Lebanese president Joseph Aoun stated last week that Lebanon has ‘no choice’ but to negotiate, in a clear reference to Israel. He told journalists that ‘the language of negotiation is more important than the language of war’, adding ‘we have seen what [war] did to us.’ 

Aoun’s statement sparked intense debate among Lebanon’s political parties over the prospect of direct negotiations with Israel. This scenario has been long been considered a taboo in Lebanon. The two countries have no diplomatic relations and have been technically in a state of war since 1948, although recent conflicts have been between Israel and the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah, with the Lebanese Armed Forces generally staying on the sidelines.

While Aoun’s words did not explicitly refer to direct negotiations (as opposed to indirect talks via intermediaries) it is highly likely that Lebanon will eventually take this path. In the ongoing aftermath of the 2023–2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel, Lebanon is under mounting pressure – by Israel militarily and the US diplomatically – to accept compromises it previously considered objectionable. 

Hezbollah bears primary responsibility for this scenario due to its actions since its agreed ceasefire with Israel in November 2024. Although the ceasefire agreement stipulates the disarmament of all non-state armed groups, taken to include Hezbollah, the group has refused and is continuing to move its remaining arsenal between different sites in Lebanon and smuggling weapons in from Syria. Hezbollah says the agreement to disarm only applies south of the Litani River and accuses Israel of repeatedly violating the ceasefire.

Israel has continued to strike Hezbollah-linked sites and personnel within Lebanon since the ceasefire. It has called on the Lebanese state to disarm Hezbollah and is reportedly pressing it to be more aggressive in doing so. Recently, Israel has also escalated both its rhetoric on the potential resumption of war and the scale and frequency of its strikes inside Lebanon. 

The US has in parallel increased diplomatic pressure on Lebanon. A recent statement by US envoy Tom Barrack labelled the country a ‘failed state,’ while US Middle East envoy Morgan Ortagus said on a recent visit to Beirut that the Lebanese military ‘must now fully implement its plan’ to disarm Hezbollah.  

Land border and security agreement

The negotiations that Aoun referred to revolve around two major issues: Demarcating Lebanon’s land border with Israel and brokering a security agreement between the two countries. 

The disputed Lebanon–Israel land border has never been formally established. Before the latest Hezbollah–Israel war, it was widely expected among Lebanon’s ruling politicians that the land border dispute would be resolved through indirect negotiations, similarly to the process of demarcating the maritime border. In 2022, following years of on-off indirect negotiations, Lebanon and Israel agreed a US-brokered deal to end a long-running dispute over their maritime border. 

But politicians from parties outside the pro-Hezbollah camp have now increasingly begun to call for direct negotiations with Israel, which was previously taboo across the political spectrum. For example, last month, Samy Gemayel, leader of the anti-Hezbollah Kataeb Party, said direct negotiations were ‘necessary’ and that ‘what was impossible has become possible.’ He added that it is ‘preferable’ that the decision ‘be taken unanimously.’ Another MP called for direct negotiations but said they must be ‘subject to conditions,’ acknowledging potential opposition to talks from parts of the Lebanese population. 

Hezbollah is threatened by this prospect because it paves the way for a future peace deal with Israel, which would remove Hezbollah’s self-proclaimed raison d’être. Hezbollah responded to President Aoun’s statement by issuing an open letter addressed to Lebanon’s leadership in which the group rejected disarmament and direct negotiations. 

In the letter, Hezbollah sought to resurrect the now-defunct formula that had previously legitimized the group’s exceptional status as a non-state armed actor in Lebanon. The government’s ministerial statement of 2008 officially classified ‘resistance’ (widely understood as a reference to Hezbollah) as a pillar of national defence alongside the army. 

But this year, the current Lebanese government’s ministerial statement omitted any mention of ‘resistance’ and replaced it with the principle of state monopoly over arms. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam responded to Hezbollah’s open letter by affirming the state’s monopoly over decisions on war and peace. 

Hezbollah weakened

Hezbollah deploys the rhetoric of Lebanese sovereignty and national defence in its rejection of disarmament and engagement. In August, its leader threatened the Lebanese state not to move against it. But it is protesting from a position of weakness. 

Hezbollah does not have many cards left to play due to its military defeat by Israel and the weakening of its backer Tehran. The losses inflicted by Israel mean the group is struggling financially and has been unable to compensate those affected by the war, as it did after the 2006 war. While Hezbollah may retain a core backing in parts of Lebanon, some supporters reportedly privately admit they feel defeated. A directly brokered security agreement between Lebanon and Israel would serve to undermine Hezbollah’s argument that Lebanon needs it for protection from Israeli aggression.

The loss of its ally Bashar al-Assad in Syria has further cornered Hezbollah. Post-Assad Syria has been engaging in direct ‘technical’ negotiations with Israel regarding a security accord. The US is rewarding Syria partly for this reason, such as through the suspension of US sanctions and the warm welcome extended to Syrian president Ahmad al-Sharaa in Washington. When calling for Lebanon to engage with Israel, US envoy Barrack said that ‘Syria is showing the way.’ With Israel and Syria as its neighbours, and Hezbollah and Tehran weakened, it will be difficult for Lebanon to resist the pressure to follow a similar path of engagement.

Historical precedent

There is also a historical precedent for direct negotiations. Before Hezbollah officially announced itself in 1985, Lebanon and Israel did once engage in direct negotiations that led to the 17 May 1983 Peace Agreement. 

The agreement aimed at establishing peace between the two countries after Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon during the Lebanese Civil War. It stipulated that only the Lebanese state can bear arms in Lebanon and that a demilitarized zone would be established in southern Lebanon. A new security agreement between Israel and Lebanon today would likely adopt both those terms. 

However, Lebanon withdrew from the 17 May 1983 agreement in 1984. This was due to the opposition of Hafez al-Assad, who refused to withdraw Syrian troops from Lebanon, and the pro-Syrian factions in the country.  Had the 1983 agreement continued to hold, Lebanon would have gained the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory. 

This outcome is unlikely today. In the aftermath of the recent Hezbollah-Israel war and the collapse of the Assad regime, Israel has occupied several strategic points on Mount Hermon, which straddles Syria and Lebanon. Israel’s anticipated security accord with Syria is expected to leave the Israeli presence in Mount Hermon intact. Any security agreement with Lebanon will likely also not include Israel withdrawing its troops.

Despite the prospect of these compromises, which may prove contentious within Lebanon, mounting pressure means direct negotiations between the Lebanese government and Israel appear likely. Hezbollah is trying to paint direct negotiations as an unacceptable concession on part of the Lebanese state. But it is Hezbollah’s intransigence that has dragged Lebanon towards having no choice but to accept a greater price for stability.