Lebanon risks being left out of the emerging Eastern Mediterranean energy network as neighboring countries build gas infrastructure, forge export partnerships and position themselves along routes connecting producers to European markets, according to an analysis by Lebanese writer Firas Al-Aridi published in Nidaa Al-Watan.

Lebanon’s geographic location and coastal infrastructure could make it a natural part of a future regional energy network, but its political absence from efforts shaping the regional gas market could limit its ability to benefit, Al-Aridi wrote.

The issue is not only whether Lebanon possesses commercially viable gas reserves, he argued, but whether it has the institutions, strategy and negotiating power needed to ensure that the country has a role in the region’s evolving energy system.

Lebanon’s absence is not entirely the result of circumstances. When the East Mediterranean Gas Forum was established in 2019, Lebanon was invited to join but declined because Israel was among its members.

That decision had a sovereignty-based rationale, Al-Aridi wrote, but it also carried a strategic cost: Lebanon’s absence from the table where regional energy arrangements are being shaped could make it harder to secure a place in the network later.

Lebanon and Cyprus signed an agreement in November 2025 to delimit their exclusive economic zones, which entered into force in February 2026 after ratification procedures were completed. The agreement opens the way for further offshore exploration and energy cooperation, but practical developments remain limited compared with the pace of regional changes, according to the analysis.

Lebanon’s potential gas resources have not yet been commercially confirmed, and the country cannot easily compete with major regional players such as Egypt and Turkey, Al-Aridi acknowledged.

But he argued that regional influence does not depend solely on the size of gas reserves.

Countries can build their position by negotiating maritime boundaries, attracting energy companies, developing ports, signing transportation agreements and joining regional forums before commercially exploitable gas is even confirmed.

For Lebanon, that could mean developing a strategy around its geographic position and relationships with Cyprus, Egypt and Europe, as well as with gas-producing Gulf countries.

Security concerns and repeated wars remain major obstacles to advancing such plans, but continued delays cannot indefinitely be used as a justification for inaction, Al-Aridi wrote.

The risk, he said, is that energy networks being built around Lebanon could ultimately bypass the country.

Once those networks are established, joining them could become significantly more difficult and costly.

Gas networks reshape regional power

The broader transformation is being driven by a shift in the global energy landscape: control over gas is no longer the only source of strategic power. Increasingly, influence also comes from controlling the infrastructure and routes that transport gas to consumers.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, competition is therefore extending beyond offshore reserves to pipelines, liquefaction facilities, ports, export routes and the political relationships needed to protect them.

Egypt and Turkey are emerging as key players, while Cyprus and Israel are seeking to consolidate their positions as gas producers. Syria is preparing to enter the sector with what Al-Aridi described as clear Gulf and U.S. backing.

Egypt has a particular advantage because it already has infrastructure capable of liquefying and exporting gas through the Idku and Damietta facilities.

That allows it to serve not only as a producer and consumer but also as a hub for gathering, processing and re-exporting gas.

With European markets seeking to diversify their energy supplies, Egypt’s position between producers and consumers gives it significant strategic value.

Cyprus seeks integration with Egypt

Cyprus is pursuing a model that relies on existing Egyptian infrastructure rather than requiring the construction of a separate and expensive export system.

At the Cronos gas field, the development plan calls for gas to be transported to Egypt and processed through existing infrastructure, including the Damietta facility, before being exported to European markets.

Cyprus is seeking to begin exporting gas from Cronos to Europe by 2028, according to recent Cypriot statements.

The model creates a division of roles within the regional network: Cyprus would act as a producer, Egypt as a processing and liquefaction hub, and Europe as the final market.

Israel has also become part of the network by exporting gas to Egypt, which can then feed it into regional and international trade.

The result is a system in which gas serves not merely as a commodity crossing borders but as a means of creating economic interdependence among countries — and, consequently, geopolitical leverage.

But offshore gas does not automatically become a viable commercial project. It requires recoverable reserves, competitive prices, transportation infrastructure, long-term purchase contracts and political and security stability.

That is why infrastructure and geographic location can sometimes matter as much as, or more than, the size of a gas field.

Turkey seeks regional energy hub role

Turkey is pursuing a different model.

While it does not yet have an LNG liquefaction system comparable to Egypt’s in the Eastern Mediterranean, it has a major geographic advantage, sitting between Asia and Europe and possessing an extensive network of pipelines, LNG facilities and gas-storage infrastructure.

Ankara has increasingly linked gas to its broader ambition to become a regional energy hub, allowing it to receive gas from multiple sources and redirect it toward international markets.

That could give Turkey greater political and economic leverage in its relations with both producers and consumers.

In July 2026, Turkey and Northern Cyprus took a more concrete step in that direction by signing a memorandum of understanding for an offshore gas pipeline.

According to Turkey’s Energy Ministry, the proposed pipeline would operate in both directions, potentially allowing gas to flow from Turkey to the island and, in the future, from the island to Turkey and then Europe.

The project would therefore not only supply Northern Cyprus but could potentially create an alternative route to the export pathways increasingly centered on Egypt.

Limits of regional cooperation

The East Mediterranean Gas Forum was established in 2019 with the stated aim of creating a collective framework in which gas could become a basis for cooperation rather than another source of conflict.

Its founding members were Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan and Palestine. The forum later became an intergovernmental organization headquartered in Cairo, with its charter entering into force in March 2021.

But the experience has also demonstrated the limits of regional coordination.

The forum has not failed institutionally, but its collective framework has not prevented individual countries from developing separate bilateral arrangements.

Egypt has strengthened ties with Cyprus and Israel. Turkey has pursued closer energy cooperation with Northern Cyprus. Cyprus has developed relationships with major energy companies, while Israel has deepened its links with Egypt.

The forum has consequently remained primarily a platform for dialogue and coordination rather than an organization managing regional gas production and transportation.

Infrastructure could determine the future

For Lebanon, the stakes extend beyond potential gas revenues.

Energy infrastructure built today can shape trade routes for decades. Pipeline routes, liquefaction and processing facilities and long-term supply contracts can lock in commercial relationships and determine which countries become central to regional energy flows.

Global energy companies also consider factors beyond the presence of resources when deciding where to invest, including political stability, institutional capacity, regulatory clarity and the ability of governments to make decisions efficiently.

That means Lebanon’s challenge is not simply to determine whether it has enough gas.

It must also determine whether it can build the institutional and diplomatic framework needed to make its location strategically relevant to the region’s emerging energy network.

The Eastern Mediterranean’s geopolitical map is increasingly being shaped not only by borders and military conflicts but also by pipelines, liquefaction terminals and long-term energy contracts.

For Lebanon, the central question is therefore whether it can secure a place in that emerging map before the routes and infrastructure around it become entrenched.

A country that is absent from negotiations over the regional energy system may eventually find itself negotiating its place on a map that others have already drawn.