The history of attempts to resolve the conflict between Israel and Lebanon has been marked by repeated false dawns. Each round of fighting has typically been followed by some form of agreement, often even a UN Security Council resolution to give it an international stamp of approval, only for hostilities to resume at some point. The common denominator has been the failure to implement what had been agreed. What has always complicated matters is that Israel’s conflict has not been with the Lebanese government but with non-state actors: until 1982, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and since then, Hezbollah. In both cases, their hostility has been directed not only against Israel but also against the Lebanese state.

In the latest attempt to achieve a lasting settlement and bring an end to hostilities along this troubled border, Israel, Lebanon, and the US signed a tripartite framework deal in Washington last week. The agreement seeks to address the core issues underlying the conflict. Significantly, however, Hezbollah, which whether by consent or coercion must cooperate if the agreement is to succeed, is not a party to it, which must serve as the first spoiler alert. The movement immediately mobilized its supporters in Beirut to protest against the deal, and its leader, Naim Qassem, rejected the framework, describing it as “humiliating, shameful, and a surrender of sovereignty.”

In Israel, there has been relatively restrained criticism of the agreement’s principles. Nevertheless, skepticism remains widespread, including within the security establishment, over whether the framework can be translated into reality.

The text, as released by the US State Department, conveys a strong sense of aspiration, but offers far less clarity on the practical pathway to implementation. It is aspirational in that it sets out a clear objective: “Israel and Lebanon affirm the right of each state to exist in peace, and their mutual desire to live in security as neighboring sovereign states.”

At a time when the region is being ravaged by war and instability, the very fact that the Lebanese and Israeli governments have engaged in direct negotiations is encouraging. Credit is due to the two governments and to the US administration for investing considerable diplomatic capital in an effort to end the hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, a conflict in which so many innocent civilians have been caught in the crossfire, many have lost their lives, and more than a million have been displaced. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun has shown great courage by pursuing this initiative, despite knowing that it has placed a target on his back for Hezbollah and its backers in Tehran.

The parameters for reaching the ultimate goal of peace are, on paper, almost self-explanatory, but implementing them will be far from straightforward. The first step outlined in the agreement is mutual recognition of each other’s sovereignty. Yet as long as Israel continues to occupy significant areas of Lebanese territory, without any timetable for withdrawal, that principle remains largely theoretical.
To be sure, Israel’s legitimate security concerns must also be addressed for this deal to be sustainable. The agreement envisages this through a “sequenced process with clear conditions,” under which the Lebanese Armed Forces would “restore effective sovereign authority over all Lebanese territory.” In principle, this is entirely reasonable. In practice, however, it introduces the largest obstacle of all: the requirement for the “verified disarmament of non-state armed groups and dismantlement of associated infrastructure.” 

The obvious target is Hezbollah, although not exclusively. The agreement seeks to end the long-standing anomaly whereby Hezbollah possesses the country’s most powerful military force, one that is stronger in many respects than the official Lebanese Armed Forces, which currently lack the capability to control, let alone dismantle the group’s military infrastructure. Moreover, Hezbollah’s central raison d’etre has long been armed resistance against Israel, and without it they will lose a considerable amount of relevance and will need to reinvent themselves.

Only last week the Israeli military reportedly demolished a large underground Hezbollah facility beneath the southern Lebanese village of Majdal Zoun. The complex reportedly extended some 200 meters and reached depths of more than 25 meters beneath the village. According to reports, the tunnel was used to assemble, store, and launch Iranian-made drones.

Yet the agreement offers no convincing answer to the central question: What incentives, pressures or guarantees could persuade Hezbollah to transform itself into a purely political and social movement, relinquish its weapons, and prioritize the interests of Lebanon and its own supporters over those of Tehran? Without a credible response to that question, there can be no clear answer as to when Israel will fully withdraw from Lebanese territory, where it currently occupies up to 7 percent of the country.

Notably, the agreement avoids using the word “withdrawal.” Instead, it refers to Israel “progressively redeploying out of Lebanese territory.” In the immediate future, this would apply only to two pilot zones, allowing the Lebanese Armed Forces to assume control there before any broader redeployment. However, unless there is an accelerated process combining Israeli withdrawal with the rapid deployment of Lebanese troops all the way to the international border and supported by a robust international force, Israel’s military presence risks becoming semi-permanent. That, in turn, would provide Hezbollah with a continuing excuse for refusing to disarm.

As could only be expected, many within Israel’s security establishment, alongside right-wing politicians, argue that Israel should retain this so-called security zone indefinitely, insisting that without it the country’s northern communities cannot be adequately protected. While these concerns are understandable, and with the exception of a small but vocal group of politicians promoting the lunatic idea of establishing Israeli settlements in southern Lebanon, the Israeli government should be prepared to take calculated risks in support of its Lebanese counterpart. By withdrawing in coordination with Beirut, it could help undermine Hezbollah’s central narrative of resisting Israeli occupation and expansionism.

By immediately declaring, as Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz did, that Israel has “no territorial ambitions in Lebanon,” while simultaneously insisting that the Israeli military will not withdraw “a millimeter” until Hezbollah is fully disarmed, he may have sought to project strength, particularly with a general election approaching. Yet such rhetoric does little to advance the newly signed framework.

Despite employing overwhelming military force that has senselessly killed thousands of Lebanese civilians and caused widespread devastation across southern Lebanon, Israel has not achieved its objective of eliminating Hezbollah. Unless it intends to maintain a prolonged military presence in Lebanon, Israel should work closely with the Lebanese government, the US, and the wider international community to transform this framework agreement into a fully fledged, practical, and durable reality along the Israeli-Lebanese border. The alternative is another quagmire of guerrilla warfare that will only serve Hezbollah and Iran.