There has been much talk lately of reconstruction in Arab territories and countries destroyed in recent conflicts – above all Gaza, Syria and Lebanon. Yet the amounts involved are so potentially enormous, that we must seriously consider that reconstruction may not happen. Such an outcome will have myriad political repercussions.

The situation in Lebanon will be particularly interesting to watch, insofar as developments in the country reflect fault lines in the broader Middle East. This is especially true of the rivalry between many Arab states and Israel, on the one side, and Iran, on the other, so that reconstruction will be tied to regional power considerations.

In a recent article for Foreign Affairs, Maha Yahya, the director of the Carnegie Middle East Centre in Beirut, wrote that the “World Bank and UN organisations have estimated that rebuilding the Middle East and providing enough humanitarian aid will cost between $350 and $650 billion. The UN Development Programme has estimated that at least $40 to $50 billion is needed to rebuild Gaza alone”.

The obvious question is who will be willing to pay such astronomical amounts? In Lebanon, specifically, the World Bank has estimated the losses from the conflict with Israel at $11 billion in the short and medium terms. Many in the country still believe that the Gulf states will step up to cover at least a portion of those costs. However, this may be wishful thinking, for three reasons principally.

First, no money will be given until the Lebanese introduce economic and financial reforms. The days of blank cheques are long gone. Second, many of the Gulf states have domestic priorities, while, regionally, other entities – above all Syria and Gaza – are competing with Lebanon for assistance. And third, what impetus do such states have to help rebuild Lebanese areas controlled by their political foes? Very little.

Last week, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun visited Saudi Arabia, and it was noticeable that he came back with no Saudi financial commitments to assist Lebanon. Instead, the final communique affirmed the need for Lebanon to implement reforms, and the two sides agreed to examine the “obstacles” to a resumption of Lebanese exports to the kingdom and a return of Saudi travellers to Lebanon.

The Saudi intention was not to humiliate Mr Aoun, whose election the kingdom backed and with whom it has, by all accounts, good relations. Rather, as one Saudi source described it, the visit served to “break the ice” with Lebanon, but also to show that “there was no rush to return to the country”. After more than a decade of tensions with the Gulf states, Lebanon will require more time to regain the trust of prospective funders.

Then there are the politics. Earlier this month, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, signalled a hardening of Iran’s position on negotiations with the US, when he declared such talks “[would not be] intelligent, wise, or honourable”. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian confirmed this policy direction when he stated: “I personally believed it would be better to negotiate [with the US], but the supreme leader said we will not talk with the US. So I said we would not negotiate with the US.”

In light of this, one could expect Iran to try to resurrect its network of regional allies, above all Hezbollah, which was severely weakened in the recent war with Israel. Such a context makes it all the more difficult to expect that those who oppose Iran’s allies most in the region will rush to rebuild areas of Lebanon that are mainly loyal to Hezbollah, in such a way that this assistance may restore the group’s credibility.

On the contrary, for as long as Hezbollah-controlled areas remain in the devastated condition they are today, the group may see its popularity erode. Its secretary general, Naim Qassem, has anticipated this, recently declaring: “The state must lead reconstruction efforts [since] what Israel destroyed, it destroyed in the Lebanese state.” In other words, Hezbollah seems prepared to deflect anger in the Shiite community away from itself and on to the government if no funding arrives for reconstruction.

That cynical tactic might work to a limited extent, but nothing can change the fact that Hezbollah will find it all but impossible to resume a military strategy against Israel with communal endorsement if reconstruction money is not forthcoming. This may also lead to a domestic political backlash visible in parliamentary elections next year, and even in municipal elections, also next year. For Hezbollah and the allied Amal Movement, to lose their electoral stranglehold over the Shiite community would represent a major blow.

That is precisely why Hezbollah is so keen to secure reconstruction assistance before the elections. And that is also why the countries most likely to help Lebanon may see little reason to intervene. Hezbollah finds itself in a bad place. Until it reinvents itself as a civilian party, it will remain at the mercy of those it once so recklessly castigated.