuring, anti-corruption measures, and fiscal stabilization remain stalled. The slow-moving process of Hezbollah’s disarmament is further undermining international confidence as the Lebanese state appears unable to assert sovereignty or to guarantee stability. Without credible reform steps, Beirut will be bypassed in favor of more reliable reconstruction hubs.

Shared Economies

Lebanon’s and Syria’s interdependent economic relationship goes back decades. During the Assad regime, Lebanon acted as a financial backbone, commercial conduit, and service center for Syria’s Assad regime, offering Syria a gateway to the world during periods of diplomatic and economic isolation. Lebanon became essential for Assad in the 1980s after international sanctions isolated Syria due to President Hafez al-Assad’s alignment with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. Lebanon’s conduit role continued in the 2000s after the Assad regime was implicated in the 2005 assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and again after 2011, when the United States and the European Union (EU) imposed additional sanctions as the regime responded to the Syrian uprising with astonishing brutality. Syria’s elites long trusted Beirut’s banks (at least until Lebanon’s 2019 financial collapse) to handle foreign currency transactions and to transfer remittances that Syria’s sanctioned state institutions could not due to their isolation from the international financial system. Lebanon’s ports and airports became vital arteries linking Syria to international markets, evolving over time into a lifeline that connected Syrian trade and business to regional and global networks through Lebanese financial and logistics infrastructure.

Syrian migrant labor has also long been essential to Lebanon’s economy. Before the Syrian civil war, Syrians dominated agriculture in Lebanon’s Bekaa and Akkar regions, supplying the majority of the country’s construction workforce and filling low-wage service roles that Lebanese workers often avoided. Lebanon absorbed surplus Syrian labor by hiring hundreds of thousands of workers for long-term roles, as well as for casual jobs in agriculture and construction. During Syria’s civil war, when refugees flooded into Lebanon (where close to 1.5 million Syrians continue to live), the dependence on Syrian labor deepened. Even after Lebanon’s 2019 financial meltdown, Syrians continue to sustain key economic sectors, albeit in conditions of largely informal and precarious employment.

Economic ties and business dealings endured periods of political tension during Syria’s 29-year occupation of Lebanon, which ended in 2005. But even as Lebanon chafed under Syrian tutelage, Lebanese entrepreneurs, contractors, engineers, and consultants flocked to Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs, the primary markets for many Lebanese industries. Although Syria consolidated its political hegemony over Lebanon in the 1990s, Lebanon has retained its edge in finance, services, and global connectivity, while its economy remained tied to Syrian routes, labor, and demand, adapting in times of strain. Because under the first Assad regime Syria’s economy was heavily state-controlled—with strict exchange controls, state-owned banks, and restrictive import regulations—its businesses struggled to access hard currency, imports, and reliable remittance channels. Lebanese banks and trading networks filled these gaps by providing dollar access, facilitating imports through the Beirut port, and channeling diaspora remittances. In effect, Syrian capital flowed into Lebanon because Syria’s own institutions could not deliver these essential functions. Lebanese banks and trading networks continued to serve as the main conduit for Syria’s imports and remittances, helping Syrian businesses bypass restrictions and inefficiencies in their own economic system.

Conversely, it was through Syria that Lebanon exported agricultural and industrial goods to markets in Jordan, Iraq, and the Gulf. When Lebanon’s ports and airports became inoperative during its own civil war, trans-Syrian land routes provided Lebanon’s only access to regional markets. For example, prior to the Syrian civil war, some 250 trucks would enter Syria from Lebanon each day; agricultural goods would then cross the Syrian-Jordanian border crossing at Nassib. Any closure of these border crossings would therefore seriously disrupt Lebanon’s exports. These and other examples of the persistent ties between the two countries illustrate the role that Lebanon can play in Syria’s recovery.

Leveraging Ties in Reconstruction

The scale of that recovery is daunting: in February 2024 the UN Development Program estimated the cost of lost infrastructure and economic output due to Syria’s civil war at nearly $923 billion. But even that staggering number does not fully convey the scale of the destruction and the reconstruction needed. The war devastated entire urban centers, ruining housing, schools, hospitals, road networks, and power grids in Aleppo, Homs, Raqqa, parts of Damascus, Idlib, and other areas. A 2016 case study of Aleppo estimated that it would cost $35-40 billion dollars just to reconstruct residential buildings; a more accurate post-war figure likely will be even higher. The conflict wrought widespread human suffering: 90 percent of Syrians (some 22 million people) live in poverty, compared to 33 percent before the war. Most public institutions are dysfunctional. The collapse of essential services such as water, education, health care, electricity has deepened social fractures.

