A plan by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to collect unauthorized weapons from Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps has stalled, exposing deep internal divisions within Fatah and raising concerns over the viability of the Palestinian leadership’s control on the ground.

During his visit to Beirut on May 21, Abbas pledged to implement a phased weapons collection initiative. The first phase was to target camps in Beirut—Sabra, Mar Elias, and Burj al-Barajneh—followed by a second phase covering Beddawi in the north and Al-Jalil in the Bekaa Valley. Talks regarding the volatile southern camps, particularly Ain al-Hilweh were to follow.

However, the deadlines have passed with no tangible progress or official Palestinian explanation, aside from casual discussions and speculation circulating in political circles.

According to sources cited by Asharq Al-Awsat, the delay was requested by the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which initially underestimated the complexity of the task. The leadership has since realized it needs more time to build the necessary political groundwork and overcome logistical and organizational barriers within its own ranks.

Palestinian sources say the PLO was caught off guard when it attempted to implement the disarmament plan in camps under its influence, only to discover that Fatah, the PLO’s dominant faction in Lebanon, was ill-prepared. The movement, they said, is suffering from internal fragmentation and lacks a clear leadership structure capable of enforcing the commitments Abbas made to Lebanese President Joseph Aoun.

The sources emphasized that the primary obstacle lies within Fatah itself. While attention had initially focused on potential resistance from rival Palestinian factions such as Hamas and others based in Ain al-Hilweh, the more immediate problem turned out to be Fatah’s internal disarray. These rival factions, many of which include extremist elements and fugitives wanted by Lebanese authorities, have thus far remained on the sidelines of the initiative.

Contrary to expectations that the strongest pushback would come from groups excluded from the PLO and the disarmament negotiations, the disruption instead stems from within Fatah, which is weakened by competing leaderships and a lack of accountability.

Faced with this paralysis, Abbas dispatched a large delegation from Ramallah to Beirut, tasking it with reorganizing Fatah’s operations in Lebanon. The group’s mission is to unify the faction’s fragmented leadership and rebuild its credibility, especially in the face of growing influence by Hamas and its allies in key camps like Ain al-Hilweh.

The mission coincided with Abbas’s abrupt decision to strip Ashraf Dabbour, the Palestinian ambassador to Lebanon, of his broader organizational role as deputy to Azzam al-Ahmad, the PLO official responsible for the Lebanon file. Dabbour’s responsibilities were restricted strictly to diplomatic functions, amid criticism of his handling of Fatah’s affairs in Lebanon.

Notably, al-Ahmad, who had pledged to return to Beirut immediately after the Eid al-Adha holiday to finalize the disarmament plan with Lebanese officials, has so far remained in Ramallah. In his absence, the task of salvaging the disarmament effort has fallen to the visiting delegation, which is now focused on internal restructuring rather than weapons collection.

Sources suggest that Dabbour and several Fatah figures share responsibility for the current dysfunction, citing poor management, violations of organizational rules, and a decline in the faction’s influence on the Palestinian scene. However, they declined to comment on allegations that Dabbour’s dismissal was orchestrated by Yasser Abbas, the president’s son, due to a personal rift and his reported involvement in Fatah’s internal politics.

Some observers claim Yasser Abbas played a key role in preparing his father’s Lebanon visit, meeting with Lebanese officials to announce the disarmament pledge. Despite warnings from local security officials that such an announcement would require an actionable roadmap and timeline, Abbas went forward without a clear mechanism, leaving Lebanese authorities unwilling to enforce the plan by force, given the sensitive nature of entering Palestinian camps.

The delegation currently in Beirut has avoided mentioning weapons collection in its meetings with Lebanese officials. Instead, it has focused on reorganizing Fatah structurally and politically, including discussions with General Security chief Maj. Gen. Hassan Choukair, who is leading Lebanese coordination efforts on the matter.

For now, there is little indication that the weapons plan will proceed in the near term. The PLO has asked for an indefinite extension to the timeline, citing the need to first resolve Fatah’s leadership issues, correct internal mismanagement, and restore its relationship with the Lebanese state.

Sources say the delegation is working on a series of political, disciplinary, and administrative reforms aimed at reasserting Fatah’s leadership role, bringing it under President Abbas’s direct control, and regaining the trust of Palestinians in Lebanon.

Whether Abbas can engineer what some describe as a “top-down revolution” within Fatah remains unclear. Some senior officials are expected to be removed, while others plan to resign for personal reasons. The delegation, meanwhile, is pushing for more time to complete its task, rein in internal dissent and ultimately force Hamas and its allies to engage in the disarmament process.