Over the past week, the wheeling-dealing Lebanese political elite and their favorite US envoy, Amos Hochstein, were able to ostensibly agree on a working plan for a ceasefire, one that gives the Israelis what they have been asking for all along: A demilitarized zone south of the Litani River that curtails Hezbollah’s ability to strike inside Israel.

Late Tuesday night, the Israeli Prime Minister announced that his cabinet had greenlit Hochstein’s proposal to end the third Israeli-Lebanese war, a conflict that broke out on October 1 and saw the total destruction of villages and towns across Lebanon, leaving thousands dead, including Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary general, and nearly all the senior members of Iran’s Lebanese proxy. Almost immediately after the announcement of the ceasefire, thousands from the 1.5 million displaced Lebanese began trickling back to their destroyed homes in the South. They returned to areas where the Israeli army had razed Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, reducing entire towns to rubble and rendering some uninhabitable for the foreseeable future.

Yet, the joy and optimism of those returning to their devastated homes and burned family photo albums does not obscure the harsh reality: What the Biden administration announced is not a real political settlement but a temporary security arrangement. This plan will, hopefully, hold for the next 60 days – until Donald Trump is sworn in as president. Hochstein’s approach to the Lebanese file, echoing his superiors and local Lebanese “partners” like Nabih Berri, amounts to a little more than buying time by adopting the tactic of kicking the can down the road.

In his so-called previous successful mediation, Hochstein brokered the Lebanese-Israeli maritime demarcation deal, which saw Lebanon and Hezbollah relinquish thousands of miles of Lebanese maritime territory rich in gas reserves. In much the same way, the current ceasefire deal lacks a genuine political transition plan or roadmap. Instead, it resurrects UNSCR 1701, which ended the 2006 war – a framework shattered by the October 7 events and Hezbollah’s so-called war of support for Gaza.

Contrary to the claims of Hezbollah and their local political mouthpiece Nabih Berri, the Hochstein ceasefire is nothing short of a total capitulation to Israeli demands. The Israelis, through a written side deal backed by the US, have been granted unrestricted freedom of movement over Lebanon and Syria to ensure Hezbollah cannot resupply or rebuild its arsenal. In typical duplicitous fashion, Berri has acquiesced to the US-Israeli side deal, provided it remains outside the official provisions of the ceasefire announcement, thus maintaining a stance of plausible deniability.

Nevertheless, what is even more criminal on the part of the Lebanese political establishment is their failure to create a safety net for the aftermath of the war. Lebanon desperately needs billions of dollars for reconstruction and immediate humanitarian aid, yet no member of the international community – especially the oil-rich Arab Gulf states – is willing to inject these funds without a clear recovery roadmap. Such a plan would require transparent structural political reforms and, more crucially, a concrete mechanism for the disarmament of Hezbollah – a dangerous yet unavoidable necessity.

This raises critical questions about the Lebanese political elite’s priorities. Are they committed to the long-term rebuilding of Lebanon, or are they simply protecting the status quo for their own benefit? The international community, while hesitant to engage, might be persuaded to act if civil society voices emerge strongly to demand accountability and offer alternative leadership.

In addition to these murky details, several factors suggest the ceasefire might hold – for now. Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran’s acceptance of such a humiliating deal is likely a tactical move to buy time, regroup, and gradually rebuild both their military capabilities and their tarnished image. This, however, is an uphill battle. Hezbollah must contend with a drastically changed landscape, where the Assad regime in Syria has effectively transitioned from an ally to a liability. Syria is now a tool for Israel to sever Hezbollah’s logistical lifelines to Tehran.

Under the US-Israeli side deal, Israel has free rein to strike any target inside Syria, particularly those linked to Hezbollah’s resupply efforts. Moreover, Israeli forces will continue targeting Hezbollah’s financial networks, burning cash depots and gold reserves – assets hidden in entities like the shadowy Qard al-Hassan pawn operation.

The real question is not whether this ceasefire will hold but for how long – and at what cost. More importantly, can the Lebanese afford to wait another decade or more to relive the nightmare of the past year? Berri, as the face of Lebanon’s decaying political system, seems to believe he can outlast the clock and force the region, and eventually the Trump administration, to stabilize Lebanon through investments.

Yet, Berri and those who continue to support him must remember that Lebanon no longer commands the same empathy or status on the international stage as it did in 2006. Worse still, the failure to disarm Hezbollah north of the Litani River remains a central issue for Lebanon’s survival.

The only paths forward are grim: A civil war that would destroy Lebanon or the far more challenging task of building a strong nation-state. Building such a nation-state will require more than rhetoric; it demands sustained grassroots organizing, public accountability for political leaders, and external partnerships that prioritize long-term development over short-term security fixes. Without this, the cycle of destruction will inevitably repeat.

The announcement of the ceasefire may bring a fleeting sense of relief, but the sight of celebratory gunfire is a bitterly satirical reminder of Lebanon’s deeper malaise.

As the smoke clears, Lebanon faces a choice: Continue down this path of managed decline or confront its existential challenges head-on.