Iran has built a sprawling network of more than 5,000 military-linked agencies that has enabled it to import billions of dollars in weapons components, explosives, industrial machinery and heavy-duty vehicles, helping replenish its missile and drone capabilities despite Western sanctions and a U.S. naval blockade, a Reuters investigation has found.

The network, operating under numbered entities bearing the initials MOD for Iran’s Ministry of Defense, has imported at least $2 billion worth of military-related equipment since January 2025. Its operations rely on foreign intermediaries, shell companies and proceeds from illicit oil sales to acquire goods abroad while keeping financial transactions largely outside conventional international banking channels.

The investigation found that the agencies continued receiving shipments even after the war began on February 28, with materials entering Iran by sea, air and land from countries including China, Russia and Germany. The findings offer an insight into how Tehran has continued to replenish its military supplies while facing sustained attacks on its missile and drone infrastructure.

At the center of the procurement system is MOD 346428, an agency that imported $2.3 billion in military hardware between January 2025 and June 2026, according to import records reviewed by Reuters. Its purchases included chemicals used in solid rocket fuel, explosives, aircraft engine components, precision industrial equipment and hundreds of heavy-duty trucks that can be converted into mobile missile launchers.

The agencies share the same registered address in Tehran as the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, or MODAFL. Their official incorporation dates are listed as February 11, 1979, the day Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to power following the overthrow of Iran's monarchy. However, records show that most were actually established in 2013, when Iran was under mounting sanctions that had sharply reduced its oil exports and weakened its currency.

Reuters identified the agencies in collaboration with Israeli-American risk consultancy 240 Analytics, drawing on thousands of Iranian banking and government records, corporate filings, shipping documents and import data. Their financial activity can be traced through bills of lading, invoices and bank accounts, even when transactions are conducted through foreign intermediaries.

The system was described by Miad Maleki, a former senior U.S. Treasury official who helped design Washington's sanctions program against Iran, as the regime's military lifeline and a comprehensive ecosystem for its military trade.

A financial system designed to evade sanctions

The agencies operate through a network of frontmen and foreign shell companies, known collectively as trustees, who use money generated by illicit oil sales to purchase equipment for Iran's military.

Rather than transferring funds across borders, where international banking systems could flag suspicious transactions, the network relies on intermediaries abroad who use cash held in foreign bank accounts to pay suppliers and arrange shipments to Iran.

In 97% of the shipments examined by Reuters, payments were settled without a cross-border currency transfer, according to the import data. This arrangement has allowed the procurement system to operate alongside the formal global economy while limiting the financial trail that sanctions authorities might otherwise follow.

The network's scale first emerged through documents from Bank Sepah, the Iranian state-owned lender responsible for handling salaries and pension payments for Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel. Noam Binstok, a senior analyst at 240 Analytics, discovered thousands of accounts bearing the same MOD naming pattern while uploading Iranian banking records to the company's platform in June 2025.

The documents, which had appeared on Telegram and the website WikiIran, showed that the agencies shared the same registration date and address. Each also had a unique 11-digit government identification number that appeared in Iran's corporate registry, bank accounts, invoices and shipping records.

Bank records reviewed by Reuters showed that 36 of the agencies held foreign-currency accounts containing a combined $1.2 billion at the end of 2024. The remainder of the network held approximately $1.8 billion in local currency, with an average balance of about $360,000 per account.

Binstok initially set the project aside before returning to the records in August. The newer documents revealed that the same agencies were receiving money from contraband oil sales and purchasing large quantities of equipment with potential military applications. The discovery allowed investigators to link the financial records to specific imports and map the wider procurement system.

Phone numbers registered to 91 of the agencies also appeared in Bank Sepah records associated with IRGC personnel. Among those identified were at least two commanders whom the United States has accused of abuses against civilian protesters.

Despite decades of sanctions targeting Iran's military establishment, Reuters found no evidence that the numbered agencies identified in the documents had themselves been designated by Western governments.

