Source: Kataeb.org
Wednesday 18 November 2026 09:12:39
Political discussions over how to resolve Lebanon’s financial crisis have opened a contentious debate over the country’s gold reserves, with Hezbollah lawmakers reportedly seeking $15 billion from their value to finance reconstruction in the south in exchange for supporting legislation that would allow the central bank to use part of its gold holdings to help repay depositors.
The proposal has raised concerns that Lebanon’s gold reserves could become the subject of a political bargain, with the rights of hundreds of thousands of depositors effectively tied to demands by powerful political factions, Nidaa Al-Watan said.
Under the proposal being discussed by some political parties, Parliament would amend Law 42, enacted in 1986, which prohibits the disposal of the central bank’s gold reserves. The amendment would allow Banque du Liban (BDL) to convert part of its gold holdings into income-generating financial assets, helping generate the liquidity needed to meet its obligations to depositors.
But some Hezbollah lawmakers have reportedly demanded that approval of the amendment be conditional on allocating $15 billion from the value of the gold reserves to rebuild southern Lebanon.
The proposal would set a troubling precedent in the management of public finances and national wealth, effectively treating a strategic asset held by the central bank as a resource available for political distribution while depositors have been waiting for access to their savings for more than seven years.
While residents of southern Lebanon have every right to demand reconstruction after the destruction caused by the war, critics argue that no political faction should be able to use that national obligation as leverage to secure a share of the country's wealth or impose its priorities at the expense of depositors.
Banque du Liban has previously clarified that the existing legal framework, particularly the 1986 law, places explicit restrictions on the use or disposal of its gold reserves. The gold therefore cannot be treated as an immediately available source of funding or automatically incorporated into the current financial restructuring plan.
The central bank has nevertheless left open the possibility of a future arrangement, subject to the necessary legislative authorization, under which part of its gold holdings could be converted into income-generating financial assets, such as long-term U.S. Treasury bonds.
Any returns generated through such an arrangement, however, would have to be used exclusively to cover the central bank’s share of its obligations to depositors. They could not be diverted to repay government debt, finance state projects or cover the liabilities of commercial banks.
This distinction lies at the heart of the current controversy. Amending the 1986 law to generate additional income for depositors is fundamentally different from using the legislative change to earmark billions of dollars for reconstruction.
The proposal to allocate $15 billion to the south would therefore undermine the very purpose that could justify amending the law: helping restore depositors’ rights. It also raises questions about how the government could persuade the public that opening the door to the use of gold is intended to address the deposit crisis if a substantial portion of the wealth is to be diverted to another purpose from the outset.
The debate is unfolding as officials discuss an initial framework to repay up to $100,000 to each depositor, calculated on the basis of their total deposits across all banks rather than separately for each account.
The proposed ceiling is expected to cover around 90% of depositors, with repayments to be made over four years. Payments already received under Banque du Liban Circulars 158 and 166, estimated at approximately $2 billion, would be deducted to prevent double counting.
Any remaining obligations within the $100,000 ceiling would then be repaid over five to six years through regular monthly installments.
The figures highlight the scale of the resources required to restore depositors’ savings and the importance of ensuring that any additional revenue generated from national assets serves that objective. Diverting billions of dollars from the gold reserves to other purposes while presenting their use as a solution to the deposit crisis would raise serious questions about the credibility of the entire restructuring process.
The proposal also raises broader questions about the state's responsibility for reconstruction. Why should the central bank's gold reserves bear the cost of rebuilding southern Lebanon? And should reconstruction become a means of relieving the state of its obligations or allowing one political faction to impose its priorities on the rest of the country?
Reconstruction and infrastructure projects financed with public money must be subject to transparency, oversight and accountability, particularly given Lebanon’s record of waste and corruption in public contracts and procurement.
Allocating billions of dollars to projects without a clear financing plan and strict oversight mechanisms could create further opportunities for mismanagement, especially if the funds are treated as political entitlements rather than national resources to be distributed according to public priorities and established criteria.
Ultimately, the gold reserves must not become the subject of a political bargain between depositors’ rights and the demands of influential factions. Any move to amend the 1986 law must be accompanied by clear guarantees that the objective is to protect and invest the country's gold wealth under strict legislative and institutional safeguards, generating revenue to help Banque du Liban meet its obligations to depositors.
Linking the amendment to a $15 billion allocation for reconstruction would instead turn the financial crisis into an opportunity to impose political conditions on the State, leaving depositors facing an unacceptable choice: accept the proposed bargain or continue to be deprived of their savings.