Growing up in West Beirut in the 1980s, I vividly recall the sudden appearance of massive posters depicting a menacing, scowling figure. The quotes alongside him labeled the United States as the “Great Satan” and Israel as the “Little Satan,” calling for their destruction. This enigmatic man was none other than Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic.

His image was soon adopted by Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy, whose name quickly became synonymous with the abduction of Western hostages and terrorist attacks.

Beginning with the 1982 bombings of the US embassy and Marine barracks, Hezbollah’s violent actions culminated for me in the assassination of my friend Lokman Slim in February 2021 – a staunch liberal voice who never accepted Hezbollah’s supposed “transformation.”

The recent war between Israel and Hezbollah, combined with the assassination of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and the decimation of his top command, has effectively “reset” the party to its original form, or back to its factory setting.

 

Decades of efforts to cultivate a Lebanese identity for Hezbollah have crumbled, as Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reasserted direct control over the party. What started as a fanatical militia has grown into a strategic pillar of Iran’s regional ambitions, but the mask of local legitimacy has been shattered.

In its first decade, Hezbollah – officially the “Party of God” – struggled to shed its reputation as an Iranian proxy. Many Lebanese Shias, who largely supported the cleric Musa al-Sadr and his Amal movement, derided Hezbollah as the “anti-God party.” The group’s radical practices, such as emulating Khomeini’s teachings by throwing acid at unveiled women, did little to endear them to Lebanon’s majority Shia population. Many Lebanese Shias were already active in secular and Marxist political movements, further limiting Hezbollah’s appeal.

After the Lebanese Civil War ended in 1990, Hezbollah sought to reposition itself by focusing on fighting the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Even after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, the group refused to decommission its weapons. Over time, Hezbollah’s so-called “resistance” became a threat to Lebanon itself.

In February 2005, the group was implicated in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

A year later, Hezbollah sparked a 34-day war with Israel that devastated Lebanon’s infrastructure. Then, in May 2008, Hezbollah attempted to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, revealing its true sectarian ambitions.

By 2011, the group sealed its fate by sending fighters to support the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, further alienating it from much of Lebanon.

The devastating setbacks Hezbollah has faced recently have sparked conspiracy theories suggesting that Iran “sold out” Hezbollah in exchange for a better deal with the Biden administration. These theories portray Iran as a pragmatic player that can be reasoned with. However, this view ignores the reality that, since the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Iran’s expansionist ambitions have relied on Hezbollah and other factions as proxies to defend its regional hegemony. Hezbollah’s declared goal of “liberating Jerusalem” and fighting for the oppressed was always a façade – merely a tool for Iran’s messianic drive to dominate Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen.

With Hezbollah weakened by military failures and the looming threat of an Israeli strike on Iran, its utility as a proxy has been compromised, if not destroyed. The group’s inability to appoint a successor to Nasrallah has forced the IRGC to intervene directly. Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh, the deputy commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, has been dispatched to oversee Hezbollah’s fragmented fighting force.

This explains the recent shift in tactics, including more precise missile strikes on Israeli targets like the Binyamina army base and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s summer residence.

Going forward, it is more accurate to see the IRGC, not Hezbollah, as the entity negotiating with Israel and the West – by firepower, no less. Iran hopes that escalating tensions on the Lebanese front will deter Israel from launching a retaliatory strike against its mainland. Lebanon, meanwhile, finds itself under three occupations: the advancing Israeli army, an Iranian regime that uses Lebanon as a human shield for political leverage, and a domestic political elite too corrupt or cowardly to chart a path forward.

Hezbollah and Iran have come full circle. What began in the summer of 1982 with the founding of a small terrorist group ended in the fall of 2024 with the collapse of their proxy network of terror and corruption.

The only viable path for the Lebanese people is to declare Iran an occupying force and fight for their liberation. Anything short of this will only waste more time, resources, and innocent lives.