Rocket fuel chemicals, explosives and the Bandar Abbas blast

MOD 346428's procurement activity has expanded considerably over the years. Its overseas purchases rose from $442 million in the 12 months ending in March 2023 to $988 million in the following 12-month period, placing it among Iran's 10 largest importers, according to customs statistics published in Iranian media.

Between January and April 2025, the agency imported 886 tonnes of chemicals into the Bandar Abbas port complex. The shipments were listed as originating in China and included sodium chlorates and other perchlorates, chemicals that can be used as precursors for solid rocket fuel.

Three days after the final shipment arrived, a massive explosion struck the port on April 26. Two people familiar with the incident told Reuters that sodium perchlorate had ignited inside shipping containers at the docks.

Iranian state media reported that the chemicals were stored by Sina Port and Marine Services Development Co., which is owned by Bonyad Mostazafan, a multibillion-dollar foundation directly controlled by Iran's supreme leader.

The blast killed at least 70 people and injured more than 1,200. Sina's chief executive at the time attributed the explosion to a false declaration concerning the contents of a shipment that had been delivered without proper documentation or labels.

Reuters could not establish whether chemicals contained in the final 75-tonne shipment were responsible for the explosion.

Bonyad Mostazafan was sanctioned by the United States in 2020. The U.S. Treasury Department alleged that the foundation, which presents itself as a charity serving the poor, had been used by the supreme leader to enrich his office and reward allies.

The foundation is headed by Hossein Dehghan, who became Iran's defense minister in 2013, when most of the MOD agencies were established. Dehghan previously commanded IRGC forces in Lebanon and was linked in a U.S. Treasury sanctions statement to the 1983 bombing of international peacekeeping forces in Beirut, which killed 241 U.S. service members and 58 French paratroopers, as well as Lebanese civilians. The United States has blamed Iran for the attack.

Dehghan did not respond to Reuters' requests for comment about the explosion, the MOD network or his position at the foundation.

Trucks converted into mobile missile launchers

The procurement system has also brought hundreds of heavy-duty trucks into Iran, some of which can be used as disguised mobile platforms for missiles and drones.

One of the earliest examples identified by investigators involved six Iveco Eurocargo trucks purchased in Italy in autumn 2022 by an Iranian car dealer living there. The vehicles, bought for 426,000 euros, were shipped to Deilami Trading Co. in Dubai before being transported to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas.

The buyer's identification number was linked to MOD 346428, while the packing list indicated that the trucks were ultimately destined for Sahara Thunder, an Iranian company that plays a significant role in manufacturing and selling drones. The United States sanctioned Sahara Thunder in 2024 over its production and supply of drones to Russia for use in the war in Ukraine.

Between January 2025 and June 2026, MOD 346428 imported another 435 Iveco trucks. Reuters used satellite imagery, social media footage and vehicle identification numbers to trace some of them to a customs yard outside Tehran in February 2025.

An Iveco truck also appeared in footage released by U.S. Central Command in March, showing what the military said was a strike on a disguised Iranian mobile missile launcher. Reuters could not establish whether the vehicle was among those imported by MOD 346428, but analysts at British defense intelligence company Janes identified it as an Iveco model of a type imported by Iran.

Iveco said its official distributors are required to ensure that vehicles are not used for military, chemical, biological or nuclear purposes and that the company has safeguards against sales to prohibited destinations, entities or individuals. It added, however, that it cannot control products transferred by third parties with which it has no direct contractual relationship.

The Italian company said it had no record of the 2022 sale identified by Reuters and that most of the trucks found in the Tehran customs yard had been intended for Central Asian markets. It maintained that any Iveco vehicles present in Iran had reached the country beyond the company's control and responsibility.

The same agency also imported thousands of Toyota Hilux and Land Cruiser pickups. The IRGC and its affiliated groups modify such vehicles to mount heavy machine guns on their flatbeds, turning civilian-style pickups into armed platforms.

