Diplomatic sources following international contacts say the risk of renewed conflict is growing as several Western capitals conclude that Lebanon has failed to make sufficient progress toward consolidating the state's monopoly over arms, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu enters a politically sensitive period in which security issues are expected to feature prominently.

The sources told Asas Media that none of the major regional or international players can confidently predict Lebanon's trajectory. The country's domestic political crisis remains deeply complicated, regional dynamics continue to evolve, and multiple scenarios remain possible.

One conclusion, however, appears to command broad international consensus: there is no longer any international willingness to accept the continued presence of Hezbollah's weapons in Lebanon, even if ending that reality requires a prolonged conflict and an extended period of attrition for the country.

According to the sources, Israel now believes time is working against it.

From the Israeli perspective, allowing the current situation in Lebanon to persist would effectively cement a security equation that it is no longer prepared to tolerate, particularly after concluding that two previous military campaigns failed to achieve their strategic objective of permanently resolving the issue of Hezbollah's arsenal.

Diplomats argue that the current situation can only be understood by tracing developments back to the 2024 war.

That conflict, they note, did not erupt without warning. It was preceded by repeated political and security messages delivered to Lebanese officials through several international channels.

The demands were clear: end Hezbollah's "support front" linked to the Gaza war, remove the group's military presence south of the Litani River, and fully implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701.

The fighting eventually ended with a ceasefire agreement that directly linked lasting calm to Lebanon entering a new phase in which the state would assume exclusive responsibility for security and the possession of weapons.

That vision was reinforced following the election of President Joseph Aoun and the formation of a government committed to restoring state authority and its monopoly over the use of force.

However, one year later, the gap between those commitments and their implementation had become increasingly evident.

Domestic political divisions, fragile power-sharing arrangements and broader regional complexities significantly slowed progress on the issue of Hezbollah's weapons.

Meanwhile, Israel repeatedly maintained that the ceasefire could not be considered successful as long as conditions on the ground remained fundamentally unchanged.

Diplomatic sources said several Western governments now view the coming autumn as one of the periods carrying the highest risk of renewed military escalation.

They stressed that this assessment does not necessarily mean a decision to go to war has already been made.

Rather, they said, many of the political and military conditions that preceded the previous two conflicts are once again taking shape.

Israel has publicly insisted that it expects full implementation of the framework agreement before withdrawing from occupied areas.

At the same time, much of the international community believes the Lebanese state's ability to establish exclusive control over weapons remains limited.

Meanwhile, Lebanon's fragmented political environment appears incapable of producing a rapid internal settlement, while Hezbollah continues to reject any solution based on externally imposed conditions.

According to the diplomatic sources, the greatest concern extends beyond the possibility of another conventional war.

Increasingly, diplomatic discussions focus on the prospect of Israel maintaining its military presence in southern Lebanon while continuing targeted strikes and simultaneously intensifying international pressure on Beirut to accelerate implementation of the security provisions contained in the framework agreement.

Such a scenario, they say, could expose Lebanon to sustained military pressure without a formal declaration of war.

Attention is also turning to the expected arrival of U.S. General Joseph Clearfield, who is set to lead a team of American military officers responsible for supervising implementation mechanisms and coordinating security arrangements.

Sources familiar with the process said Washington intends to assume a more direct role after concluding that previous monitoring mechanisms produced only limited results.

The prospect of greater U.S. involvement has also heightened concerns inside Lebanon.

Some political assessments warn that the country could face not only continued Israeli military operations but also growing domestic political and security unrest.

Such a scenario would place Lebanon under simultaneous pressure from two fronts: continued Israeli military action in the south and internal instability that could further weaken state institutions and undermine their ability to manage the crisis.

Diplomatic sources argue that the coming months will represent both a military and political test.

Success will depend on whether the Lebanese state can demonstrate that it is capable of implementing the commitments it has made, and whether Lebanon's political forces can develop a domestic consensus that prevents every security crisis from evolving into renewed internal confrontation.

If the 2024 war revolved around Hezbollah's weapons, and the 2026 conflict was fought under the same premise, diplomats say the central question is no longer simply whether fighting will resume in September.

Rather, it is whether Lebanon has succeeded, after two years of bloodshed and destruction, in addressing the underlying conditions repeatedly cited to justify military action.

For now, neither developments on the ground nor diplomatic assessments provide a reassuring answer.