The massacre of 12 children in Majdal Shams in the occupied Golan Heights opened the door for a new phase in the conflict between Hezbollah, Iran and Israel. It presented the Israeli government with an opportunity to expand the current parameters of conflict.

In Lebanon, the assassination of Fouad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah commander, in the heart of Beirut’s southern suburbs, Hezbollah’s stronghold, reshuffled the rules of engagement between the two parties on the Lebanese-Israeli borders.

The conflict had been mostly confined to the border region on both sides, and whenever Israel would strike beyond these parameters, Hezbollah would target a military base deeper within Israeli territories, often without casualties, to avoid providing Israel with an alibi for a wider confrontation.

Today, the targeting of Beirut’s southern suburbs warrants a response for three main reasons. First, it is the second such attack on the southern suburbs, following the January killing in Beirut of Saleh Al Arouri, deputy chief of Hamas’s political bureau.

Back then, Hezbollah had avoided an attack against Israeli cities to limit the conflict and avert an all-out war. Today, this option will be difficult as the attack, the second in six months, sets new rules of engagement, with Israel allowed to strike against Hezbollah’s stronghold when deemed necessary.

Second, unlike the January strike, this attack targeted a Hezbollah commander and killed him alongside civilians, including two children. It would be difficult to avoid a response. The organisation has already warned against any change to the rules of engagement following the Golan Heights attack, and its credibility is at stake.

In a speech on Thursday evening, Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah said his group was exploring a “real, studied” response. Third, the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’s political chief, on Iranian territory would warrant a direct response from Tehran, as Iranian sources have confirmed.

In April, the Iranian attack had led to an escalation from Lebanon, with Hezbollah using new weapons and tactics. This could occur now with an anticipated direct Iranian response to Haniyeh’s killing.

Whether Majdal Shams was a Hezbollah battlefield error or an error in judgment or an ally’s strike, it arrived at a perfect time for the government of Benjamin Netanyahu. Mr Netanyahu is facing great pressure at home to bring about an agreement with Hamas to release Israeli hostages from the Gaza Strip. The Israeli Prime Minister wants to avoid the backlash from a deal with Hamas, which could bring about the end of his far-right government, and perhaps his political career.

At the same time, he is keen on a Donald Trump administration in the White House, and a pre-US elections escalation could have repercussions on the incumbent administration, especially if it’s dragged into another conflict in the Middle East.

Escalating with Hezbollah and Iran could either help Mr Netanyahu survive the internal pressure or give him enough points on his war scorecard to opt for a ceasefire deal. An escalation with Hezbollah and Iran might grant Mr Netanyahu time and a victory over Israel’s adversary, yet a wider war could reverse any gains.

Hezbollah not only has mightier firepower than Hamas, with missiles and drones that could reach any point inside Israel, the organisation’s regional allies across the Levant and in Yemen could mobilise to its aid, raising the cost of conflict to a war-fatigued Israel.

Nevertheless, Hezbollah stands to lose the most. The organisation joined the conflict on October 8 last year, with limited attacks, designed to pressure Israel but not to start an all-out war. However, these cautious conflict parameters have proved to be costly to Hezbollah, with hundreds of fighters, commanders and civilians killed on the Lebanese side, while Israel lost a few dozen soldiers and civilians.

The limited war setup proved costly, with Israel’s airpower and intelligence ability, and its use of new spying technologies and years of infiltrating Hezbollah and Lebanon. Despite the high costs of the ongoing conflict, the organisation stands to lose more if it opts out of the war, as a withdrawal would weaken this regional alliance (unity of the fronts), which is now tested with militias in Yemen, Lebanon and Iraq supporting Hamas against Israel.

If the organisation agrees to a ceasefire while the Gaza war continues, Hezbollah’s stature among its allies and its leading role in this axis will suffer, let alone its standing across the Arab region.

At the same time, the organisation cannot enter an all-out war in which Israel has already threatened to destroy much of Lebanon, similarly to its scorched-earth campaign in the Gaza Strip. A devastated Lebanon would create a crisis for Hezbollah following the war, as the organisation would be blamed for joining the conflict in the first place, in support of Gaza and not in defence of Lebanon’s interests.

Hezbollah is in a maze of connected traps, and the only way out is in the long waiting game with the confines of a limited war, until Mr Netanyahu – who lacks a vision for the day after – opts for a ceasefire or his government falls apart. A greater escalation could jeopardise the only visible way out.