A long-awaited ceasefire took effect at 4 a.m. local time Wednesday, bringing to a close—for now—a thirteen-month conflict between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the ceasefire remains inherently fragile, and there is a large dose of skepticism in Lebanon that it will hold. Even within hours of the ceasefire taking effect, Israeli soldiers were firing warning shots at a vehicle Israel said was carrying “suspects” in a “restricted zone.” There are not supposed to be any “restricted zones” under the agreement. Furthermore, tens of thousands of Lebanese who fled their villages and towns in south Lebanon earlier in the conflict headed back to their homes as soon as the ceasefire came into effect, despite warnings by the Israeli military that they should not yet return. Israeli troops are still deployed in some areas of the southern border district, which makes it almost inevitable that they will come into close proximity to angry Lebanese civilians in the days ahead.

The ceasefire agreement calls for a sixty-day cessation of hostilities during which time Hezbollah is supposed to withdraw its forces north of the Litani river, which runs anywhere between twenty-seven and three kilometers from the Lebanon-Israel border. In effect, this will mean that Hezbollah will abandon what is left of its military infrastructure and positions, although its personnel who live and work in south Lebanon will remain in their homes. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are planning to deploy an initial five thousand troops to the southern border district as the Israeli military withdraws back into Israel.

Given the scale of damage to border villages and towns as well as the southern suburbs of Beirut, Hezbollah’s priority is likely to focus on the welfare needs of its Shia constituency rather than immediately rebuilding its military capabilities. Lebanese Shias have supported Hezbollah during the conflict, but that support could dwindle if they end up spending months in tents while waiting for their homes to be rebuilt.

Israel says it is retaining the right to undertake unilateral military action if it determines that Hezbollah is breaching the agreement and the LAF and the United Nations peacekeeping force are seen to be doing nothing about it. In the past year, Hezbollah has lost much of its deterrent factor that helped keep a tense calm along the Lebanon-Israel border between the last war in 2006 and the outbreak of hostilities in October 2023.

Going forward, Israel probably will not hesitate to attack Hezbollah if it believes the group is working against the ceasefire agreement. The question is whether Hezbollah would retaliate to such actions or absorb any blows inflicted by Israel in order not to revive a war that has proven costly for the organization.

A win for the Lebanese and Israeli peoples and governments; a loss for Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas

Jonathan Panikoff 

For Israel, in the best of circumstances, the deal provides an opportunity to have the security it has sought for much of the past two decades via United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1701 being meaningfully enforced. Its failure to have been so before directly led to the current situation, with Hezbollah receiving advanced weapons transfers from Iran and using the land south of the Litani River to stage and store the weapons being fired at and threatening Israel today. 

But if Tuesday’s agreement is successful, having the Lebanese Armed Forces enforce provisions related to Hezbollah not being allowed in the south—and by implication dominating the security landscape there—would further weaken Hezbollah as Israeli kinetic attacks have done for the last four months. Doing so would strengthen the position of non-Hezbollah-aligned parts of the Lebanese government, all while enabling Israeli families to return to their homes in the north after more than a year of being displaced. 

At the same time, the ceasefire would give a significant reprieve to those in Lebanon who have had to endure dozens of strikes with thousands of deaths and upwards of one million people displaced. 

Of equal importance, the agreement breaks the kinetic link between Hezbollah and Hamas—as the former had previously committed to keep attacking Israel until there was a ceasefire in the Strip—and undermines Iran. Tehran has seen its deterrence decline following its direct attacks on Israel last month and Israel’s elimination of Iran’s air defense systems and purported attack on the Parchin nuclear facility. 

Iran is probably quietly supportive of the deal, concerned that pushing Hezbollah and the Lebanese government to oppose it would risk continuing Israeli strikes that could decimate the group, which has long been the pointy end of Iran’s regional deterrence strategy, even further. But in acquiescing to the deal, Iran risks not being able to rebuild Hezbollah’s capabilities with the same ease it did after the 2006 war, thus undermining its own regional deterrence structure.

An enduring ceasefire hinges on how much Trump changes the atmosphere

Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley 

A ceasefire has been reached in Lebanon. Finally.

What was supposed to be a short sharp incursion into Lebanon by the Israel Defense Forces to mop up Hezbollah’s capabilities had begun to drag. The killing of top leaders, wounding of thousands of fighters, and overwhelming air power up to the day the ceasefire was agreed could not stop Hezbollah rockets or Israeli soldiers dying. Though Israel fights to protect its land from attack, Lebanese Hezbollah was fighting for its very land.

Even so, the combination of Israel’s success and the increasing cost to Lebanese civilians and the economy, Hezbollah’s will to fight, wisely, weakened.

New guarantees should strengthen the effectiveness and longevity of the ceasefire’s foundation, UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Even its imperfect implementation in 2006 brought over sixteen years of relative peace and stability. Both sides are ready for that.

The deal’s success may rest on two important changes in perspective: First, Iran may sense an opportunity to lessen its isolation with President-elect Donald Trump, the self-described “peace” president, and be motivated to help ensure Hezbollah abides by the truce for the time being. Second, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may sense he is on a shorter leash. After all, Trump takes no prisoners. He saw Netanyahu’s willingness to repeatedly, blatantly embarrass US leadership in spite of Biden’s commitment to Israel. It can be argued that Biden’s “no daylight” policy saved Netanyahu’s political longevity, even as it undermined his own. Trump’s record makes clear he’s unlikely to make a similar error. His stature and reputation for strength are his priority, and the prime minister would be wise to stay in his good graces. Support for Israel does not require support for Netanyahu.

There is now space for another look at Gaza. While mostly silent on the conflict, Trump has given no indication that he believes the continuing carnage is the best Israel can do. Like Richard Nixon opening China, there is reason to hope he will try another way.

The deal is less important in its details, and more in its enforcement

Danny Citrinowicz 

After more than a year, Israel and Lebanon have reached a ceasefire agreement that effectively ends the war that Hezbollah began on October 8, 2023, in its attempt to force Israel to stop its campaign in Gaza.

Israel has made significant achievements in this war. Chief among them is the elimination of the organization’s leadership and the severing of the Gordian connection between Lebanon and Gaza in a way that dramatically weakens the ethos of the Iran-backed Axis of Resistance. But the truth must be told: Hezbollah has indeed been beaten, but it has not been dismantled, and it is still the strongest organization in Lebanon militarily and politically. 

Both Israel and Hezbollah wanted the agreement in light of the understanding that the failure to reach it during the Biden administration may dramatically prolong the war, which is not in the interest of any of the parties.

However the future of the agreement will not be determined by its clauses or the side letter that the US administration will give to Israel. Instead, it will be decided by Israel’s willingness to go all the way in an attempt to prevent Iran from rebuilding Hezbollah’s capabilities. Rebuilding Hezbollah is a necessity for Tehran in light of the dramatic damage to Iran’s deterrence caused by Hezbollah’s weakness.

For Lebanon, the hope is that the weakness of Hezbollah and especially the death of Nasrallah will lead to a strengthening of the moderate forces in Lebanese politics. The first test of this prospect will be the appointment of a new president for the country. The military and political weakening of Hezbollah opens the door to significant changes in the Middle East, such as the potential weakening of the Syrian component of the Axis of Resistance and strengthening of the Lebanese Armed Forces into a dominant force.

And yet, the determining factor will be whether Israel is willing now—unlike its more relaxed approach after the 2006 war in Lebanon—not to allow Hezbollah to rebuild its forces. That is the biggest question mark regarding this agreement.