Source: Kataeb.org
Friday 13 February 2026 09:57:32
At a time when geopolitical forecasts predicted a sharp decline in trade between Tehran and Beirut under the weight of military pressure and the aftermath of the recent war, newly released customs and economic data for 2025 tell a markedly different story.
Iranian exports to Lebanon not only held steady but rose significantly, reaching nearly $81 million in 2025, up from roughly $48 million in 2024, according to figures obtained by the Lebanese daily Nidaa Al-Watan.
In Beirut’s southern suburbs and across southern Lebanon — areas widely regarded as Hezbollah strongholds — Iranian goods have become a visible fixture. Imports of Iranian products surged after Lebanon’s financial collapse in 2019, when consumers, particularly within Hezbollah’s base, turned to lower-priced alternatives amid soaring inflation and currency depreciation.
Despite political upheaval and periodic tensions, imports have remained relatively stable over the past several years. They fell to $22 million in 2020 but rebounded sharply, reaching $106 million in 2022 before settling at current levels.
According to sources familiar with Hezbollah’s internal structures, the group provides members and supporters with “Al-Sajjad” and “Nour” cards that allow them to purchase goods at cooperatives affiliated with or supported by the group. Iranian products in these outlets are sold at highly competitive prices, often undercutting local market rates.
Many of the goods imported into Lebanon are lower-grade products, which helps explain their low price points, traders say. Other sources add that a portion of the imports is not sold at all but distributed directly by Hezbollah as assistance to loyalists, particularly in the wake of the losses and economic shocks that have affected its constituency in recent years.
“Why are southern villages flooded with Iranian candy? Don’t we produce candy? Don’t our factories sell sweets?” a distributor in southern Lebanon asked.
“There are many products we simply cannot market in the south and in some other areas,” he added, “because the Iranian product gets priority.”
Customs figures show reinforcing steel topping the list of imports from Iran, with shipments exceeding $25 million in 2025. Glass imports also surged, with approximately 1.5 million kilograms imported in January 2026 alone, compared with 1.9 million kilograms for all of 2025.
The Port of Beirut received shipments valued at $26 million, while the Port of Tripoli served as a strategic alternative, handling goods worth $28 million. An additional $37 million in imports entered through Beirut Airport, alongside $15 million through the Masnaa land crossing and roughly $19 million via the Abboudieh crossing in northern Lebanon. Iranian exports worth $17.7 million entered through the Port of Sidon.
The imports included steel, dates, copper wire, plastics, carpets, spices, glass and a range of food products. Pharmaceutical imports declined compared with previous years.
Through the distribution of “Al-Sajjad” and “Nour” cards, Hezbollah has effectively shaped a new consumption pattern centered on Iranian goods. In some regions, the pricing structure has eroded the competitiveness of local Lebanese merchants.
Informed sources told Nidaa Al-Watan that a significant share of the imported goods is distributed as free or subsidized food parcels to families of members and supporters. The system functions as a parallel social safety net independent of the Lebanese state, reinforcing loyalty by tying household livelihoods to the continued flow of shipments from Tehran.
The growing trade flows come as U.S.-Iran tensions remain elevated. The U.S. Treasury Department has announced efforts to track Iranian funds transferred abroad, stating that Tehran has been moving liquidity overseas to shield assets from crippling domestic inflation. That dynamic, analysts say, could partly explain increased commodity flows into Lebanon.
The developments unfold amid fears of renewed escalation between Washington and Tehran, even as diplomatic negotiations between the two sides continue.
Israeli media reports have meanwhile described what they characterize as a rebuilt and increasingly sophisticated smuggling network between Iran and Hezbollah. The alleged network relies on maritime routes, arms transfer channels and even cryptocurrencies, following financial transfers from Tehran reportedly totaling around $1 billion.
Several months ago, Israel filed a complaint with the U.S.-led committee overseeing the ceasefire agreement, accusing Iran of financing Hezbollah by smuggling large sums of cash through Beirut Airport. Israel warned it could strike the airport if the activity continued.
The Wall Street Journal, citing a Pentagon official speaking on behalf of the oversight committee, reported that Israel had complained Iranian diplomats and others were delivering tens of millions of dollars in cash to Hezbollah to fund the rebuilding of its military capabilities.
Security sources say that since the last war — particularly following the fall of Syria’s previous regime, tighter controls along the Lebanese-Syrian border and heightened monitoring at Beirut airport — Iran has sought to recalibrate how it supports allied groups in the region, especially Hezbollah.
But the environment has changed, they say.
“It is no longer as easy as before,” one security source said, pointing to stricter border enforcement, official resistance to Iranian interference and mounting Israeli and American threats.
With few alternatives, Iran may turn to indirect methods to maintain its foothold, the sources said. That could include overland smuggling routes, which continue to receive Iranian goods, or relying on individuals transporting funds through the airport.