In the aftermath of the 2006 war, when former Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora was asked about the extent of Iranian aid for reconstruction, his answer was telling: "I don't know." This lack of clarity underscored a troubling reality—no one in the Lebanese state seemed to know.

The reconstruction efforts following the war revealed a stark imbalance between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah. This imbalance remains a key lesson, as citizens today find themselves amid the ruins of their homes, waiting for assessment teams dispatched by Hezbollah and receiving compensation checks that have left many disappointed.

Official data from 2006 shows that Lebanon’s Higher Relief Council (HRC) received $1.55 billion in reconstruction aid. Of this, $1.2 billion came from Arab states, with $374 million provided by the Lebanese government. Saudi Arabia was the largest donor, contributing $734 million to cover housing compensation, infrastructure, education, and more. Kuwait followed with $315 million. Additionally, Saudi Arabia deposited $1 billion in Lebanon's central bank to support monetary stability, while Kuwait deposited another $500 million.

In contrast, Iran’s contributions were elusive. While Tehran financed Hezbollah’s immediate relief efforts and funded various projects through its reconstruction agency, it did not provide direct monetary aid to the HRC. Iranian officials consistently avoided disclosing figures, with the head of Iran’s Reconstruction Authority, Engineer Hussam Khoshnevis, stating, “The budget is not a number but an action... How can we talk about financial figures in light of the sacrifices made by the Lebanese people, which are priceless?!”

The Iranian authority claims to have funded 73 places of worship (although Qatar covered the full cost of building places of worship), along with educational centers, hospitals, clinics, bridges, roads, municipal projects, beautification initiatives, sports facilities, and public libraries. However, no cost details were provided. While Iran did finance Hezbollah's immediate post-war relief efforts, there is no evidence that it contributed to rebuilding damaged homes or provided any aid to the Lebanese government for this purpose.

The HRC ultimately compensated over 115,000 damaged units across Lebanon at a cost of $724 million, with Saudi Arabia covering half of these units. Kuwait and Lebanon also handled significant shares, while Qatar took on independent projects worth approximately $300 million. Iran, however, steered clear of funding housing compensation directly, instead focusing on Hezbollah’s controlled projects.

Hezbollah’s then-leader, Hassan Nasrallah, pledged during the 2006 war to rebuild homes “more beautiful than before.” Post-war, the party launched “Waed” (Promise), a construction company tasked with rebuilding Beirut’s southern suburbs. Recipients of Arab-funded compensation were required to channel their funds through Waed, which claimed to have rebuilt 242 buildings—34 more than were destroyed.

The lack of transparency surrounding costs remains a contentious issue. While Waed asserted its expenses totaled $400 million, government figures indicate that $374 million was allocated to rebuilding the suburbs, including infrastructure and debris removal. Allegations of inflated damage assessments and mismanagement plagued the process, prompting donors to demand stricter oversight for future aid.

Iran’s approach to reconstruction in 2006 was strategic: fund Hezbollah and its affiliates while leaving the financial burden of compensation to Arab donors. This model allowed Tehran to bolster its influence in Lebanon without shouldering the full cost of rebuilding.

The situation in 2024 is even more complex. Initial assessments indicate that nearly 400 buildings in Beirut’s southern suburbs were completely destroyed—double the number in 2006. Across Lebanon, surveys reveal that 50,000 residential and commercial units were completely destroyed, with partial damage affecting over 317,000 more.

With inflation soaring, reconstruction costs are expected to far exceed those of 2006. Yet, forty days after the war’s end, no clear funding plan has emerged. Lebanon’s financial instability, exacerbated by Iran and Hezbollah’s prolonged control over state institutions, has left the government ill-equipped to handle such a monumental task.

In a December 6 speech, Hezbollah’s leader, Sheikh Naim Qassem, outlined the party’s reconstruction plan:

• Distributing “gifts” of $300-$400 to 233,000 families, totaling $77 million.
• Providing $8,000 for furniture replacement and up to $6,000 in annual rent for displaced families, amounting to an estimated $400-$450 million.
• Leaving the bulk of reconstruction costs—over 90%—to the state, including debris removal, infrastructure repairs, and housing compensation.

The state, however, is bankrupt and unable to secure international loans, leaving it reliant on foreign aid. Unlike in 2006, Hezbollah cannot impose its terms on the Lebanese government or donors.

The challenges extend beyond Lebanon’s borders. International donors are stretched thin, focusing on Gaza’s ongoing devastation and Syria’s widespread destruction. Iran’s strained resources, internal economic woes, and growing domestic opposition to its foreign policy further complicate its ability to contribute meaningfully.

For Lebanon, the path forward is fraught with political and financial hurdles. The reconstruction effort is inseparable from the broader political status quo, including the urgent need to elect a president and restore constitutional order. Iran and Hezbollah’s approach will become clearer in the coming weeks, with a key test being their stance on allowing the state to regain sovereignty over all its territories.

Rebuilding Lebanon after the 2024 war is not merely a logistical challenge; it is a test of political will and international cooperation. As the Lebanese people wait for answers amidst the rubble, the lessons of 2006 loom large, reminding all stakeholders that reconstruction is as much about accountability as it is about aid.

This article is an adaptation of an Arabic piece published by Asas Media.