Civilians will join formal talks for the first time since the creation of the Lebanon–Israel ceasefire mechanism. Lebanon is sending former ambassador Simon Karam; Israel is dispatching its National Security Council’s Uri Resnick.

On paper, this is a modest procedural adjustment. In reality, it is a political moment that exposes both opportunity and danger for the Lebanese state — a rare opening for diplomacy that risks becoming yet another exercise in symbolic theater if not followed by action.

There is no doubt that Simon Karam is the right man for this role. A seasoned diplomat who understands both the language of formal negotiation and the unspoken codes of regional power politics, Karam possesses two assets Lebanon sorely lacks at the table: credibility and independence. He is neither a partisan emissary nor a theatrical “representative of resistance theater.” His career has been defined by professionalism rather than posturing — precisely what Lebanon requires when engaging an adversary state that measures outcomes, not slogans.

Yet while Karam has been formally mandated to join the ceasefire mechanism, this appointment does not — and must not — absolve the Lebanese state of its larger responsibility. Diplomacy is not a substitute for sovereignty. And sovereignty remains impossible so long as the fundamental contradiction at the heart of Lebanese politics continues unresolved: the existence of Hezbollah’s independent military power.

Disarming Hezbollah is not a concession to Israeli demands — it is the fulfillment of Lebanese national interest. It is not an externally imposed agenda — it is the prerequisite condition for recovering state authority. The logic is simple and inescapable: no negotiation can produce stability while a non-state actor retains the unilateral capacity to ignite war or veto peace on Lebanon’s behalf.

Sending Simon Karam to the table is welcome — but the Lebanese establishment cannot hide behind this move while avoiding its own overdue reckoning. Lebanon has perfected the art of delegating competence upward while retaining irresponsibility below. It appoints capable individuals to represent a state that refuses to behave like one. Diplomats are sent abroad while political paralysis reigns at home.

That pattern cannot be allowed to repeat itself now.

The civilian participation in ceasefire talks matters not because it “humanizes” the process, but because it politicizes it. Once civilians replace uniformed intermediaries, de-escalation ceases to be a purely tactical exercise and becomes what it always should have been: a question of state authority. The talks move from military containment to political accountability.

Lebanon can no longer pretend to be a spectator to decisions made about its borders, security, and wars. Civilian negotiators imply civilian responsibility. If civilians sit across the table, the Lebanese government must finally accept ownership of the peace process — with all the obligations that entails.

History offers the warning in stark terms.

In May 1983 — after Israel’s withdrawal from Beirut — Lebanon made its last serious attempt to negotiate as a sovereign actor. The May 17 Accord aimed to structure mutual withdrawals and define security arrangements under US auspices. Antoine Fattal, a skilled diplomat and disciplined institutional figure, helped lead Lebanon’s negotiating team. For a fleeting moment, Lebanon spoke with something approaching a unified state voice.

The agreement’s collapse was not rooted in diplomatic failure but in institutional cowardice. Lebanon signed an accord it was politically unable to defend. Syrian pressure mattered — but domestic paralysis was decisive. The presidency faltered, Cabinet unity dissolved, and the political class refused to confront the armed veto that would soon be embodied by Hezbollah.

May 17 failed because Lebanon could not will sovereignty into existence.

This lesson screams relevance today.

Placing Simon Karam at the negotiation table raises expectations — but expectations are meaningless without political will. Diplomacy can work only when a state possesses exclusive authority over force. Lebanon still does not. The same contradiction persists: the government sends diplomats abroad while tolerating an internal militia that monopolizes the real power to declare war or peace.

Every actor in the region understands this contradiction — Israel, Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah itself. Only Lebanon continues to deny it.

Civilians at the ceasefire table may appear as modernization, but they become performative unless accompanied by hard choices at home. The core issue remains untouched: as long as Hezbollah retains military autonomy, no diplomatic arrangement can be binding, durable, or credible.

The real question therefore is not whether Simon Karam can negotiate skillfully. He can — and he will. The real question is whether the Lebanese state will permit those negotiations to matter.

Ending diplomatic outsourcing requires political courage: standing publicly behind ceasefire commitments; backing negotiations when backlash erupts; reaffirming without ambiguity that the Lebanese Army alone exercises legitimate authority over border defense.

Most importantly, it requires abandoning Lebanon’s most destructive habit — negotiating internationally while disintegrating internally.

Simon Karam deserves backing, not abandonment.

But this moment is about more than one diplomat — however capable.

It is a referendum on whether Lebanon is finally prepared to behave like a sovereign state, align diplomacy with sovereignty, and confront the armed contradiction that has hollowed out both.

Civilians at the table means the state is now on trial — and history will not grant it another May 17 escape clause.