Footage from protests earlier this year showed security forces driving Land Cruisers equipped with machine guns through the northern Iranian city of Tonkebon. In January 2025, MOD 346428 also imported four Toyota Tundras, a model used by the IRGC to transport drones.

Toyota said it did not conduct business in Iran and had neither participated in nor had knowledge of the purchases identified by Reuters. Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry said it maintained strict controls on exports of goods related to national security and conducted outreach to businesses to explain the relevant regulations.

Supplies continued during the war

The import records indicate that Iran continued acquiring materials needed for its missile and drone programs even as the United States and Israel targeted military facilities, production sites and weapons infrastructure during the war.

On February 9, 2026, a ship arrived at Bandar Abbas carrying 93 tonnes of unwrought Chinese titanium, a high-strength metal that weapons experts said could be used in missile airframes and rocket motor casings.

In the month before the war began on February 28, shipments also included 268 tonnes of nitrocellulose and 276 tonnes of other chemicals originating in China. The materials, classified under customs codes that include perchlorate, can be used in rocket propellants and explosives.

Imports initially fell sharply after the war began. Monthly shipments dropped by 47% in March, to $54 million from the previous month, but had recovered to $77 million by May, according to the data.

A June shipment included $1.9 million worth of Russian detonators, which can trigger high explosives used in missile and drone warheads. It was the fifth similar shipment from Russia since January 2025, bringing the total value of such deliveries to $7.6 million.

The materials entered Iran through several routes, including cargo ships crossing the Caspian Sea from Russia, trucks arriving from Central Asia and freight aircraft from China.

The imports also included hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of trucks, aircraft engine components and electronics listed as originating in Germany and other European Union countries. The records identified MOD 346428 as the importer and included $34 million worth of Iveco trucks.

The findings raise questions about how goods reached Iran despite the European Union's sanctions against its Defense Ministry. An EU spokesperson said member states were responsible for enforcing the bloc's sanctions, which also cover Sahara Thunder and other entities, adding that the bloc continued to assess information concerning Iran's efforts to strengthen its drone and missile programs.

The governments of Germany and Italy did not respond to Reuters' requests for comment.

Reuters cautioned that not all import records contained detailed descriptions of shipments. In some cases, investigators relied on customs codes to identify the goods and their declared origins, which they could not independently verify.

China, Russia and the UAE in the supply chain

China and Russia featured prominently in the import records, although their governments denied or did not confirm involvement in the reported procurement activity.

China's Foreign Ministry said it was unaware of the situation described by Reuters and opposed attempts to associate regional hostilities with China or damage its reputation.

On October 12, U.S. President Donald Trump said he did not believe Beijing or Moscow was providing support to Iran's war effort, arguing that any assistance would be limited. The White House, Russia's Defense Ministry and U.S. Central Command did not respond to Reuters' requests for comment.

The records also showed that $27 million worth of goods purchased by Iran's military since the war began were listed as originating in the United Arab Emirates, with almost all arriving by sea.

The most recent shipment identified in the data was listed as electronics and arrived by sea on June 27, nine days after Washington announced the suspension of its naval blockade. The blockade resumed in mid-July and remained in effect at the time of the Reuters report.

The UAE government rejected the allegations in a statement sent to Reuters after publication, describing them as baseless and saying they misrepresented the country's policies and actions. It said the Emirates was committed to preventing its territory from being used for illicit activities.

Military procurement network extends into Iran's security apparatus

The investigation also found that the MOD agencies were connected to a broader system of state-linked foundations known as bonyads, which control substantial parts of Iran's economy and are closely tied to the country's political and security establishment.

Many of the foundations were created after the 1979 Islamic Revolution using assets confiscated from the former royal family and others considered enemies of the new government. U.S. and European sanctions documents, as well as previous Reuters investigations, have described the foundations as instruments through which Iran's elite maintains influence and rewards loyal allies.