Fortunately, the international community has already mobilized early support. In March 2025, a European Union-led conference in Brussels resulted in commitments of roughly 5.8 billion euros ($6.3 billion) in grants and low-interest loans to support reconstruction. Alongside these pledges, international agencies such as the UN World Food Programme are scaling up emergency food assistance for millions of Syrians who face severe food insecurity. Bilateral actions are also underway. Saudi Arabia, for example, has committed to supplying Syria with 1.65 million barrels of crude oil to aid energy recovery and refineries, while prominent business figures from the region are planning investments. Obviously, far more is needed.

Here, the Syria-Lebanon relationship offers a potential asset in the rebuilding of Syria—not only because of the two countries’ close ties, but also because of Lebanon’s competitive advantages. While Turkey’s construction giants are likely to dominate large-scale rebuilding, Lebanon’s edge is in serving as a financial, service, and logistical bridge for channeling funds, delivering professional services, and providing its ports and, eventually, diaspora networks to complement physical reconstruction. Lebanon’s vast diaspora, long a source of remittances, investment, and professional expertise, can be mobilized to complement donor flows, providing trusted funding and skills that Syria’s fragile institutions cannot yet generate on their own. If Lebanon can mobilize these assets, it could become an important conduit for capital flows that international donors would otherwise hesitate to channel directly into Syria given compliance risks, weak oversight and limited institutional capacity.

Although EU and UK sanctions, as well as general US sanctions, on Syria have been lifted, donors may still prefer to route funds through Beirut rather than directly into Damascus for a variety of reasons, including ongoing targeted sanctions on certain individuals and entities in Syria, compliance risks for banks and aid agencies, and the weakness of Syria’s oversight mechanisms, all of which raise concerns over corruption and financial diversion. Lebanon, despite its own weaknesses, can arguably manage financial inflows more transparently than Syria. Until Syria builds stronger systems for accountability and financial oversight, Lebanon is a logical bridge for international engagement with Syria.

Lebanon also serves as a culturally familiar and geographically close partner for Syria that can mobilize needed expertise at a lower cost than distant international contractors can. Its ports offer direct maritime gateways into Syria and its service economy has decades of cultural experience operating in Syria. Lebanese construction firms may not be able to match the scale or cost efficiency of Turkey’s giants, but they have a track record in public works and engineering at home and were active before Syria’s civil war in Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs. Lebanese firms are well placed to handle specialized, smaller-scale engineering, renovation, design, and project management—roles that complement, rather than compete with, Turkish capacity. Such activity could generate cross-border growth and serve as an engine for Syria’s rebuilding and for Lebanon’s own economic recovery.

Practical First Steps: Domestic Reforms

Any vision for Lebanon serving as a gateway for Syrian reconstruction must begin with the reform of its financial sector, once the backbone of its economy. Lebanon’s banking sector collapsed in 2019 as reckless lending, corruption, and political capture eroded trust and liquidity. The crisis caused the currency to lose more than 90 percent of its value, wiped out savings trapped in insolvent banks, and pushed more than 80 percent of the population into poverty, making it one of the most severe financial meltdowns globally since the mid-19th century. In recent months, Lebanon has taken some preliminary reform steps. In April 2025, in response to demands from the International Monetary Fund, parliament passed an amendment to the banking secrecy law that grants authorities, including auditors, regulators, and the judiciary, retroactive access to banking records going back ten years. In late July 2025, the government adopted a banking restructuring law that establishes a Bank Restructuring Authority (replacing the Banking Control Commission) with powers to recapitalize, merge, or even liquidate failing banks.

But major problems remain. Depositors are still unable to access their savings, many commercial and central bank losses are yet to be quantified, and confidence in the authorities’ ability to follow through on implementation is weak. Fiscal and governance reforms—especially the restructuring of insolvent banks, the establishment of independent regulatory oversight, and compliance with international anti-money laundering standards—are essential ingredients for the country to become a credible hub for reconstruction finance.

Lebanon also needs to upgrade its logistics infrastructure. The Tripoli port, in particular, could become a nerve center for Syrian reconstruction. Tripoli’s proximity to the Syrian border—about 30 kilometers away—makes it well suited for large-scale supply chains and the rapid movement of construction materials, humanitarian aid, and industrial goods. With modest investment in port and transport infrastructure, along with the modernization of the customs system, Tripoli could serve as a bridge to Homs and Aleppo in northern Syria. There are signs of Chinese and Gulf interest in investing in port modernization, though Gulf financing is contingent upon Lebanon’s ability to curb Hezbollah’s influence in the country. Tripoli’s development would not be intended to displace Syria’s ports, but to complement them—with a multiplier effect on Lebanon’s depressed northern regions, generating employment and integrating local communities into regional trade flows.

Any discussion of Lebanon as a reconstruction hub, however, must consider the rapid development of Syria’s own maritime infrastructure. In May 2025, Damascus signed a contract with DP World to develop and operate a multipurpose terminal at Tartus, while CMA CGM renewed its 30-year concession at Latakia, Syria’s largest port, with a $260 million investment that includes a new berth and expanded facilities. Since CMA CGM already operates terminals in Beirut and Tripoli, it could redirect Syria-bound cargo directly to Latakia, bypassing Lebanese ports.

