Despite the American naval blockade and Western sanctions, the supply of vital components for Iran's military arsenal has not stopped, revealing a complex network of secret entities and shell companies that has enabled Tehran to import billions of dollars worth of equipment, explosives, and components for missiles and drones.

Iran has harnessed a military and financial network comprising 5,000 entities to bring in components, explosives, and heavy trucks essential for its drone and missile programs, with shipments reaching Iran by land, sea, and air even during the war.

A Reuters investigation concluded that Iran has established a global network of secret military entities to import equipment, explosives, and heavy trucks worth at least $2 billion since January 2025, circumventing the American naval blockade and Western sanctions.

These entities, operating in secrecy, bear names starting with the letters (WDJ), which is an abbreviation for the Iranian Ministry of Defense.

A Massive System

Moreover, over 5,000 entities form a massive financial and military system, with their financial transactions traceable in shipping bills and other import data dating back to 2016, some of which are linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and commercial groups known as "Bonyad," controlled by the Iranian elite.

In the 18 months from January 2025 to June 2026, a single entity among these, "WDJ 346428," imported massive quantities of rocket fuel, explosives, and essential weapon components for manufacturing drones and missiles, as well as heavy trucks that can be used as launch platforms. This equipment reached Iran by land, sea, and air, with records showing that a significant portion came from China, Russia, and Germany.

The investigation into the Iranian defense network relied on thousands of Iranian banking records, government documents, company registration papers, and import data.

All secret entities share a single address in Tehran, the same as the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, and these agencies list their establishment date as February 11, 1979, the day Ayatollah Khomeini took power in Iran after the overthrow of the Shah's regime.

However, records show that most of these entities were actually established in 2013, while Iran was suffering under sanctions that led to a decline in its crude oil exports and a collapse of its currency.

A Network of Fronts

These entities, identified by Reuters for the first time in collaboration with the Israeli-American risk consulting firm (240 Analytics), form the backbone of Iran's military procurement system and sanctions evasion. They manage a network of individuals acting as fronts and foreign shell companies, known as "trustees," who use proceeds from illicit oil sales to purchase goods on behalf of Iran.

The network is utilized by senior military leaders involved in Iran's ballistic missile and drone programs, as evidenced by phone numbers registered under 91 of these entities in the records of Sepah Bank, which has accounts for individuals from the Revolutionary Guard. Among them are at least two commanders accused by the United States of committing abuses against civilian protesters.

While the Iranian military has been subject to multiple American sanctions for decades, the analysis found no evidence that any of the entities mentioned in the documents have been listed on Western sanctions lists.

The arms import network has provided many of the raw materials Iran needs to manufacture missiles and drones. These weapons are responsible for Iran's ongoing precision attacks on energy facilities in the region.

A Lifeline for the Military Regime

Meyad Maleki, a former senior official at the U.S. Treasury who helped develop the U.S. sanctions program against Iran, stated, "What we see here is the military lifeline for the regime during this conflict and for many years before. This is the entire integrated system of the Iranian military's business operations."

Maleki was one of four experts on sanctions against Iran and weapons who reviewed the investigation's findings and confirmed that many of these materials could be used in Iran's missile and drone programs.

As part of tracking imports, a portion of nearly 19,000 import records was reviewed against shipping documents, social media clips, and official media reports. The data showed that almost all materials imported by Tehran were exempt from customs duties and specifically classified as military equipment.

Experts noted that many imports, even explosives, could be considered dual-use, and thus could also have civilian applications. Notably, the "Wall Street Journal" published a report on some shipments coming from China on September 23.

Iranians Residing Abroad

Money rarely crosses borders, as this could trigger an alert for sanctions violations. Instead, import data showed that 97% of shipments were settled "without money transfer," as trusted intermediaries among Iranians residing abroad purchased goods using funds deposited in foreign banks and then shipped them to Iran.

Among the entities obtaining their needs through this network is the military unit overseeing Iran's ballistic missile programs, including Tondar Sahra Company (Desert Thunder), which was sanctioned by Washington in 2024 for manufacturing and supplying drones to Russia that caused devastation in Ukraine.

According to import databases during the first six months of this year, shipments included detonators worth $1.9 million, tons of explosives, aircraft engine parts, rocket fuel components, and heavy launch vehicles. Experts in weapons and sanctions stated that all these materials could be used as key components for manufacturing and launching ballistic missiles and drones, including Shahed drones.

Path of Iran's Imports

Additionally, imports entered Iran on cargo ships across the Caspian Sea from Russia, by trucks from Central Asia, and on cargo planes from China, according to import data and documents obtained by Reuters.

In response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that it is "not aware of the situation you describe." It added, "We strongly reject attempts to maliciously link the fighting in the region to China or to defame China," while the Russian Ministry of Defense, the U.S. Treasury, the White House, and U.S. Central Command did not respond to requests for comment.

In addition to individual components, Iran purchases precision machines that can be used to manufacture its military equipment independently. Purchases include materials classified as advanced computer-controlled lathes, electron beam furnaces, and particle accelerators, according to import data covering the period up to June. All this equipment has industrial uses and can also be used in manufacturing military equipment, including drone and missile structures.

Stock Renewal During War

Confidential shipping documents and recent import data were also reviewed, alongside the Iranian company registry, to reveal the extent of the network and how it enabled Iran to renew its stockpiles during the war, showing that one entity, identified as "WDJ 346428," has purchases dating back to 2016.

Purchases by "WDJ 346428" from abroad steadily increased over the years, from $442 million in the twelve months ending March 2023 to $989 million in the following year, according to customs statistics published by Iranian media. This placed the entity among the top ten importers in Iran.

The investigation found that "WDJ 346428" imported military equipment worth $2.3 billion from January 2025 to June 2026, along with 886 tons of chemicals through the Iranian port complex of Bandar Abbas, with data indicating that the origin of these materials is China, and they fall under a customs category that includes sodium chlorate and other types of perchlorates, which are key raw materials in the production of solid rocket fuel. Three days after the last shipment arrived, a massive explosion rocked the port, killing at least 70 people and injuring more than 1,200.

In addition to components that can be used in rocket fuel manufacturing, data also show that Iran imports heavy trucks, which the military uses as camouflaged mobile launch platforms for missiles and drones.

Even as the war intensified and a blockade was imposed on Iranian ships, the Iranian military continued to bring in materials from abroad. According to the data, monthly import volumes initially dropped by 47% to $54 million in March compared to the previous month, but rose to $77 million by May.

Imports did not come solely from Russia and China; companies in the European Union, which has imposed sanctions on the Iranian Ministry of Defense, also shipped goods to the Iranian military.

Import data showed that trucks and aircraft engine components and electronics worth hundreds of millions of dollars, including Iveco trucks valued at $34 million, all came from Germany and other places in the European Union, and all their documents were listed under the name "WDJ 346428."