"There is talk about demarcating the land borders, which could be the key. Hezbollah may consider its involvement in this battle, which we are definitely against, as an achievement for Lebanon in demarcating the land borders with the enemy. What is required is to ensure that both Hezbollah and Israel climb down from the tree, and this can only be achieved by building conviction among all that the only solution is through politics. Conviction, not external pressure, especially concerning Israel," he explained.
"The United States can exert pressure on Israel, but as we know, we are entering the stage of the U.S. elections, and we know that the Democratic Party is supportive of the state of Israel, limiting the pressure. Therefore, the deterrent in Israel should be self-imposed, and the will should be conviction. I agree with Mr. Hassan Nasrallah that there may be an opportunity for a settlement, but I disagree with him on the timing because he says the settlement should come after Gaza, making the solution more difficult because then there will be a winner and a loser, leading to constant tension. Whereas now there is a sense of balance, meaning there is neither a winner nor a loser, and thus the solution is within reach," he went on saying.
Concerning U.S. foreign policy, he said: "I recall Henry Kissinger's book written after the Cold War, titled 'Does America Need a Foreign Policy?' because at that time, the United States had a surplus of power and exclusivity in various fields that made it unnecessary for meticulous calculations. It could ultimately tip the balance in its favor. Therefore, there is a persistent problem in reading what Washington wants or does not want. Washington is content with declaring general directions that allow for the coexistence of contradictions on the ground. Priorities vary based on references, between fully independent constitutional institutions, administrative diversity, the role of the White House, and the influence of the domestic arena on decision-making. The constant remains the significant concern for Israel's security, as they believe Lebanon is not a priority and is only relevant to the extent that it is linked to Israel's interest."
He clarified that Americans found the key in demarcating the borders, which might open a series of steps or a roadmap paving the way for the reimplementation of UNSC Resolution 1701.
"This involves not only security arrangements but a comprehensive approach based on UNSC Resolution 1559, which calls for disarming all armed factions, a dialogue table, a defensive strategy, and the necessity of encouraging Lebanon to secure its complete borders and prevent smuggling. In essence, UNSC Resolution 1701 aims to create an internal Lebanese peace framework and sustainable stability along the borders," he noted.
Regarding the lingering impact of the Lebanese Civil War on dealing with the Palestinian cause, Sayegh explained: "Every reconciliation becomes elitist and begins with elites in all nations. In Europe, the German-French reconciliation first defined common interests through economic agreements in Europe and military agreements in NATO from 1949 to 1963 when they established the Élysée Treaty. It took more than 15 years of work and a common framework. In Lebanon, it's no joke that 150,000 people, both Lebanese and Palestinians, fell in what is known as the War of the Camps, which didn't end until 1982 and then recurred in the Camps War in 1986 and before that in Tripoli. So, it's a series of fireballs that did not target a single sect or faction but the entire society as a whole."
"The Palestinians engaged in self-critique, something the Lebanese have not done yet. They formalized the Palestinian Declaration in Beirut in a document signed by Lebanese figures later on, admitting that we made mistakes in our political choices in Lebanon. They made a qualitative shift in the resistance's work by transitioning entirely to the internal front, starting with the Stone Intifada that began in December 1987," he explained.
"Every time a problem arises with the Palestinians internally, the Lebanese, with their sensitivity, recall the painful memories of the past. The war did not truly end for many, as the war concluded in 1990, with winners and losers. A part of it lives with the aftermath of defeat because our major leaders, who had the most significant influence on a segment of the population, were displaced by the Syrians. They were unable to bring about reconciliation and genuine compromise. When the historic opportunity of March 14 presented itself, it was squandered due to power calculations before it was wasted through coercion and intimidation by the Axis of Resistance," he added.
"Why, until today, hasn't the Lebanese army entered the Palestinian refugee camps and taken full control of their administration, despite the decisions of the National Dialogue in 2006?" he wondered.
"The answer comes from the Nahr al-Bared camp and the protection of the resistance to keep weapons outside the camps, leading to the obstruction of handing over weapons inside the camps to the Lebanese state. The official Palestinian stance remains clear, committed to the handover, while the implementation mechanism has been hindered by the resistance," he said.
Regarding granting Lebanese nationality to the children of Lebanese women married to foreign spouses, Sayegh clarified that the issue is not specific to Palestinians but applies to any foreign individual married to a Lebanese woman.
He explained that the Kataeb Party confirmed in its 2018 political program that Lebanese women have the right to grant nationality to their children and husbands within the citizenship law, thus ensuring equality between men and women before the law.
"However, in Lebanon, there is no specific citizenship law, and this issue is not straightforward or populist. In countries worldwide, there are laws governing citizenship within a regulated framework and clear criteria," he stated.
