Brazil has emerged as an important hub for Hezbollah’s activities in Latin America, with leaked intelligence and security files, along with Brazilian investigations, pointing to links between the militia, organized crime and illicit financial networks, Erem News reported.

For nearly three decades, São Paulo has served as the base for successive Hezbollah representatives in Latin America, according to an investigation published by Diálogo Américas. The network described in the investigation extends beyond fundraising to religious and cultural institutions, youth activities and alleged terrorism and terror-financing operations.

Brazil has also become a focal point for a broader convergence between organized crime and actors linked to Middle Eastern militant groups. A July 2026 Federal Police investigation known as Operation Hawala uncovered an international network accused of laundering about 100 million Brazilian reais, or nearly $20 million, over three years for three major Brazilian crime syndicates: the First Capital Command (PCC), the Red Command (CV) and the Third Pure Command (TCP), or Terceiro Comando Puro.

The investigation remains ongoing, and Brazilian authorities are pursuing possible links to both Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda, according to Diálogo Américas. Seven of the 22 people indicted in the case are Lebanese nationals who allegedly operated a network of front companies and used intermediaries in the Tri-Border Area between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay.

Hezbollah and the Organized Crime Network

The Tri-Border Area has long been associated with illicit finance and has historically been identified as a hub for Hezbollah fundraising and financial activity, according to U.S. and regional authorities.

The Hawala investigation has added a new dimension to that picture. Brazilian investigators allege that Lebanese businesspeople involved in the case helped facilitate the movement of illicit funds across state and international borders through shell companies and intermediaries.

According to Diálogo Américas, one of the Lebanese nationals indicted in Operation Hawala is related to a person believed to have masterminded the Hezbollah plot uncovered during Operation Trapiche.

The Hawala case, however, does not by itself establish that the nearly $20 million in laundered funds was intended for Hezbollah. The investigation concerns money laundering on behalf of major Brazilian criminal organizations, while authorities are separately examining possible connections between the network and Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda.

São Paulo as a Hezbollah Base

Leaked files obtained through the risk-intelligence platform 240 Analytics, cited by Diálogo Américas, indicate that Hezbollah has maintained a permanent regional representative in Brazil for nearly 30 years.

The first known Hezbollah cleric to permanently reside in Brazil was Sheikh Ali Abou Raya, who served as imam of the Mohamad Messenger of God Mosque, commonly known as the Brás Mosque, after the São Paulo neighborhood where it is located.

Abou Raya worked for Hezbollah’s Foreign Relations Department and had also served in Canada and Belgium. His affiliation with the group became known after he was killed in an Israeli strike in southern Lebanon on Sept. 23, 2024, alongside other Hezbollah clerics, according to the investigation.

His successor was Sheikh Bilal Mohsen Wehbe, another member of Hezbollah’s Foreign Relations Department. In 2010, the U.S. Treasury Department identified Wehbe as Hezbollah’s “chief representative in South America” and imposed sanctions on him. Treasury said Wehbe had served at the request of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.

Wehbe continued to lead the community in Brazil until 2019, when he returned to Lebanon, according to Diálogo Américas.

Wehbe’s successor and the current holder of the position is Sheikh Badri Abdul Menhem Mouawia, also known as Sheikh Badri Zeineddine, according to the same investigation.

Leaked files obtained through 240 Analytics indicate that Mouawia maintains three U.S. dollar-denominated bank accounts at Al Qard al Hassan, a Hezbollah-controlled financial institution that is under U.S. sanctions, the report said.

Mouawia previously worked at the Maaref Al Hikmiya Institute in Lebanon, a cultural institution associated with Hezbollah, where he served as editor of its Al Mahajjah journal, according to the report.

He arrived in Brazil in 2024 on a temporary visa sponsored by the Islamic Religious Charitable Association of Brazil (ARBIB), the organization that runs the Brás Mosque. A Brazilian government official familiar with his immigration status told Diálogo Américas that he obtained permanent residency in April 2026.

