Venezuela’s links to Hezbollah have come under intense scrutiny following the recent capture of President Nicolás Maduro by U.S. forces. The connections, spanning continents and decades, reveal a network of illicit activity allegedly fostered by Caracas officials, stretching from narcotics trafficking to financial schemes benefiting the Iran-backed group.

As Venezuela’s foreign minister in 2007, Maduro traveled to Damascus for a highly publicized meeting with then-Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on his way to Tehran. While the official narrative emphasized strengthening ties with countries opposed to Washington, sources familiar with the matter told The Financial Times that Maduro also held a secret meeting with a senior Hezbollah commander. The meeting, at a central Damascus hotel, is believed to mark the first documented encounter between Maduro and a top Hezbollah operative.

U.S. authorities have long accused members of the Venezuelan government of collaborating with Hezbollah in drug trafficking and money laundering. Several Maduro allies have faced criminal investigations in the United States, citing these connections. The issue gained fresh attention following Maduro’s arrest, which came during a pre-dawn raid in Caracas. In a New York court appearance on Monday, Maduro pleaded not guilty to four charges, including narco-terrorism, conspiracy to import cocaine, and possession of weapons.

While the indictment did not explicitly reference Hezbollah or Iran, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio highlighted Caracas’ alignment with both.

“Venezuela has cosied up to Hezbollah and its patron Tehran,” Rubio said in an interview. “In the 21st century, under the Trump administration, we will not allow a country in our hemisphere to serve as a hub for Hezbollah, Iran, or other malign actors.”

Hezbollah’s involvement in Venezuela is widely linked to the broader Iran-Caracas partnership, forged through shared anti-U.S. ideology and strengthened by Washington’s sanctions on both nations. Intelligence sources and former officials told The Financial Times that Hezbollah, Iran’s primary proxy, established ties with Venezuelan officials under Hugo Chávez; ties that expanded under Maduro. According to one source, these connections have facilitated “drug trafficking, money laundering, schemes to obtain passports, arms transfers, and intelligence-gathering, often under diplomatic cover.”

Both Venezuela and Hezbollah have denied such allegations, yet multiple investigations—including Project Cassandra, a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) probe launched in 2008—have documented Hezbollah’s overseas operations and links to Venezuelan authorities. The project uncovered evidence that Hezbollah operatives were issued Venezuelan passports and received logistical support from Conviasa, the state-owned airline. DEA reports from 2010 indicate cocaine shipments were sent on Conviasa flights to Damascus, along with large cash transfers routed to Hezbollah-affiliated money exchanges in Lebanon.

Roger Noriega, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, testified in 2012 that Conviasa flights “provided Iran, Hezbollah, and associated narcotraffickers a surreptitious means to move personnel, weapons, contraband, and other materiel.” These operations, experts told The Financial Times, relied on the cooperation of Venezuela’s ruling party, known as the Chavistas.

Hezbollah’s presence in Venezuela extended beyond financial operations. DEA investigators reportedly documented militants training in urban warfare on Margarita Island, a free-trade zone with a significant Lebanese diaspora and known financial activity linked to the group. While some officials have suggested the area served as a training hub, counterterrorism expert Matthew Levitt told The Financial Times that characterization is exaggerated.

“Hezbollah has a deep-rooted history in Venezuela. It does not require formal training camps to maintain its presence,” he said.

The group has also relied on Latin America’s Lebanese diaspora for funding and logistical support, often using established clan networks. Several Maduro confidants reportedly came from these clans. In 2008, U.S. sanctions targeted Venezuelan diplomat Ghazi Nasr Al Din for allegedly using his embassy posts in Damascus and Beirut to channel resources to Hezbollah. Subsequent reports identified the Nasr Al Din family as integral to Maduro’s bureaucratic network, providing protection and resources to the group. Other allies, such as Tareck El Aissami and Adel El Zabayar, have faced U.S. indictments for sanctions evasion and alleged Hezbollah ties, including appearing in the group’s propaganda videos.

While some Trump administration officials warned that Hezbollah could use Venezuela as a base for potential attacks on the U.S., evidence remains limited. Allegations of ties to other militant groups, such as Hamas, also have little substantiation. Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s activities in Venezuela appear to persist. A December investigation by The Financial Times found that Venezuela-based cryptocurrency accounts had transacted with wallets linked to Tawfiq Al-Law, a U.S.-sanctioned Syrian accused of moving illicit funds for Hezbollah, Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen, and companies tied to the Assad regime in Syria. Binance, implicated in the case, denied wrongdoing and said it complies with international sanctions laws.

Former counterterrorism officials told The Financial Times that the current Maduro administration’s survival leaves Hezbollah’s networks largely intact.

“The system is still in place—the same one that seemingly collaborated with Hezbollah,” said Levitt. “From the outside, it is unclear how the U.S. action will significantly disrupt Hezbollah and Iran’s presence in Venezuela.”