Last weekend, the US deputy special envoy, Morgan Ortagus, visited Beirut, her second trip since Joseph Aoun was elected Lebanon's President. While the first visit was aimed at opening channels to Mr Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, the latest had a harder edge: Ms Ortagus wants the Lebanese to set a timetable for Hezbollah’s disarmament and establish committees to resolve unresolved matters with Israel.

Both demands have made the Lebanese uneasy. Hezbollah’s disarmament is too complex and risky to be rushed by outside actors acting on their own politically convenient schedule. And the Lebanese are wary of talks with Israel that could create a semblance of normalisation between the two countries. While they want to address three key issues – disputed borders, Israel’s full withdrawal from Lebanon, and Lebanese prisoners held in Israel – they don’t want the format to allow Israel to spin this as a step towards peace.

The question of Hezbollah’s weapons is acute for Lebanon, not least because the President and his government have openly committed themselves to the principle that the state should have a monopoly over weapons. Yet their preferred way of bringing this about is through dialogue. Recently, Mr Aoun repeated this point in an interview with the broadcaster France 24, adding that Hezbollah was co-operating on the question of its weapons.

Hardliners hostile to Hezbollah were unhappy with the President’s mention of a dialogue, feeling this would give the party a margin of manoeuvre to undermine disarmament. While their point may be defensible in theory, it’s difficult to see what is a realistic alternative to dialogue, given the real dangers of pursuing other methods.

The Lebanese authorities are not about to take military action to disarm Hezbollah, which would likely be seen by most Shiite citizens as an attack against their community. This could lead to civil war, divide the army, and provoke deeply unwelcome outcomes. For all its merits, the army doesn’t have the capacity to easily eliminate Hezbollah by force.

Moreover, the country encouraging this measure, the US, has credibility problems in Beirut. While Mr Aoun seeks to maintain strong relations with Washington, he is not willing to do so if it means the Americans try to impose an Israeli agenda on him.

Ms Ortagus herself has her own issues in this regard. When she visited Beirut last, she made the mistake of declaring at a press conference: “We are grateful to our ally Israel for defeating Hezbollah,” oblivious to the destruction the Israelis had caused in the country hosting her. The statement embarrassed the Lebanese, yet revealed that the Trump administration is willing to go far in advancing Israeli goals in Lebanon.

More ominously, Lebanese officials are aware of two things in their country’s recent history that impose caution when it comes to negotiations with Israel and implementing a military solution to confiscate Hezbollah’s weapons.

In 1982–1983, the Lebanese began talks with Israel to reach a withdrawal agreement after the summer war between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

The negotiations deeply divided Lebanon, leading to what would have been a peace accord had it been implemented. The outcome was heightened conflict that prevented the government from ratifying the accord, after which the US withdrew from Lebanon.

The Americans failed then to understand that Lebanon could not sign a peace agreement without a domestic consensus, so that forcing the issue only made matters worse and brought about a resumption of the civil war. Today a formula must be found to avoid discrediting Mr Aoun and Mr Salam, who nonetheless oppose Hezbollah’s priorities.

Mr Aoun is especially conscious of a second event making him more realistic about disarming Hezbollah by force. He was an officer in 1990, when the army, then led by Michel Aoun, tried to disarm the Christian Lebanese Forces militia. The campaign failed disastrously, though the army was stronger than the militia, and led to devastation and, ultimately, Michel Aoun’s 14-year exile from the country.

Does Joseph Aoun intend to repeat that experience? It’s highly unlikely, and it would be a major mistake if he and the government tried doing so. Even a desire to secure American backing won’t make the Lebanese embark on a new cycle of civil conflict.

But the Lebanese must be careful. They also cannot delay a dialogue with Hezbollah, let alone put off a more vigorous implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which seeks disarmament of the area south of the Litani River. With Israel having a blank cheque in Washington, it is conceivable that if it feels that Lebanon is not fulfilling its end of the ceasefire agreement reached in November, Israel may restart the conflict, push up to the Litani or beyond, and remain there indefinitely until Hezbollah is disarmed and a peace agreement is imposed.

The Lebanese are right in resisting American injunctions that may not be thought out, particularly if they correspond to Israel’s reading of Lebanon’s events. However, leaving things as they are is dangerous. Israel has many options, and unless the Lebanese prepare for and try to neutralise them, they may soon find that more of their country is occupied.