After weeks of expecting an escalation between Israel and Hezbollah, due to Hezbollah’s threats to avenge the assassination of its chief of staff, Fuad Shukr, recent events signal that neither party is rushing into war any time soon.

Israel preempted the Hezbollah attack with a somewhat limited strike, avoiding hitting strategic targets. Hezbollah, though it failed in executing its plan, presented an image of victory to its public, indicating this chapter has ended. As Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, said in a televised speech: “Hezbollah’s response has ended and at the current stage Lebanon can rest and the Lebanese who fled can return to their homes.” 

Still, the Israel-Hezbollah escalation is far from over. All signs suggest it will get much more intense rather than subside — a clear trend decision-makers in Washington need to prepare for.  

It has been almost 11 months since Hezbollah launched its first attack against Israel, one day after the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas that killed more than 1,200 Israelis and took more than 200 Israelis hostage. At that time, Hezbollah launched hundreds of explosive drones and thousands of rockets and anti-tank guided missiles against Israeli communities in the north, resulting in massive damages and casualties.

The Israeli government at the beginning of the war decided to evacuate tens of thousands of civilians from the north, anticipating another Hamas-like attack — a decision that today seems might have been rushed.  

Those evacuees have been living like refugees in their own country since then.  

Many are hosted in other communities in Israel or have rented temporary housing in the center, but this situation is not sustainable, either practically or economically. Now, as the school year in Israel begins, these families are not even sure where to send their kids.  

Just this week, one of the heads of the regional councils in the north said to the minister of education in an emergency discussion about the school year that they “will never forgive this government for abandoning us and burning us alive.”

The ugly truth is that the government does not have a viable solution to protect these communities while fighting continues. Even if fighting stops, many of those evacuees are not willing to go back unless the threat of Hezbollah is removed.   

The hope, for some, is that a hostage deal with Hamas will stop the fighting in Gaza, leading to Hezbollah stopping its attacks in the north, enabling families to come back to their homes. But the negotiations are currently stalled, and it does not seem like a breakthrough is in the cards — meaning that Hezbollah may continue to attack.  

The more important issue, which is being missed by many commentators, is that even if a hostage deal were to miraculously materialize and Hezbollah stopped all of its attacks, Israelis have now become very aware of the threat of Hezbollah on the northern border, and they are unwilling to go back and live under such a threat.   

In a recent survey by Israel’s leading national security think tank, more than 40 percent of Israelis responding to the question of “what Israel needs to do in response to Hezbollah’s attack” answered that Israel should start a wide military operation against Hezbollah even at the risk of a regional war. This result should not shock anyone. Survey after survey in recent months has shown that many Israelis support a war against Hezbollah.  

Hezbollah’s continued attacks against Israelis since Oct. 8 made clear to many Israelis the power that Hezbollah holds in Lebanon. It also showed them that Israel’s strategy of trying to prevent Hezbollah from building its military capabilities while avoiding war did not succeed.

What about diplomacy? The U.S. has tried repeatedly in recent months to negotiate between Israel and Hezbollah, to come up with a formula that will stop the fighting and remove some of Hezbollah’s fighting forces from the border area. Sadly, no significant progress was achieved.  

Furthermore, after the complete failure of UNSCR 1701 that concluded the Second Lebanon War and that was supposed to make sure Hezbollah would not rearm in south Lebanon — it did so anyway — many Israelis lost all trust in the efficacy of diplomacy to stop Hezbollah.  

The brutal truth is that war between Israel and Hezbollah is inevitable, even if it won’t happen this week or next week, or even in the next few months. Hezbollah has proven to Israelis and Israeli decision-makers that it is a considerable threat that cannot be dealt with only by trying to stop its rearmament.  

Yes, Israeli decision-makers will need to define what will be considered a victory in a much better way than in Gaza, but taking out Hezbollah’s strategic capabilities and pushing its forces away from the border will be a good start. 

Whether this war will happen under this administration or the next one, Washington must treat this scenario as the most probable, think about ways to limit the impact of such a war on the entire region and come up with effective mechanisms to end such a war that will benefit both the U.S. and Israel.