Hezbollah supporters blocked roads in Beirut and protested the Lebanese government’s attempts to assert sovereignty on October 16 and 17, after a series of government internal security raids compromised Hezbollah’s weapons smuggling, illicit finance, and de facto statelets within Lebanon. Hezbollah officials expressed fury at the government’s unannounced and entirely legitimate police action, and began threatening Lebanon’s government and population with civil conflict if the government continued to challenge Hezbollah’s criminal and terrorist activities on October 19. The Lebanese government responded with measures that Hezbollah officials likely did not expect, including major military deployments to the Hezbollah stronghold in Dahieh, Beirut’s southern suburbs. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s recent statements of resolve to restore the rule of law contrast entirely with Hezbollah’s desired effect, which is to freeze the government into inaction using credible threats of violent unrest.

This most recent effort is part of Hezbollah’s attempts to compel the Lebanese government to abandon its efforts to disarm the group using methods that rely upon Hezbollah’s historic successes in doing so. The Lebanese government’s commitment to disarm Hezbollah through a June 2026 agreement with the United States and Israel poses an existential threat to Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s raison d’etre of “resistance” is predicated on the use of force to oppose Israel and other adversaries. Any effort to disarm its military organization would therefore be akin to Hezbollah’s destruction. Hezbollah is executing several lines of effort to deter the Lebanese government from disarming the group and secure popular support for Hezbollah’s military organization. These efforts include threatening the government and anti-Hezbollah civilians, discrediting the government as a sectarian institution that is subservient to US and Israeli interests, attempting to portray itself and other parties that oppose the agreement as a multi-religious coalition representative of Lebanese popular will, and advancing Iranian-assisted reconstruction for Hezbollah’s Shia support base. There are considerable challenges Hezbollah must overcome to successfully compel the government to abandon its efforts. It must, for example, convince its historic support base in the south that it is a competent nationalist organization that can “defend” the Shia base while presenting the Lebanese army as inept and sectarian. The United States must support the Lebanese government in implementing the terms of the June 2026 agreement — particularly by supporting the Lebanese military — to deny Hezbollah the initiative to preserve its armed capabilities and leverage popular support.

Lebanese government initiatives to disarm Hezbollah over the past two decades failed because Hezbollah repeatedly succeeded in coercing the government to abandon its course. Hezbollah is a formidable military organization even after recent setbacks. It has ample weaponry, some (albeit decreased) support among Lebanon’s Shia population, and an institutionalized role in the Lebanese government. Hezbollah has repeatedly leveraged these assets to deter the government and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) from pursuing meaningful, lasting disarmament initiatives. Government efforts in 2007 and 2008 to restrict Hezbollah’s logistics and telecommunications networks prompted Hezbollah to mobilize its supporters and fighters and seize West Beirut in May 2008. Hezbollah’s seizure of Beirut neighborhoods by force enabled the group to extract political concessions from the government. Hezbollah also ultimately maintained public support by contrasting itself with the corrupt political class, even though it broke its promise to avoid using weapons against Lebanese citizens and alienated many non-Shia citizens.

Hezbollah again threatened civil unrest against the government to thwart disarmament efforts in 2025. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem openly threatened to provoke mass protests against the government in August 2025 during the first major government attempt to disarm Hezbollah after Israel’s 2024 campaign, for example. Government forces made limited progress in disarming Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in late 2025. Hezbollah’s threats made senior LAF officers fearful of fracturing within the military. Many of the current LAF senior leaders were junior officers during previous instances of upheaval within the LAF. These officers are naturally concerned about the health of the institution they serve and the risks that a divided LAF would present to the country.

Hezbollah views efforts to deter it as an existential threat, and dismantling Hezbollah’s military organization would be akin to the destruction of Hezbollah. Hezbollah is not a political party; it is a military force that created a political party and social apparatus to protect itself. The strict implementation of the agreement is therefore an existential threat to Hezbollah because it expressly intends to dismantle Hezbollah’s military organization. Some Lebanese officials have suggested that Hezbollah could become a purely political party after disarmament, but this would be inconsistent with Hezbollah’s view of itself. Hezbollah’s raison d’etre of “resistance” is predicated on the use of violent force to oppose Israel and other threats. Any effort to disarm its military organization would therefore be akin to Hezbollah’s destruction. Hezbollah would only acquiesce to disarmament if it rejected its foundational principles, which could cause the group to splinter. Hezbollah will not allow itself to accept disarmament and risk splintering unless it is forced to do so. Hezbollah therefore seeks to compel the government to abandon the agreement or stall meaningful disarmament efforts indefinitely, at minimum.

Hezbollah’s efforts to relate itself to and secure the support of the Lebanese public are integral to its efforts to avoid disarmament. Hezbollah overwhelmingly depends on the support and complicity of Lebanese Shia civilians to secure its operations, maintain its political and armed authority, and challenge the Lebanese government. Hezbollah has repeatedly exploited the population to weaponize civil unrest against the government and thwart disarmament efforts, such as in 2008 and 2025. Civilians and local officials who are loyal to Hezbollah also hinder disarmament on the ground by electing not to cooperate with government orders and LAF personnel who must seize concealed weapons and dismantle military infrastructure.

Hezbollah desires the support or acquiescence of non-Shia Lebanese civilians, despite its primary focus on the Shia population, to appear as a legitimate anti-sectarian political organization. Hezbollah leaders have long framed the group as the primary extension and legitimate representative of Lebanese civilians and popular interests. Hezbollah’s 2009 manifesto declared the group as the “people’s resistance,” for example. Hezbollah founded and continues to fund, train, and arm the Lebanese Resistance Brigades —a multi-religious adjunct militia that sometimes fights alongside Hezbollah — to strengthen its claim that Hezbollah and its affiliates are representative of the broader Lebanese population. Hezbollah’s political organization similarly includes offices like the “Christian Relations Department” to seem considerate of all Lebanese civilians, even though the group has engaged in sectarian violence and regularly threatens non-Shia Lebanese to preserve itself.

Hezbollah has significant challenges to its survival that the United States and its partners can and should exploit. The group’s nationalist credentials are extremely questionable at present, given the degree of IRGC penetration. Secretary General Naim Qassem is a figurehead who lacks the charisma and support his predecessor enjoyed. Local civilians in southern Lebanon increasingly view Hezbollah as incompetent and a threat to their interests because Hezbollah has started two wars in 24 months. Hezbollah’s present military weakness also makes the group vulnerable to limited force or threats of force from the LAF in localized areas. These challenges to Hezbollah’s hegemony in Lebanon are real, and they are exploitable. The United States must remain focused on assisting its Lebanese partners in their efforts to suppress and ultimately destroy Hezbollah.

Hezbollah’s Lines of Effort