On the surface, such a possibility would appear to threaten Lebanon’s ambitions. The operation of Tartus and Latakia ports at full capacity could sharply reduce Syria’s reliance on Tripoli as a maritime entry point. Yet Syria’s port modernization faces structural obstacles: governance and oversight remain weak, corruption and rent-seeking networks are entrenched, and the broader infrastructure and regulatory framework is severely underdeveloped due to decades of conflict, sanctions, and institutional decay. These constraints mean that, even with upgraded terminals, Syria may not immediately command donor or investor confidence. In addition, continued Russian military presence and influence in Syria creates risks for some investors. Tripoli, in contrast, offers not only proximity to Syria’s devastated north, but also provides a platform where oversight, compliance, and logistics can be managed with relatively greater transparency. Accordingly, Syrian port upgrades would not eliminate Lebanon’s role but make it more urgent for Beirut to modernize and distinguish its complementary role.

At the same time, the revitalization of Beirut’s devastated port, once Lebanon’s primary maritime gateway, is also important. It was devastated by the 2020 explosion that killed more than 200 people and destroyed 50,000 homes. The absence of accountability for this tragedy has become a powerful symbol of Lebanon’s governance failures and raises doubts about its ability to manage infrastructure responsibly. But if it is rebuilt efficiently and transparently, Beirut could once again serve as an important transit point for goods bound for Syria’s southern and central regions, particularly Damascus, linking maritime trade to overland routes into Syria. Accelerating port modernization efforts, including digitized customs processes, restored storage facilities, and the adoption of international-standard safety protocols, would showcase Lebanon’s ability to manage infrastructure responsibly and help restore investor and donor confidence.

Equally important are Lebanon’s overland connections with Syria, linking its ports to Syrian markets. The Beirut–Damascus highway, historically Lebanon’s main trade corridor into Syria and on to Jordan and the Gulf, needs safeguarding and upgrading, with investments in road repair, customs harmonization, and security infrastructure required to facilitate the reliable flow of materials into Damascus and beyond. Likewise, the Tripoli–Homs road, connecting the northern port to Syria’s industrial heartland, is strategically crucial for reconstruction. With targeted investments, this corridor could not only reduce costs and delays of transport into Syria, but offer northern Lebanon an economic lifeline.

Steps to modernize infrastructure and restructure Lebanon’s economy will be essential to position Lebanon as a viable reconstruction partner. Such steps must be accompanied by sound governance reforms that guarantee transparency and accountability. Credibility also requires that Lebanon’s future leadership comes from a new generation of technocrats, entrepreneurs, and industrialists, individuals committed to transparency and efficiency, rather than reproducing the same dynamics that precipitated the country’s financial collapse. Only then will donors and investors view Lebanon’s reforms as more than another “on paper” commitment, a prerequisite for ensuring that reconstruction finance does not altogether bypass Beirut.

Risks and Opportunities

Lebanon’s ability to position itself as a hub for Syrian reconstruction is complicated by its own domestic realities—political rivalries, sectarian divisions, and competing vested interests that could capture reconstruction funds through patronage networks, just as they did with Lebanon’s own post-civil war recovery. Structural constraints include Lebanon’s collapsed banking sector, weak state institutions, and unresolved questions of sovereignty and Palestinian militias’ and Hezbollah’s disarmament. Endemic corruption and chronic governance failures threaten to transform reconstruction into another rent-seeking scheme captured by sectarian leaders and their patronage networks.

The slow pace of much-needed institutional reforms adds to the climate of uncertainty, raising concerns among international partners about Lebanon’s readiness to sustain large-scale recovery efforts. Without progress, donors and key stakeholders will not exploit Lebanon’s advantages in Syria’s reconstruction. And without such a reconstruction role, Lebanon risks sliding into irrelevance just as international interest in Syria intensifies.

Lebanon’s challenges fuel skepticism about whether the country can positively play such a role. Critics may argue that it is unrealistic for Lebanon to serve as a hub for Syria’s reconstruction —but the alternative could be more destabilizing. A deteriorating economic and political outlook in Lebanon, coupled with a chaotic recovery in Syria dominated by armed groups and by economic networks tied to the former regime, threatens to fuel instability across the region. By contrast, linking Lebanon’s recovery to Syria’s reconstruction offers a pathway toward stability for both countries, creates incentives for further reform, channels productive investment, and foster cooperation across the border. For Syria, it means access to capital, services, and logistical channels that its own fragile institutions and infrastructure cannot yet reliably provide. For Lebanon, this is a golden opportunity to reinvent itself as a catalyst for regional renewal and, in the process, set the foundations for its own recovery.