Source: Kataeb.org
Thursday 1 October 2026 09:01:34
Lebanese citizens may already account for only about 54% of the people living in Lebanon, according to a 2026 demographic study that estimates the country’s population at 6.86 million in mid-2024.
More strikingly, the study, cited by Libnanews magazine, projects that Lebanese could account for between 45% and 48.8% of the resident population by 2035, potentially making them a minority among the people living in the country.
The figures are estimates rather than the results of a new national census, and other official and international sources use different population counts. But the study highlights a broader demographic challenge facing Lebanon: declining birth rates, emigration, an aging population and the presence of a large non-Lebanese population.
The study estimates that Lebanon had about 3.7 million Lebanese residents in mid-2024, out of a total population of roughly 6.86 million.
That would put Lebanese citizens at around 54% of the people living in the country.
The remaining population is estimated at about 2.1 million displaced Syrians, 230,000 Palestinian refugees and 830,000 people of other nationalities.
The study, published through Lebanon’s National Defense journal, draws on several statistical databases and demographic assumptions. It uses different sources for Lebanese and non-Lebanese populations, including Central Administration of Statistics data, Palestinian population figures and Lebanese General Security data on displaced Syrians.
The 54% figure should therefore not be treated as a definitive measurement of Lebanon’s population.
Lebanon has not conducted a comprehensive modern population census that could provide an exact, up-to-date breakdown of residents by nationality. Different government agencies and international organizations also use different methodologies, reference dates and definitions.
That helps explain why population estimates can differ substantially.
The study projects Lebanon’s total population at about 8.01 million by 2035.
Under an optimistic scenario in which the Lebanese population resumes positive growth, Lebanese citizens would represent about 48.8% of the total population. Under a scenario in which current growth trends continue, their share would fall to about 45%.
In one projection, the number of Lebanese would reach around 3.91 million by 2035.
The study assumes that the displaced Syrian population, starting from about 2.1 million, could reach approximately 2.91 million under its projected growth rate. The Palestinian refugee population would rise to about 283,000.
But those figures are not a fixed forecast. They depend on assumptions about births and deaths, Lebanese emigration, Syrian returns, new arrivals, departures of foreign nationals and future migration policies.
A substantial change in any of those factors could significantly alter the demographic picture.
Other data illustrate the difficulty of establishing a single population figure for Lebanon.
Lebanon’s Ministry of Public Health estimates the resident Lebanese population at about 4.07 million in 2025. The ministry says that estimate is based on the latest Central Administration of Statistics household and labor-force survey and subsequent estimates.
The difference between 4.07 million and the roughly 3.7 million Lebanese estimated by the demographic study for 2024 underscores the importance of methodology and reference dates.
The Syrian population is an even greater source of uncertainty.
The Lebanon Response Plan and UN agencies estimate that about 1.12 million Syrian refugees were in Lebanon at the start of 2026. UNHCR said more than 500,000 refugees returned to Syria during 2025, while more than 100,000 Syrians arrived in Lebanon after December 2024.
Those figures are considerably lower than the 2.1 million Syrians used as the starting point in the demographic study.
The discrepancy does not necessarily mean that one figure is correct and the other incorrect. Rather, it reflects different definitions, sources and methodologies for estimating a population that is difficult to count precisely.
The demographic shift is not only about the number of foreigners living in Lebanon. The size and structure of the Lebanese population itself are changing.
Official Health Ministry data show a sustained decline in Lebanese births.
Hospital records show that the number of Lebanese live births fell from 69,380 in 2017 to 49,859 in 2025, a decline of about 28%.
A separate civil-registration series recorded 90,647 Lebanese births in 2017 and 70,986 in 2025, also showing a substantial decline, although the two datasets measure different things and should not be directly compared.
The Health Ministry's data also show that the hospital-recorded number of Lebanese births declined almost every year over the period, despite differences between hospital and civil-registration figures.
The economic crisis that began in 2019 has compounded the demographic pressures, encouraging many working-age Lebanese and university graduates to seek opportunities abroad.
Even when emigration is temporary, it reduces the number of Lebanese physically present in the country and can affect marriage, family formation and birth patterns.
Lebanon is also expected to age significantly in the coming decades.
The demographic study projects that the median age of Lebanese citizens will reach 38 by 2050, while people aged 65 and older could account for about 25% of the Lebanese population.
Such a shift would increase pressure on the labor market, healthcare system, pensions and broader social-protection networks.
A smaller working-age population would have to support a growing proportion of older people, increasing the dependency burden on workers and public institutions.
The demographic challenge is therefore broader than the changing ratio between Lebanese and non-Lebanese residents. It also concerns the ability of the Lebanese population to reproduce itself and retain working-age people inside the country.
The size of the Syrian population remains one of the most important variables in any projection of Lebanon’s future demographic structure.
A scenario in which a very large Syrian population remains in Lebanon would mechanically reduce the Lebanese share of the overall population. Conversely, sustained large-scale returns to Syria would significantly change the calculation.
Returns accelerated after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in December 2024. UNHCR reported that more than 500,000 Syrian refugees returned to Syria in 2025, while the UN-backed Lebanon Response Plan put the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon at 1.12 million at the start of 2026.
But the number of border crossings does not necessarily translate into permanent returns.
Security, economic and humanitarian conditions in Syria remain important factors in determining whether families can settle there permanently. Some families also maintain homes, relatives or economic interests on both sides of the border.
As a result, demographic projections extending to 2035 will have to be revised as population movements evolve.
Lebanon’s demographic debate ultimately faces a basic statistical problem: the absence of a recent comprehensive population census.
Researchers, government agencies and international organizations therefore combine household surveys, administrative records, registration data and estimates of refugee and migrant populations. These sources serve different purposes and do not necessarily count the same population.
It is also important to distinguish between Lebanese citizens, Lebanese residents and the total population living in Lebanon.
A Lebanese citizen who has permanently emigrated remains a Lebanese national but is not part of the country’s resident population. Conversely, a Syrian refugee or foreign worker living in Lebanon is part of the population present in the country without being a Lebanese citizen.
The study’s estimate that Lebanese citizens represented about 54% of the population in 2024 is therefore best understood as the outcome of a particular demographic reconstruction, rather than an official and definitive population share.
The broader trend, however, is visible across several datasets: Lebanese births have declined, emigration has increased, the population is aging and Lebanon continues to host a large non-Lebanese population.
How much the Lebanese share changes by 2035 will depend heavily on birth and death rates, emigration, the Lebanese economy, migration flows and, above all, the scale and permanence of Syrian returns.