With Assad’s demise, there is a palpable sense that Lebanon is starting a new chapter, one in which the Baathist regime’s stifling shadow over Lebanese politics is absent and where a genuine opportunity exists to finally jump-start the building of state institutions. Indeed, January 9, 2025, could mark the first time Lebanon elects a president without the Baathist regime in power since 1958. For the first time in decades, a president need not be approved by Damascus. An opportunity also arises for Lebanese security institutions to be given a chance to function without direct or indirect interference by Syria’s now defunct regime, a first since the civil war ended.

What Happens to Hezbollah?

At the same time, however, there is also a concern that the regime’s end, coupled with the losses sustained in the recent conflict with Israel, may make Hezbollah more antagonistic in the domestic arena in the immediate term. Yet even here certain constraints have emerged that make any potential belligerent action less likely. These include the:

• The loss of its top-tier leadership and the recent shift to a more pragmatic approach by Nabih Berri, the speaker of Parliament and leader of the Amal Party, who has emerged as the de facto political leader of the Shia community;
• The disintegration of Hezbollah’s political alliance with the Free Patriotic Movement, which fell apart in October, leaving Hezbollah without a prominent Christian ally and undermining its long-standing cross-sectarian political cover; and
• The empowerment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) following the terms of the November 26 Israel-Hezbollah cease-fire, which threatens to further weaken Hezbollah’s self-proclaimed status as the defender of Lebanon.

The loss of its land route for arms supply across Syria via the Albukamal crossing with Iraq is yet another blow that works to deter it from a more aggressive posture domestically, at least in the short term.

The extent to which its losses stemming from the war with Israel and Assad’s fall will lead to Hezbollah being amenable to disarm is questionable at this stage. Thus far, Hezbollah’s leadership has signaled it is open to resuming a national dialogue process on the issue, with some skepticism arising over whether the sentiment is genuine or yet another delaying tactic.   Discussions about this and pressure to disarm are likely to increase following the parliamentary session on January 9 to elect the president.

Yet working against the pressure to disarm is Israel’s repeated violations of the cease-fire, which only provides fodder for Hezbollah and its allies in the country as they make the LAF and the state look feckless amid Israeli strikes. That Israel continues to strike LAF positions without their responding will also put undue pressure on the Lebanese army as it tries to fulfill its duties — something that, if carried out effectively, would ultimately cripple Hezbollah. Moreover, Israel’s incursion deeper into Syrian territory in the Golan and its delayed withdrawal from Lebanese territory along the border, which started earlier this week, bolsters the Lebanese narrative that Israel’s objective is more about territorial expansion than it is about security. This in turn, exacerbates the sense of insecurity in Lebanon. 

Renewing Domestic Politics

The war with Israel and Assad’s fall have also been a boon to Lebanon’s traditional political party establishment — party flags and paraphernalia are ubiquitous again in public spaces as politics and political discourse veer toward the disarmament of Hezbollah and the untangling of regional alliances and influences. The bread-and-butter problems that catalyzed a large segment of the population against these parties and the political system in 2019 are on the backburner, for now.

In a way, what is transpiring is bringing into sharper focus the argument that the confessional system was never the real problem, but rather it was the outsized and inimical role of Syria, Hezbollah and Iran in Lebanese affairs that prevented the political system from functioning in an inclusive and effective manner. The evolving dynamics in this next phase will act to confirm or shift this perspective. Along these lines, there is a nascent push emerging from civil society to fully activate provisions of the constitution previously eschewed that would de-confessionalize the political system, seeing the drive to disarm Hezbollah as an opportunity to fully implement the Taif Accord, the agreement ending Lebanon's 15-year civil war. 

The regime's fall is also raising some immediate security concerns, with rumors circulating that high-level remnants of the regime have entered Lebanon illegally. Many undocumented Syrians from the country’s Shia and Alawi communities and others close to the Assad regime are also being rejected from entering the country via the Masnaa border crossing as Lebanese authorities are keen to prevent a potential influx of refugees and any security threats that could arise from individuals linked to the former regime. On the flip side, many in the country are now hopeful that the 1.5 million Syrian refugees hosted in Lebanon will now be able to return home voluntarily, easing the strain put on the country's economy and infrastructure.

Over the medium and long-term, there is cautious optimism that Assad’s absence from the domestic landscape can lead to an environment in which the political deadlock and paralysis that have plagued the country’s affairs since 2005 will subside as consensus-making — once a staple of Lebanese politics — will be easier to attain.