One example is the Foundation for the Preservation of Relics and Publication of Sacred Defense Values, which is tasked with promoting the government's ideology and what it calls the culture of resistance, sacrifice, jihad and martyrdom.

Documents reviewed by Reuters showed that the foundation had financial links to at least two MOD agencies, including through internal cash transfers. In 2017, it received four shipments of electronics and refrigeration equipment whose identification numbers matched those of MOD 346428. The investigation could not establish how the foundation used the goods.

The foundation's leadership includes senior IRGC commanders from all 31 Iranian provinces. In Khuzestan, one of them is Brigadier General Hassan Shahvarpour, the longtime commander of the IRGC's elite forces in the region.

Shahvarpour did not respond to Reuters' requests for comment. U.S. sanctions documents accuse units under his command of killing at least 100 civilians in the city of Mahshahr during protests in 2019 over rising fuel prices. The U.S. Treasury said the forces used armored vehicles to surround protesters attempting to flee before opening fire with machine guns.

Two local human rights activists who said they witnessed the killings told Reuters that security forces also set fire to sugarcane fields where some protesters had sought refuge. One activist's account was corroborated by another person who was present.

Washington sanctioned Shahvarpour in 2020 over alleged human rights abuses. During a religious ceremony after the sanctions were imposed, a prominent cleric reportedly kissed him on the head and described the measures as a source of pride.

In 2021, Shahvarpour requested 50 billion rials from a state-owned steel company to finance the construction of a new IRGC building in Khuzestan. The sum was then worth more than $1 million at the official exchange rate. A document bearing his signature identified MOD 424000 as the account that was to receive the money.

The two activists also told Reuters that Shahvarpour's forces played a role in suppressing demonstrations in Khuzestan at the beginning of this year, during a nationwide uprising against Iran's economic collapse. They said they had documented 46 deaths in the province, most of them on January 8 and 9, when IRGC forces allegedly opened fire on protesters.

State television footage from a parade earlier this year showed IRGC troops under Shahvarpour driving through a town in Khuzestan in white Toyota Tundras of the type favored by the MOD procurement network. One of the trucks was carrying a bright pink Shahed drone.

Questions over the effectiveness of sanctions

The findings highlight the challenge facing Western governments seeking to restrict Iran's access to military technology and prevent it from rebuilding its weapons capabilities.

The United States has imposed sanctions on Iran's military institutions and companies for decades. Yet the numbered agencies identified by Reuters appear to have operated without being individually designated by Western governments, while using foreign intermediaries and payment arrangements that reduce their exposure to conventional financial monitoring.

The network has also demonstrated an ability to source materials through multiple countries and transport routes, including during a war in which Iran's missile and drone facilities have been targeted by U.S. and Israeli forces.

A U.S. Treasury Department spokeswoman said Washington had severed the Iranian government's economic lifelines and remained ahead of its attempts to evade sanctions, finance military programs and access foreign currency.

But Peter Salisbury, a Columbia University adjunct assistant professor who researches Iranian arms transfers and supply chains, said the import records pointed to an industrial-scale effort to rebuild or expand Iran's existing missile and drone arsenal.

The data, he said, demonstrated the adaptability of Iran's procurement system and its ability to find alternative routes for obtaining critical supplies.

Reuters' findings were reviewed by four specialists in Iranian sanctions and weapons procurement, who confirmed that many of the imported materials could be used in missile and drone programs. They also cautioned that a significant portion of the goods, including some chemicals and explosives, have potential civilian applications.

Iranian government entities and companies contacted by Reuters, including the presidency and Tehran's delegation to the United Nations in Geneva, did not respond to detailed requests for comment.

The investigation was based on thousands of Iranian banking and government records, corporate filings, confidential shipping documents and import data. Reuters also cross-checked a portion of approximately 19,000 import records against shipping documents, social media footage and Iranian state media reports.