Source: Al-Modon
Tuesday 14 April 2026 12:13:44
Lebanon's economy will not emerge from the current war the way it emerged from the war of 2024 — even if hostilities ended today. The wounds inflicted on the economy by the first war have been transformed by this one into permanent scars, deepened beyond the state's capacity to heal in either the near or medium term.
Lebanon emerged from the previous war in 2024 carrying losses and financing gaps it had not managed to close before entering the war that began on March 2, 2026. If that earlier conflict cost Lebanon $14 billion in direct and indirect material losses — alongside immense human and environmental damage — the country may exit the current war with losses twice that figure.
That prospect is not alarmism; it is a logical conclusion grounded in two key factors that amplify the risks of the current war. The first is that it unfolds in parallel with a regional conflict whose consequences ripple indirectly through Lebanon's economy. The second is that it erupted before Lebanon had any chance to close the wounds left by the last one.
Taking the estimated daily losses from the previous war as a baseline — figures that already understate present realities — the toll runs into the billions. United Nations and UNDP reports placed daily losses during the 2024 war at approximately $225 million, which means cumulative losses in the current conflict have reached at least $10 billion at the lower bound. Precise figures will only emerge after the war ends, just as post-survey assessments pushed the 2024 war's final toll to $14 billion — a precedent that only underscores the scale of what is accumulating now.
Nor can the projected losses from the current war be separated from those still unaddressed from the last. In the aftermath of the 2024 war, Lebanon received only $250 million from the World Bank for reconstruction — a fraction of what was needed. The vast financing gap left behind will only widen further as this war adds billions more to it, making any prospect of closing it very nearly impossible.
Lebanon's losses from its war with Israel will not be limited to those measured against the previous conflict. For the first time in history, this war runs concurrently with a regional confrontation that carries its own economic consequences for Lebanon. Chief among them — and most dangerous — is a rise in inflation driven by soaring energy prices and higher shipping costs, a phenomenon playing out globally as well. These pressures bear heavily on Lebanon's economy and living standards, particularly given that most of the country's sectors depend on auxiliary energy sources.
The war with Iran also directly affects Lebanese diaspora remittances. Those transfers are already under strain as the regional conflict squeezes Gulf economies through Iranian strikes on oil production facilities and infrastructure. Experts estimate that remittances from Lebanon's approximately 500,000 diaspora workers in the Gulf have already fallen by 5 percent, with further declines expected should the war drag on — particularly after the first round of U.S.-Iran negotiations collapsed.
A sustained decline in diaspora remittances would threaten one of the Lebanese economy's most essential pillars and its primary source of hard currency. That, in turn, could deepen the foreign exchange shortage — especially given rising import costs driven by global inflation, elevated oil prices, and surging shipping rates — and could trigger further imbalances in domestic monetary equilibrium, pushing the Lebanese pound into yet another spiral of depreciation.
Whatever the precise toll on Lebanon's economy to date, all current figures remain approximate and subject to upward revision depending on how long both conflicts — the regional and the Lebanese — continue. The most alarming indicator of structural damage may be the one already confirmed by Lebanese officials: a contraction in Lebanon's gross domestic product exceeding 7 percent.
The Institute of International Finance has projected a contraction of between 12 and 16 percent in Lebanon's economy for 2026 as a result of the war, alongside forecasts that the current account deficit will widen to 17 percent of GDP by the year's end.
The anticipated losses span multiple fronts: widespread infrastructure destruction, and severe damage across key productive sectors. The tourism sector has ground to a complete halt, with an estimated 95 percent decline according to tourism trade union officials. Agriculture has contracted by approximately 40 percent. Commercial activity has been disrupted by roughly 60 percent according to trade and industrial unions. Businesses across Lebanon have already begun laying off workers as operations collapse, and experts warn that the circle of distress will continue to expand — driving unemployment upward and, inevitably, pushing poverty rates higher in its wake.
The gravest monetary and financial risk remains the depletion of Banque du Liban's foreign currency reserves and the central bank's growing struggle to maintain exchange rate stability.
In the final reckoning, this war has not struck any single sector in isolation. It has hit the infrastructure, the productive base, and the human fabric of the country simultaneously — bringing the vital arteries of the Lebanese state to a standstill.