The main conclusion that can be drawn a year after the "Al-Aqsa Flood" operation in the Gaza Envelope and the launch of the “support” war from Lebanon, is that this "flood" has drowned those behind it. Hamas has been reduced to Yahya Sinwar and his small entourage; Hezbollah has lost Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah after losing many of its first, second, and perhaps third-rank officials.

A year after the October 7 operation, Hamas has lost its stronghold in the Gaza Strip, where residents’ only concern is securing food, water, and shelter. They are certainly not preoccupied with the ideas, doctrines, and goals of political Islam. As for Hezbollah's base, it has become all but homeless after around one million people were displaced from the South, the Bekaa, and the southern suburbs of Beirut because of the policies the party has pursued for decades.

The "flood" also hurt the two organizations’ primary patron, which may have planned the operation; indeed, though there is no concrete evidence to that effect, the political and military trajectories of the past two years point in that direction. Iran has lost two of its proxies in the region simultaneously. Hezbollah, its leading proxy, is being dealt rapid, lethal blows that will be difficult to recover from. As for Hezbollah’s Hamas, its defeat deprived the Sunni branch of political Islam allied with Iran of a key military asset.

None have suffered more from the "flood" and the war it sparked than the Palestinian people, especially the residents of the Gaza Strip which has been completely destroyed, and the Lebanese people. The aftermath of the October 7 operation has rattled the relationship between the United States and its strategic ally Israel, because of Israel's failure to appropriately carry out its role as a US vassal that safeguards American interests in the region.

Moreover, Benjamin Netanyahu's radical right-wing government has undermined US policy objectives in the region, and his obstinance has forced Washington to intervene directly, sending money, weapons, and fleets to protect Israel.

Diplomacy and its role in the region have also drowned in this “flood.” Diplomacy has failed to address major issues, and we have only seen tactical initiatives focused on reviving stalled negotiations, reaching a ceasefire (that remains elusive), and ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid and relief.

After the Gaza war and the support front turned into a direct conflict between Iran and Israel, the focus of diplomacy, especially US diplomacy, shifted to averting a major conflict between the two countries that would drag the United States in and further undermine its already strained relations with Russia and China, further complicating matters for the US in Ukraine and Taiwan.

Regardless of whether Netanyahu is right to take the battle to what he considers the mastermind and instigator of conflicts in the region, and to take a belligerent approach to pushing back against Iran, diplomacy has deviated from its path. The diplomatic course primarily entails developing arrangements for ending the wars in Gaza and Lebanon and paving the way for settlements and negotiations that lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state, which is a necessary prerequisite for undermining Iran’s influence in the region by depriving it of its ability to claim that it is the ultimate backer of the Palestinian and the resistance.

Netanyahu and his hardline government claim that through their emphasis on security in addressing every problem with the Palestinians and the Gaza Strip, as well as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran, they are fighting alongside the camp of peace and moderation in its battle against the Axis of Resistance, religious extremism, the sponsor of non-state actors and their destabilizing roles that have undermined nation-states.

It is difficult to deny the existence of these two camps. However, at the same time, it is also crucial that we keep in mind what Israel has become, especially under Netanyahu's government. In Israel, the camp of religious and ideological extremists and fanatics is gaining the upper hand over the camp it claims to defend and belong to.

The conundrum presented by Israel does not negate the need to eliminate the non-state actors that make political decisions in several countries, can expand, and are increasingly shaping regional policies at the expense of states.

On the other hand, the split between the two camps is also reflected domestically, with local dynamics between the camps diverging in each country. Iran is dealing with splits within the regime, despite its bravado and self-assurance. The recent setbacks Hezbollah has faced mirror what is happening inside Iran.

Israel is also dealing with domestic divisions and long-standing disputes between extremists and moderates, religious and secular parties, among the religious groups themselves, as well as advocates of peace and a two-state solution, and proponents of annexation and the expulsion of the Palestinians.

After the wars in Gaza and Lebanon, the scene has become more complicated. Skepticism about the role and strength of the United States is growing. That strengthens the position of those who argue against relying on the Americans at a time when Russia’s influence is fading and its effectiveness is diminishing, and when China has refrained from intervening, opting to sit and watch.

Finding solutions will be challenging. It begins with allowing states to take back their roles by ending the hegemony of militias. This outcome is becoming a real possibility after having been a mirage, especially if the alliance of minorities crumbles. We also have reason to hope that religious Zionism could collapse in Israel.

States retrieving their roles would allow for addressing the region's problems and conflicts through regional initiatives sponsored by moderate Arab states. Maybe that could make US diplomacy more effective.