International efforts around Lebanon are increasingly converging on a single idea: strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces so the State can fully assert its authority and ensure that weapons are held exclusively under its control. With the notable exception of Hezbollah, most political actors broadly agree on this objective even if they remain divided on how realistic it is, and how to get there.

While there is broad agreement on the need to disarm Hezbollah, divisions persist over the feasibility of such a move and the tools required to implement it. The Lebanese government has issued firm statements in support of State authority, but tangible progress on the ground has remained limited.

As Lebanon approaches a potential transition in its security framework, officials face a growing challenge: coordinating multiple international tracks, or at least preventing them from working at cross-purposes.

According to an article published by Annahar, one of these tracks involves the United Nations. The organization is expected to try to preserve its political role through the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL), while continuing operational work through the Observer Group Lebanon (OGL), which currently operates under the umbrella of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). However, extending or replacing these roles after UNIFIL’s mandate expires would require a new mandate from the UN Security Council; something that would largely depend on U.S. approval.

At the same time, Europe is exploring its own options. The European Union and several member states are considering deploying separate missions once UNIFIL’s current mandate ends. But such a move would require a formal invitation from Beirut, as well as close coordination with both Israel and the United States.

Replacing UNIFIL with a NATO-led force appears unlikely, given the alliance’s current focus on the war in Ukraine and the broader Russian threat, which is already stretching its capabilities.

Meanwhile, a third track—arguably the most influential right now—is a U.S.-led mechanism established in 2024 with French support to oversee the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel. This framework, which includes Lebanon, Israel, and UNIFIL, has effectively created a discreet channel for communication and coordination between the Israeli military and the Lebanese Army.

In practice, this mechanism has reduced UNIFIL’s operational relevance, providing a more efficient platform for deconfliction and information-sharing aimed at preventing clashes and advancing disarmament efforts in southern Lebanon.

But recent developments have exposed this mechanism's limitations. Hezbollah attacks and Israeli military findings have highlighted significant gaps stemming from a mix of factors, including the Lebanese Army’s limited capabilities, its reluctance to fully enforce government directives on disarmament, and shortcomings in monitoring and verification systems.

A U.S. policy researcher cited by Annahar argues that the success of any future arrangement will depend on one key factor: whether it can genuinely strengthen long-term security between Lebanon and Israel and lay the groundwork for a broader peace. At the heart of that effort, he says, is the establishment of real, effective Lebanese sovereignty across the entire country.

The main obstacle remains Hezbollah’s arsenal; a challenge made even more complex by Iran’s continued backing of the group and its interest in maintaining that military capability as leverage against Israel.

Ultimately, responsibility for disarmament lies with the Lebanese State. Yet Beirut faces well-known constraints, from limited resources and institutional capacity to political divisions that complicate decision-making. Foreign assistance could help bridge some of these gaps, particularly through training programs focused on disarmament operations, counterterrorism, border control, and tackling arms smuggling.

At the same time, political and economic pressure may be needed to push for meaningful behavioral change. Still, analysts caution against an overly heavy foreign footprint. Keeping that involvement limited is seen as essential, both to empower the Lebanese Army and to avoid giving Hezbollah opportunities to exploit foreign presence for its own narrative or influence.

The existing U.S.-led mechanism could serve as a foundation for what comes next. It is already well-positioned to integrate additional players after UNIFIL’s mandate expires, whether from the United Nations, Europe, or regional actors. Donor countries could contribute by training Lebanese forces and supporting specific areas such as engineering, logistics, humanitarian operations, and possibly monitoring missions.

One idea currently being discussed is a pilot project to train and equip an elite Lebanese Army unit specifically tasked with disarmament operations—a focused, practical step that could test what is achievable in the near term.

Still, the United Nations and the European Union may push to maintain independent roles in Lebanon, despite concerns about overlap. If that happens, coordination with Beirut, Washington, and Jerusalem will be critical to ensure efforts complement rather than undermine each other. The United States, for its part, retains significant leverage through its veto power at the UN Security Council.

Looking further ahead, some analysts believe the current U.S.-led framework could evolve into a more durable model. They point to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula as a possible template—highlighting its centralized leadership, focused mandate, strong political backing, and relatively streamlined structure compared to traditional UN missions.

Applying similar principles in Lebanon—clear roles, strong coordination, and trust among key players—could help build a more effective and sustainable security framework, even if such a model remains a longer-term prospect.

In parallel, Israel is expected to work on repairing ties with European partners and deepening coordination with key countries such as Germany, Britain, France, and Italy on Lebanon-related issues. The potential involvement of European forces would make that cooperation essential, particularly on political, military, and intelligence fronts.

Until UNIFIL’s mandate expires, analysts say Israel will also need to significantly improve its conduct toward UN personnel operating in southern Lebanon.