North Korea’s secretive financial apparatus may have helped fund Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in Lebanon through a network of front companies, illicit financial channels and arms-trading intermediaries, according to security reports and testimony from North Korean defectors.

The allegations point to Office 39, a unit of North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party that is believed to manage overseas revenue streams for the country’s leadership. The reports describe a complex web of financial and logistical connections allegedly linking Pyongyang to Hezbollah, the Iran-backed armed group, through intermediaries operating across Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

The accounts, reported by Erem News, which reportedly draw on confidential security documents, intelligence assessments and testimony from former North Korean officials, allege that the network has been used to move illicit funds, arrange cross-border arms deals and support military projects in Lebanon. The claims could not be independently verified.

A shadow financial network

According to the reports, the alleged financial links between North Korea and Hezbollah do not rely primarily on conventional bank transfers. Instead, they operate through a parallel underground economy designed to conceal the origins and destinations of funds.

Office 39 is described as a central player in this system, using front companies in Beijing, Macau and Singapore to manage transactions across borders. The alleged network is also said to extend into Lebanon’s banking system and informal currency-exchange markets in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley.

The sources cited in the reports include North Korean political defectors, former diplomats and economists, as well as United Nations and international bodies. They allege that revenue from arms sales, cybercrime, smuggling networks in Asia and the drug trade—including methamphetamine trafficking—is moved through shell companies and financial institutions in countries where oversight is weak.

Some of the proceeds are reportedly converted into foreign currencies or precious metals, particularly gold, to make them easier to transfer and harder to trace.

The reports further allege that gold has been sold to help cover the costs of engineering and technical experts sent to Lebanon to assist in designing fortified tunnel networks. The deployments are said to have begun around 2003–2004 and continued in subsequent years, with Hezbollah still using the infrastructure in its conflict with Israel.

Prominent defectors who worked for years within North Korea’s financial system have alleged that Office 39 controls more than 120 front companies, alongside a broad network of commercial banks and money-laundering operations around the world.

The unit reportedly functions as a personal financial institution for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, managing foreign-currency funds through complex channels outside ordinary state financial structures.

Intermediaries allegedly link Pyongyang and Hezbollah

Among the figures cited in the accounts is Ri Jong Ho, a former senior North Korean financial official who reportedly managed funds for the country’s elite before defecting from the regime.

According to the reports, communications between the alleged networks have continued despite Ri’s defection, relying on professional intermediaries and diplomatic and military channels.

Commercial intermediaries operating under diplomatic cover are said to help coordinate the transport of dual-use goods by sea and overland. Such goods can have both civilian and military applications, making their movement particularly sensitive when they are linked to sanctioned entities or suspected weapons programs.

The reports also point to KOMID, North Korea’s principal arms-export organization, which has been identified in United Nations reporting and international sanctions-monitoring assessments as a major exporter of ballistic missiles and military technology. Through financial intermediaries, KOMID is alleged to have developed indirect links to Iranian and Lebanese financing channels.

Lebanese currency-exchange networks subject to sanctions are also described as part of the alleged system, helping move funds between accounts and intermediaries while obscuring their original source.

The precise nature and extent of any direct financial or operational links between Office 39 and Hezbollah remain unclear from the material presented in the reports.

Alleged North Korean role in Hezbollah’s tunnel network

Beyond financing, the reports describe what they characterize as a broader military and logistical relationship between North Korea and Hezbollah, including alleged cooperation in the construction of underground fortifications and the training of fighters.

The Alma Research and Education Center and Military Watch Magazine are among the research organizations and publications cited in connection with claims that North Korean expertise contributed to Hezbollah’s tunnel infrastructure in southern Lebanon.

According to field sources and compiled military and intelligence assessments cited in the reports, North Korean military experts directly supervised the design and construction of an extensive tunnel network in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley in 2003 and 2004. The network is alleged to extend for hundreds of kilometers, although the reported scale has not been independently established.

The tunnels are said to reach depths of up to 40 meters and to incorporate reinforced concrete designed to withstand powerful impacts. Their design is described as closely resembling North Korea’s defensive infrastructure along the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Korea.

The reports also allege that senior Hezbollah figures and members of the group’s elite units received advanced training in Pyongyang and at secret camps. The training reportedly covered guerrilla warfare, the operation of underground command centers, missile-system development and anti-tank weapons.

Some of those systems are described as having benefited from combined North Korean and Iranian expertise. The reports, however, do not establish the full extent of any such cooperation or provide independently verified details of the training programs.

Defectors shed light on alleged funding channels

Former North Korean officials and diplomats who defected to South Korea have played an important role in bringing the alleged activities to public attention, according to the reports.

Testimony from Ri Jong Ho and other former officials has provided accounts of how Office 39 allegedly manages illicit revenue and channels funds through international commercial and financial networks.

The reports suggest that these resources may have supported military networks across the region, including armed groups allied with Tehran. If substantiated, the allegations would illustrate how covert financial operations, arms trafficking and technical cooperation can connect state-linked networks with non-state armed groups across multiple continents.