Iranian Officers With Lebanese Passports: Traces of a Forgery Network Inside State Institutions

An investigation into alleged Lebanese passport forgery has opened a wider inquiry into how foreign nationals may have entered the country using genuine Lebanese travel documents issued under false identities, Alhurra reported on Thursday.

The case gained attention after a March 4 Israeli strike on the fourth floor of the Ramada Plaza Hotel in Beirut’s Raouche area, which killed four Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps officers and a Lebanese civilian, and wounded one Iranian officer along with several others. But investigators say the focus has since shifted to documents recovered at the scene.

Security and judicial sources told Alhurra that Lebanese passports bearing false identities were found in the hotel room used by the Iranian officers. Additional passports and reservations at another Beirut hotel were also discovered, suggesting what officials describe as a wider network involving travel arrangements and identity manipulation.

According to the same sources, the findings triggered an investigation into how Lebanese passports were issued and used in this context, and whether official procedures were bypassed through forged civil records and intermediaries.

Security sources said a company identified as “Power” arranged hotel bookings for the individuals. Corporate records show it is registered in Zahle as a simple partnership founded in 2012 and officially listed as a car trading business. However, investigators say it appears inactive and is owned by a single partner identified as “B. Sh.”

Authorities are examining whether the company functioned as a front to bypass security verification systems.

Under Lebanese procedures, hotels automatically transmit guest data to the General Directorate of General Security upon check-in for screening. During recent years, especially amid regional tensions, this information has also been shared with military intelligence, security sources said.

Separately, MP Ghada Ayoub filed a complaint with the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation over what she described as the issuance of Lebanese passports under false names or irregular procedures. A copy of the filing was seen by Alhurra.

Ayoub told Alhurra she had “evidence and indications” that Lebanese passports were used by members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah figures to facilitate movement, and said she had submitted documentation to the judiciary.

Passport forgery is not new in Lebanon and has been documented in earlier cases. In October, authorities uncovered a network accused of producing around ten forged Lebanese passports, including biometric and older formats, allegedly involving security personnel and benefiting individuals wanted by the judiciary.

A senior General Security source, speaking anonymously, told Alhurra that the alleged forgery linked to Iranian nationals took place during Lebanon’s passport crisis between 2022 and 2023.

The source said manipulation focused primarily on supporting civil documentation — including identity papers, family records, and certificates issued through local mukhtars — which were then used to insert applications into the official system.

Security sources also said the passports in question carried sequential serial numbers, suggesting they were issued from the same center within a short timeframe, potentially identifying the issuing office and responsible staff.

One official said this pattern indicates the process may have passed through a regional office before reaching the central Beirut branch, allowing it to bypass initial verification checks.

A security source also questioned how individuals who reportedly did not speak Arabic or resemble Lebanese citizens were able to pass mandatory identity interviews without raising suspicion. Such interviews typically include detailed questions on residence, travel purpose, and personal background.

The same source also questioned why the head of the issuing center had not yet been questioned by judicial authorities.

Investigators believe the case may involve informal coordination between local officials and individuals allegedly linked to Hezbollah in areas where the group holds influence, including municipalities and regional General Security offices.

Another security source said such practices expanded after the war in Syria, when Iranian travel routes to Lebanon became more restricted. In some cases, identities of Hezbollah members killed in Syria but not officially registered as deceased were allegedly reused to issue passports.

The source added that biometric passports require the applicant’s physical presence and fingerprinting, suggesting any breach would have required internal facilitation.

Data analysis and testimony from a former General Security official indicate that Lebanon’s administrative crisis between 2022 and 2024 created conditions conducive to abuse. Around 300,000 old-format passports issued in 2003 remained stored at the central bank despite a requirement that they be destroyed in 2016, according to sources.

These non-biometric passports were easier to falsify and were reportedly used in 2023 during a nationwide passport shortage, with some accepted for international travel.

General Security sources, however, rejected claims that biometric passports were stolen from storage. They described a tightly controlled production chain involving the company Inkript, the Banque du Liban, and secured transfers to General Security headquarters in Beirut.

Officials said passports are stored in secured vaults, transported under armed escort, and counted upon arrival in the presence of dozens of employees, making physical theft or removal highly unlikely.

They said any irregularities would therefore have occurred at the level of data entry and supporting documents, not at production or storage stages. They also confirmed that passports carry a pre-applied digital signature from the General Security director.

A General Security administrative official, speaking anonymously, said allegations of systemic breaches were “exaggerated,” while acknowledging isolated forgery cases involving mukhtars allegedly paid to facilitate documentation.

The official said new measures are being introduced, including replacing current biometric passports with more secure polycarbonate versions.

Security sources said tracing responsibility remains technically possible through issuance records and serial numbers, but requires a clear decision to pursue accountability.

The investigation is also examining whether forged passports were used beyond Iranian nationals, including by figures linked to the former Syrian regime who may have obtained Lebanese documents through similar mechanisms.

At the center of the case, officials say, is not only how the passports were issued, but why accountability has yet to be enforced.