Taken together, the succession of Hezbollah representatives suggests that São Paulo has been a longstanding base for the group's Latin American operations, the report said.

The Brás Mosque and affiliated institutions form an ecosystem that includes a school, a scouts' movement and a cultural association involved in events and publications. According to the investigation, their educational, religious, cultural and political activities reflect aspects of Hezbollah’s concept of a “resistance society.”

From Scouts to the Front Lines

The alleged Hezbollah-linked network in Brazil extends beyond financial and religious activities to youth organizations, according to the investigation.

The Al Huda Scouts in São Paulo have been compared with Hezbollah’s Al Mahdi Scouts in Lebanon. In May 2026, the group commemorated Mohamad Jawad Mohsen Gharib, a former scout leader who was killed while fighting with Hezbollah, according to the report.

Gharib was the nephew of Hassan Ali Gharib, president of the Brás Mosque. He moved to Brazil as a teenager and spent years as a scout leader at his uncle’s mosque in São Paulo before returning to Hezbollah’s military ranks after the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah escalated in October 2023.

According to Diálogo Américas, Gharib returned to Lebanon following the death of another relative and Hezbollah commander, Mehdi Nasrallah Gharib, who was killed by Israel in December 2024.

On May 6, 2026, Mohamad Jawad Gharib was killed in combat and was subsequently commemorated as a Hezbollah “martyr,” according to the report.

His funeral was held in Chaqra, southern Lebanon. Videos cited by Diálogo Américas showed Hassan Gharib attending the funeral while wearing a Hezbollah scarf.

The mosque’s activities have also included commemorations of Hezbollah figures and events associated with Iran. The investigation reported that the mosque has advertised travel packages for people wishing to attend the funeral of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Tehran.

Operation Trapiche

Brazilian authorities have previously uncovered suspected Hezbollah-linked terrorist activity in the country.

In late 2023, the Federal Police launched Operation Trapiche after receiving information from U.S. authorities about suspected plans for terrorist attacks in Brazil.

Brazilian judicial authorities said the investigation uncovered indications of links between suspects and Hezbollah and possible efforts to recruit Brazilian nationals for illicit activities, including terrorism.

According to Diálogo Américas, the investigation uncovered an alleged Hezbollah plot to recruit Brazilian citizens and send them to Lebanon, where Hezbollah operatives would provide guidance, training and financial resources for planned attacks in Brazil.

The alleged targets included Jewish targets in Brasília, the Brazilian capital, according to the investigation. Two Brazilian nationals of Lebanese descent were among the principal suspects identified in the case and were reportedly closely connected to the Brás Mosque.

The investigation also found a connection between Operation Trapiche and Operation Hawala: one of the Lebanese nationals indicted in the money-laundering case is related to the person believed to have masterminded the alleged Hezbollah plot uncovered in Trapiche.

Brazil’s Legal and Policy Gap

Brazil has not formally designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, a situation that Diálogo Américas says limits the ability of Brazilian law-enforcement and intelligence agencies to disrupt networks linked to the group.

The country has traditionally relied on United Nations terrorist designations rather than maintaining an autonomous national list, according to the report. Political resistance and bureaucratic obstacles have also complicated efforts to establish such a designation.

Brazil’s visa and immigration policies and the ease of travel available to Brazilian passport holders have also created opportunities that Hezbollah-linked facilitators have allegedly exploited, the report said.

The broader challenge extends beyond Hezbollah itself. The Hawala investigation illustrates how international money-laundering networks can connect organized crime in Latin America with actors linked to terrorism, while the Trapiche investigation highlights concerns about recruitment and terrorist planning.

Security and international-relations experts have therefore called for stronger national mechanisms to designate terrorist organizations, tighter financial controls and greater intelligence cooperation with neighboring countries and the United States.

Among the measures advocated are stronger use of Brazil’s Council for Financial Activities Control (COAF) to identify and freeze assets linked to illicit networks, improved scrutiny of shell companies and greater intelligence-sharing to prevent Brazilian territory from being exploited for regional terrorist or financial operations.