Nearly two years after Bashar al-Assad fled Syria and his government collapsed, former officers and members of the country’s military and security apparatus appear to be rebuilding networks across neighboring Lebanon, according to Lebanese investigations and information obtained by Al-Modon.

The networks include former officers from several branches of the Syrian army and security services, with activities ranging from smuggling and sheltering people to training and efforts to reconnect former military personnel, according to the information.

A Lebanese investigation launched in early September led to the arrest of at least five people, including a former Syrian Air Force Intelligence colonel. The case focuses on a network accused of smuggling people from Syria into Lebanon, housing them and training some of them before sending them back into Syria.

The investigation has yet to determine the full size of the network or establish definitively who is directing it.

But information obtained by Al-Modon points to a broader structure that may extend well beyond the group uncovered by Lebanese authorities.

A source familiar with developments in the area said former officers from different branches of the Syrian military and security establishment—including the Air Force, Air Force Intelligence and the Fourth Division—are spread across several parts of Lebanon.

According to the source, senior officers hold periodic meetings in isolated locations and on heavily guarded farms, while former military personnel have been brought together through networks built on relationships that predated the fall of the Assad government.

The source said some members of these groups had received training and claimed that individuals from Iraq had joined networks operating in Lebanon.

He also said senior officers had been able to re-establish contact with personnel who previously served under their command.

“With one phone, every general can gather hundreds of men,” the source said.

The claim cannot be independently verified, and there are no reliable figures on the number of former Syrian officers and personnel involved in such networks.

But it highlights a critical aspect of the Assad government’s collapse: while its institutions fell, the personal relationships and chains of loyalty built over decades did not necessarily disappear.

A military headquarters can be abandoned, but the officers who worked there retain telephone numbers, personal connections and relationships with those who once served under them.

Lebanon becomes a base

Former Syrian officers, soldiers, intelligence personnel and others associated with the Assad government began crossing into Lebanon soon after Damascus fell on December 8, 2024.

Some entered through illegal border crossings, while others used forged documents or false identities. Former officers later appeared in Akkar, the Bekaa Valley, Beirut and its southern suburbs.

Others left for third countries, while a number of senior former officials and officers settled in Russia.

At first, their movement appeared to be part of a mass flight from Syria.

The collapse of the government had left many former officials facing possible prosecution over allegations linked to killings, torture and enforced disappearances.

But information that later emerged suggested that Lebanon was becoming more than a temporary refuge.

The country’s long border with Syria and its extensive network of illegal crossings made movement relatively easy. More importantly, the Syrian government had spent decades building political and security networks inside Lebanon.

The long-standing political and military alliance between Damascus and Hezbollah also created environments that some former regime figures believed would offer them protection.

According to the information obtained by Al-Modon, areas including the Bekaa Valley, Akkar and Beirut’s southern suburbs gradually developed into locations used for communication, residence and movement.

What initially appeared to be scattered fugitives may instead include small, interconnected groups operating through smuggling routes, safe houses, limited but regular funding, difficult-to-trace telephone numbers, vehicles and specialized training.

Syria’s coast a potential target

The source told Al-Modon that the networks were focused on preparations that could destabilize Syria’s coastal region.

He claimed that former regime officers were seeking to build up groups equipped with heavy weapons, explosives and snipers, describing the effort as part of preparations for guerrilla warfare.

The source also alleged that officers close to Assad and based in Moscow were supporting the effort.

Those claims have not been independently verified.

But Syria’s coastal region remains particularly vulnerable following the violence that erupted there in March 2025, when groups loyal to Assad attacked security forces.

The violence was followed by widespread killings of Alawite civilians, turning the region into a scene of fear and revenge and leaving deep wounds in local communities.

Any renewed effort to activate armed networks there could therefore have consequences far beyond individual attacks.

The region does not require a large military force to remain unstable. Small groups of trained fighters, explosives, snipers, drones, smuggling routes and limited funding could be enough to keep security forces under constant pressure.

The objective may not necessarily be to restore Assad to power.

Instead, such networks could seek to create a prolonged state of instability, exhaust Syria’s security forces through scattered attacks and maintain the coastal region as a potential pressure point.

Low-ranking soldiers face arrest as senior officers disappear

The emergence of these networks has also exposed a sharp contrast between former low-ranking military personnel and the senior officers who once commanded them.

In Lebanon, former soldiers and junior members of the Assad-era military and security apparatus face the constant risk of arrest or deportation.

Some work as drivers or laborers, while others remain inside their homes to avoid detection.

Lebanon has carried out a series of arrests involving former Syrian military and security personnel who entered the country illegally, while Lebanese courts have begun examining cases involving the possible handover of some wanted individuals to Damascus.

One of the starkest examples is a former Fourth Division driver detained by Lebanese General Security who has a tattoo of Bassel al-Assad on his chest and now faces possible deportation to Syria.

The contrast is clear.

Lower-ranking personnel are easier to find and have fewer resources to hide.

Senior officers, by comparison, often have money, connections, documents and protection networks. They can move between countries and retain influence over people who once served under their command.

The collapse of the Assad government has therefore reversed the old hierarchy.

Those at the bottom of the system have become the most exposed, while those who once stood at the top may be better equipped to disappear—or reorganize.

The Air Force Intelligence connection

The arrest of a former Air Force Intelligence colonel has also drawn renewed attention to one of the most powerful institutions of the Assad era.

Air Force Intelligence was not simply a branch of Syria’s conventional Air Force command.

Under the Assad family, it developed into a powerful security apparatus with investigation, operational and detention branches. It operated facilities including those linked to Mezzeh Military Airport and became associated with allegations of enforced disappearances, torture and killings in detention.

The agency gained exceptional influence under Hafez al-Assad, who came from the Air Force, and expanded further under Bashar al-Assad, particularly after the uprising that began in 2011.

Its structure was built around secrecy, compartmentalized information, indirect communication, intermediaries and networks of informants.

That background gives the appearance of former officers from the agency in clandestine networks outside Syria particular significance.

Unlike personnel from a conventional military institution, intelligence officers were trained and operated within systems designed to function through secret communications and informal networks.