Source: Kataeb.org
Saturday 10 October 2026 12:14:38
Calls are growing in Venezuela to dismantle what critics describe as the remaining financial and military networks of Hezbollah, which they accuse of exploiting the presidencies of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro to build an extensive system of influence and cross-border financing, Erem News reported, citing local sources.
Despite steps by acting President Delcy Rodríguez to reset relations with Iran in line with international diplomatic norms, moves that could affect Tehran’s regional allies, Hezbollah-linked networks are still believed to retain financial and military influence in Venezuela, according to political and media sources cited in reports on the issue.
The group is accused of exploiting vast border areas in South America to run money-laundering operations and move illicit funds across borders, taking advantage of gaps in oversight to finance activities spanning several continents.
Political and media sources in Caracas say Hezbollah’s presence in Venezuela has declined sharply. They point to the current government’s efforts to establish closer cooperation with Washington and Tel Aviv, arguing that the shift has coincided with a campaign to curb the Lebanese group’s activities in the country.
According to these sources, the end of Maduro’s rule disrupted Hezbollah’s economic ties with influential Venezuelan figures, including Tareck El Aissami, a former government official who held senior positions and has been associated with the country’s political and economic establishment.
The sources say Hezbollah has lost much of the official diplomatic cover it previously enjoyed, making it harder for the group to manage logistics, authenticate documents and carry out complex operations.
They also say the group’s networks have contracted dramatically, with senior figures and key operatives either leaving Venezuela or going into hiding. The account is based on local and regional intelligence reports and analysis, according to sources close to the current governing establishment.
Former security hubs, including Yaritagua and Margarita Island, are no longer believed to offer the group the same opportunities to operate training camps or safe havens. The sources attribute the change to increased U.S. monitoring and a restructuring of Venezuela’s intelligence services under a new military, security and intelligence doctrine.
Hezbollah may still maintain sleeper cells or small-scale smuggling networks in remote areas or in cooperation with some drug cartels, the sources say. But they argue that Caracas has effectively ceased to serve as a regional command center and military-security sanctuary for the group.
A contrasting assessment suggests that Hezbollah-linked networks remain active in Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin America, with their operations supported by a broader web of commercial and criminal partnerships.
Investigations by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration have identified strategic relationships between networks linked to Hezbollah and drug cartels across South America, particularly in Venezuela, according to the account.
One method cited is the trafficking of so-called “black cocaine,” in which cocaine is chemically processed to resemble coal, making it more difficult for customs authorities to detect.
The alleged trafficking routes extend beyond the Americas into West and Central Africa, where Lebanese expatriate communities and established family and commercial ties can provide connections for moving goods and money. The region is described as a key transit point for shipments destined for European markets.
The profits from these operations are alleged to generate substantial revenue, with millions of dollars ultimately flowing back into Hezbollah-linked networks in Lebanon.
Strategic and investigative reports have also raised concerns about the use of free-trade zones to launder illicit proceeds. Weak customs controls and regulatory oversight in certain locations can allow networks to move money across borders while disguising its origins.
Areas identified in the reports include Panama’s Colón Free Zone, free-trade zones in Chile and Belize, and the tri-border region where Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay meet.
The networks are alleged to use trade-based money laundering, a practice that can involve falsifying invoices, manipulating the declared value of shipments and importing a range of consumer goods. These techniques can make illicit financial flows appear legitimate and allow value to be transferred internationally without immediately raising suspicions among banks.
The tri-border region is also described as a hub for money laundering, cigarette smuggling, arms trafficking, financial transfers and black-market activity.
Against this backdrop, experts who monitor suspicious financial flows are urging governments to look beyond conventional efforts to combat drug trafficking and target what they describe as the “shadow financial architecture” that sustains these networks.
They are calling on countries across the region, including Venezuela, to move beyond assurances about Hezbollah’s intentions and close regulatory loopholes in free-trade zones.
They also advocate designating all branches of Hezbollah as terrorist organizations, arguing that such designations would make it easier to freeze bank accounts, pursue suspected financiers and bring cases before the courts.
The challenge, according to this assessment, is not limited to identifying individual operatives or intercepting drug shipments. It also involves tracing the financial and commercial structures that allegedly allow money to move between Latin America, Africa, Europe and the Middle East.