As things stand today, there is no clear vision as to the direction Lebanon is heading in. For many stakeholders, however, the land of the cedars cannot keep going down this path without rethinking its entire political model.

During his visit to Beirut in the aftermath of the 2020 port explosion, French President Emmanuel Macron stressed the need for a new “political contract.” This implies tackling extremely sensitive subjects such the Islamic and Christian quotas in power, Hezbollah’s arms and most importantly the so-called “consociationalism” [or power sharing]: this impossible system of governance where everyone is in power and at the same time claims to be the opposition.

In other words, it is high time to turn the page on the Taif Agreement, which has been impossible to implement since the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri back in 2005.

How to do this? The legislative elections can play a role in this regard if they end up renewing in part the current political forces. For stakeholders at home and abroad, however, the elections are not enough to make a change.

“The vote will not lead to a major change,” says a Western diplomat.

In a bid to break the current deadlock, Maronite Patriarch Bechara al-Rai was one of the few to put forth a proposal with the idea of holding an international conference — an option that is favored by several Arab countries, notably the oil-rich Gulf monarchies, which consider Lebanon to be under Hezbollah’s thumb.

“The Lebanese issue remains on everyone’s mind, even if it is not considered to be a priority for many countries,” an Arab diplomat tells L’Orient-Le Jour on condition of anonymity.

Before reaching a final settlement, several international players are apparently considering stabilizing the situation in the country by placing military men in key state posts, according to several corroborating sources who spoke to L’Orient-Le Jour.

The Lebanese Army enjoys a rather positive image at home and in the eyes of many countries that see it as the last institution to avoid the complete collapse in the country.

While the army is in the grip of great financial difficulties, with major desertions in its ranks, it continues to survive mainly thanks to the international aid it receives.

For the stakeholders considering this scenario, the idea is to reach a compromise whereby army chief Gen. Joseph Aoun would be elected as president, and General Security chief Gen. Abbas Ibrahim as Parliament speaker.

It is also a question of finding a Sunni figure to fill the post of prime minister, such as Director General of the Internal Security Forces Imad Osman, or the Secretary General of the Supreme Defense Council, Maj. Gen. Mahmoud Asmar.

Such a deal is in many ways reminiscent of the 1958 compromise, which ended in the ascension of then army commander Fouad Chehab to the presidency, at a time when Lebanon was hit hard by regional crises.

“This is just mere speculation for now. But several countries are starting to think this is the best way to get things done,” an Arab politician who refused to be named tells L’Orient-Le Jour.

This scenario is being considered all the more given the fact that presidential elections are approaching, with Michel Aoun’s mandate ending in October 2022.

Joseph Aoun can in any case confidently say that he has the support of the United States, where he recently met several American officials as well as members of Congress.

Both Ibrahim and Osman maintain a rather positive image in the eyes of Western countries, although the former is in a less favorable position given the fact that he is implicated in the investigation into the 2020 Beirut port explosion.

Yet, snatching the speakership of Parliament from the hands of Nabih Berri, who has held this position for 30 years, appears a little far-fetched and would necessitate a compromise at home.

The scenario of a new president seems more plausible, with no party seeming to have vetoed Joseph Aoun.

Arms against the state?

Another theory, however, is being also discussed on the local scene, concerning a new Lebanese-style compromise, along the lines of the 2016 presidential deal. It would entail an agreement on the next president, a cabinet formation, legislative elections and several appointments to key positions in the state, notably the posts of the army commanders, the head of the Supreme Judicial Council, and the governor of the Banque du Liban, Lebanon’s central bank.

Hezbollah appears to be pushing for this kind of solution that would not challenge the status-quo, which continues to be to its advantage.

For years, the pro-Iranian party has been considering a possible change in the system, which would reflect a stronger representation of Shiites in the state — something that can only take place in a favorable regional context, which is not the case today.

In the meantime, Hezbollah is taking advantage of the current system, which since the 2008 Doha Agreement has allowed the Shiite party to have a say in everything that happens in the country, and to share power with other major players.

Preserving the status quo, however, does not seem to agree with the international community, which believes it is not in line with the required reforms.

But other major players in the country do not seem to be facilitating the process of breaking the deadlock.

Michel Aoun has never hidden his disapproval of the Taif Agreement, but at the same time is not ready to see another setback to the Christians’ prerogatives and the principle of power sharing.

Meanwhile, the Lebanese Forces are not in favor of the Taif Agreement either, but they consider it to be a good model if it were respected.

The Future Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party, for their part, are cautiously considering any change to the system, which according to them, would play to Hezbollah’s advantage.

All political players agree on the need to find a solution to the issue of Hezbollah’s arms. But at what cost? Should key state positions be offered to the Shiite community in exchange for giving up the party’s weapons? Should the militia be integrated into the regular armed forces as is the case in Iraq?

For the time being, there are no answers to these questions. And for good reasons: everything depends on factors that go far beyond Lebanon.