On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the launch of the Lebanese Resistance, Kataeb MP Salim Sayegh offered a sweeping reflection on the roots of Lebanon’s civil war and the political responsibility of interpreting history with an eye toward the future.

“Political analysis must be future-oriented. History cannot be reduced to a mere narrative or a photographic description of reality. History is written through political vision, and based on that, leaders must define the Lebanon they want and shape the future accordingly,” Sayegh said in an interview with Voice of Lebanon radio.

He emphasized that he aligns with the school of thought that rejects neutral historical narratives.

“Every side tells the story in its own way,” he said. “But we must also not forget the official records—state reports, gendarmerie logs, and Lebanese intelligence briefings—documenting what really happened on the ground.”

Sayegh challenged the commonly held belief that Lebanon's civil war began on April 13, 1975.

“The war didn’t start with the Ain al-Remmaneh bus incident. It began before the Cairo Agreement,” he said, referring to the 1969 pact that granted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) autonomy in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

“That agreement was a direct result of the Palestinians seizing control of the Lebanese state and its sovereignty. They desecrated national sanctities, and the Lebanese Army found itself in a defensive posture, no longer in control of national territory.”

“The Cairo Agreement had to be negotiated in Egypt,” he added, “because the Lebanese state wasn’t capable of concluding such a deal at home. The Palestinian factor had torn Lebanon apart. The state was gasping for air, buying time, while all Lebanese factions were seeking a way to reorganize the situation.”

Sayegh pointed to regional dynamics that exacerbated the crisis.

“After Yasser Arafat’s failed attempt to overthrow King Hussein in Jordan in 1970, the entire PLO leadership and infrastructure relocated to Beirut and the camps,” he said. “From that point on, Lebanese Army and security forces were barred from entering those camps. The Cairo Agreement lost all meaning. The PLO unilaterally imposed its will on Lebanon and disrupted the internal balance.”

He added that certain factions of the Lebanese left sought to exploit the Palestinian presence.

“Some factions of the Lebanese left thought they could use the Palestinian card to reduce the powers of the presidency—what they saw as ‘Christian privileges’—as part of their push for political reforms. This intersection of domestic and Palestinian agendas turned the Lebanese crisis into a blend of internal and external struggles, and the state simply collapsed under the weight.”

Sayegh recalled a missed opportunity in 1973, when the Lebanese Army attempted to regain control of the camps under President Suleiman Frangieh’s leadership.

“The army was barred from intervening due to Arab and international pressure. That’s when the Kataeb Party, in coordination with the Army and the Lebanese state, decided not to leave the country to chaos.”

According to Sayegh, Kataeb established training camps to prepare young men to assist the Army if needed.

“We knew war was coming, and we prepared to protect the roads, the capital, and critical areas.”

Dispelling a common misconception, Sayegh insisted that it was wrong to frame the conflict as Christians versus Palestinians.

“It’s wrong to say Christians were against the Palestinians,” he said. “Even southern Lebanese, including Shia communities and the Amal Movement, later took up arms against the PLO. The 1975 war was merely the spark that ignited an already explosive situation.”

“On April 14, the day after the Ain al-Remmaneh bus incident, Palestinians bombarded the area from several directions. The Lebanese Army did not intervene. Without the Kataeb and the support of local citizens, who would have defended Ain al-Remmaneh and told the Palestinians: ‘You shall not pass’?” Sayegh asked.

“If Arafat had succeeded in linking Sabra and Shatila with Tel al-Zaatar and Jisr al-Basha, the Lebanese State would have fallen under his control.”

While acknowledging the need for introspection, Sayegh rejected the notion that the current generation has a different view of the war.

“Our self-reflection is not a generational conflict; it’s a political methodology aimed at correcting the record. But our stance on Ain al-Remmaneh and the Palestinian presence in Lebanon is a constant. It’s like a doctrine that is non-negotiable when it comes to sovereignty. Our political project is to strengthen Lebanon and build a state that safeguards human dignity.”

Sayegh credited the Kataeb’s resistance with preserving Lebanon as a sovereign state, leading up to the Taif Agreement.

“Kataeb’s steadfastness in confronting the Palestinian project helped prevent naturalization and preserved the state’s sovereignty,” he said. “Yasser Arafat once claimed he ruled Lebanon, admitting to controlling Lebanese territory—but he never secured Lebanese legitimacy. That’s how we preserved a free Lebanon and allowed the state to reclaim its dynamics.”

“Today, when people speak of the constitution, justice, and neutrality, they should remember these were Kataeb’s slogans since the 1950s. None of that would have been possible without the firm decision that ‘Arafat will not pass through Ain al-Remmaneh.’”

Reflecting on the early days of the conflict, Sayegh said the fighting was chaotic and terrifying.

“Most of those who took to the streets were armed with hunting rifles and had no idea who they were even shooting at. The fear was overwhelming,” he recalled. “Yet, there was bravery in defending homes. War came to Ain al-Remmaneh—it wasn’t Ain al-Remmaneh that went to war. It landed in our laps, not the other way around.”

He added: “The most important lesson is that if the same events happened again, we’d react the same way. If war was to be prevented, it should’ve been in 1969, not 1975. The Army should’ve intervened decisively, no matter the cost. Moments of truth are existential, not political or tactical: you either exist, or you don’t.”

Sayegh said taking up arms was not solely a party decision.

“There was a popular will, with the Kataeb Party forming the backbone due to its credibility and organization. The founding president inspired trust. Other parties like Camille Chamoun’s National Liberal Party, Raymond Edde’s National Bloc, and the Constitutional Bloc also rejected isolating the Kataeb.”

He concluded by underscoring the importance of rebuilding the nation through a renewed belief in Lebanon’s future.

“The ability of Lebanese to learn from history and rebuild the homeland must be driven by a renewed will to believe in Lebanon, despite everything. So we must ask: Does Lebanon deserve another chance? In my view, the answer is yes.”

On the subject of reconciliation, Sayegh emphasized that it must happen on all levels.

“It must occur among leaders and among the people. But reconciliation needs the right conditions, starting with a sense of security. You can’t fight a war in the South and launch economic projects in Beirut. Lebanese have lived through that contradiction in the 1990s—when Beirut was vibrant while the South was at war.”

“We need to begin this process once state sovereignty and the rule of law are restored. Only then will we have a framework of standards to guide real dialogue. Without that, any so-called dialogue will be nothing but idle talk,” he said.