I had previously questioned the depth of Tehran’s relationship with Bashar al-Assad, as he considered it his pillar of support. It saved him in 2014 but failed after ten years.

In the final weeks of his life, Hafez al-Assad decided in March 2000 to negotiate with Israel. He was in a hurry, wanting to resolve outstanding issues before handing power to Bashar. Despite his illness, he flew to Geneva and negotiated with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak through the mediator, US President Bill Clinton. The draft agreement was about regaining the occupied Golan Heights without addressing the Palestinian state. The Israelis, aware of Bashar’s grooming for leadership, were not confident he would take power given the hidden conflicts. Hafez died ten weeks after the Geneva meeting.

Bashar did not return to negotiations until protests erupted against him in 2011. Netanyahu remained skeptical of Bashar’s ability to sever ties with Tehran and Hezbollah and refused.
One of the key reasons for the longevity of Hafez al-Assad’s regime was his ability to manage foreign relations with his adversaries.

He refrained from confronting Israel after the 1973 defeat, whereas Bashar integrated Syria into the Iranian “Revolutionary Guard Empire,” making it inevitably a target for destruction later.

Why did Hafez not sign a peace agreement with Israel, despite having secret coordination with it? His closest ally, the late Abdul Halim Khaddam, mentioned that Hafez feared it would be said that the Alawite minority signed peace with the enemy.

And what about his confrontations with Israel through Lebanon? In reality, Syria did not launch attacks on Israel during its 30 years in Lebanon. Instead, it acted as a military force to curb the activities of Palestinian factions, and later Hezbollah to a lesser extent, until Bashar expanded the risks. Hafez’s strategy was to take control of Lebanon as long as Israel occupied the Golan. He used it as a bargaining chip with Arab states and played the role of mediator in the abduction of Western hostages.

Using the same policy of getting close to the fire without being burned, he gave Turkish Kurds refuge, but when Ankara threatened him, he stopped and indirectly handed over their leader.

Hafez’s relationship with Iran must be understood as complex. He used it for geopolitical balance against his enemy Saddam Hussein to prevent the Damascus regime’s fall. He leveraged Tehran to enhance his significance in Riyadh and repeatedly played roles in easing tensions with Tehran.

After the 1996 Khobar bombing, he handed over some Saudi fugitives when it was revealed the cell had hidden in Damascus. On the other hand, he facilitated the escape of its leader to Tehran.

In trying to understand the relationship, Khaddam spoke about Hafez al-Assad’s policy toward Iran. When Rafsanjani came in 1985 seeking al-Assad’s support in their war against Iraq, like a skilled Iranian merchant, he tried to convince him that the reward for their alliance upon defeating Saddam would strengthen Syria’s position against Turkey, Israel, and Iraq. Khaddam said Hafez was cautious about overextending the alliance amid the region’s shifting sands.

There is no doubt that one of the reasons for Bashar al-Assad’s regime’s fall was his failure to manage foreign policy, especially his alliance with Iran. While Hafez built a strong relationship with Khomeini’s regime, understanding its importance, he refused to participate in its war. Yet, like Israel and Libya, he secretly Scud missiles to Iran.

As for Bashar, at the start of his presidency, he gave the impression to everyone that he had shifted his orientation westward, away from Moscow and Tehran. It wasn’t long before everyone who had initially supported him – Saudi Arabia, Spain, France, and the United States – realized the truth.

Early in his alliance with Iran, Bashar planned to seize control of Lebanon’s decision-making process by assassinating Rafik Hariri and numerous leaders, turning Hezbollah into the sole ruler in Lebanon after the expulsion of Assad’s forces.

Bashar then dared to open his southern borders to armed groups to attack the new regime in Baghdad, which was under Washington’s protection. This justified neighboring countries like Jordan and Turkey opening their borders to Syrian rebels against him in 2012, ultimately leading to his regime’s downfall.

Alliances can be understood in the context of regional conflict, considering Hafez’s strong relationship with Tehran as a significant player, and similarly Bashar’s. However, the latter became deeply involved in its wars in Lebanon and Iraq. Khaddam says Bashar made a fateful decision to fully merge with Tehran in 2011. My opinion, as I mentioned earlier, is that his involvement in Tehran’s wars started years earlier. Was Bashar’s rise to power supported extraordinarily by Tehran which pushed him to always act as an agent like Hezbollah? Very few know what happened between 2000 and 2024.