Lebanon’s government says it remains committed to carrying out the second phase of its plan to bring Hezbollah’s weapons under State control, but disagreement over where the next stage should begin is threatening to delay the process.

The dispute comes as Beirut seeks to move the Lebanese army into areas considered among Hezbollah’s most important strongholds, while Israel has categorically rejected such a move and the first phase of the disarmament plan has yet to be completed.

The second phase is expected to extend beyond the area south of the Litani River into territory containing key Hezbollah logistical infrastructure, including major tunnels and military facilities. Experts say the phase could prove decisive in determining whether the state can ultimately complete the broader disarmament plan.

The area beyond the Litani is the real test of the plan, as military considerations increasingly intersect with negotiations over its implementation.

Retired Brig. Gen. Joseph al-Asmar, a military and strategic affairs expert, told Erem  News that it would be difficult to implement the second phase before the first had been completed.

According to al-Asmar, the second phase would cover the area stretching from the Litani River to the Awali River, a strategically important part of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure that includes large tunnels, key military installations and what he described as the group’s “last line of defense.”

The area also contains two major Palestinian refugee camps, Ain al-Hilweh and Mieh Mieh, adding another layer of complexity to the operation.

Al-Asmar said that even the implementation of the second phase within its planned four-month timetable would not by itself be sufficient to complete the disarmament process.

If the first phase is successfully carried out, he said, the remaining stages would be considerably easier. The third phase would extend into Beirut and its suburbs, which he described as the core of Hezbollah’s strength, as well as the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila and the tunnel networks in those areas.

That stage, he said, should serve as a starting point for implementing the broader plan, known as the “Homeland Shield Plan.”

The fourth phase would extend from the Bekaa Valley to the Syrian border, encompassing Hezbollah weapons depots and military facilities as well as multiple smuggling routes. Al-Asmar described that stage as relatively straightforward.

The fifth and final phase would cover northern Lebanon and the rest of the country and would be easier still, he said.

Al-Asmar argued that completing the first phase would provide a strong foundation for the disarmament process, while success in the second or third phases would be critical to placing all weapons under the authority of Lebanon’s legitimate security forces.

He said the successive stages were essential to restoring Lebanon’s sovereignty to its state institutions and allowing economic development to resume.

But he also said Hezbollah was unlikely to cooperate because, in his assessment, the group no longer had full control over the decision-making process.

For that reason, al-Asmar said, the framework negotiations remain the only viable path toward achieving the disarmament of Hezbollah.

He also argued that Lebanon currently has no military force capable of confronting Israel and that the country had already lost the war launched from its territory, leaving Beirut with a weak position internationally despite what he described as a refusal to acknowledge those defeats.

Dispute Over Where the Phase Should Start

Military and strategic affairs expert Marcel Balouki said a separate dispute was holding up the second phase, with the Lebanese government insisting that it include the areas around Bint Jbeil and Khiam.

The preparatory arrangements for the phase remain unclear and, in practice, have stalled, Balouki said.

Israel, he added, wants the process to begin from the Bayada area near the city of Tyre, a position that has prevented the sides from reaching an agreement.

He said Hezbollah was also continuing to reject implementation of the second phase.

The process, Balouki argued, is closely tied to the broader security situation: escalation would come first, followed by de-escalation and the implementation of measures agreed as part of a new round of negotiations.

The disagreement over the second phase therefore goes beyond a question of timing. It reflects a deeper dispute over the geographic limits of the Lebanese army's authority and the areas where it will ultimately be expected to confront Hezbollah's military infrastructure.

For Beirut, the territory north of the Litani represents the decisive test of whether the state can extend its authority into areas where Hezbollah has maintained some of its most important military and logistical assets.

For Israel, however, the proposed deployment remains unacceptable, leaving the next step dependent not only on Lebanon’s ability to implement its own plan but also on the outcome of negotiations aimed at preventing a renewed escalation.